Skip to main content
Log in

Models Rule, OK? A Reply to Fetzer

  • Published:
Minds and Machines Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Barwise, Jon (1993), ‘Everyday Reasoning and Logical Inference’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, pp. 337–338.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braine, Martin D. S., and O'Brien, David P. (1991), ‘A Theory of If: A Lexical Entry, Reasoning Program, and Pragmatic Principles’, Psychological Review 98, pp. 182–203.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, Ruth M. J. (1996), ‘Towards a Model Theory of Imaginary Thinking’, in Jane Oakhill and Alan Garnham, (eds.), Mental Models in Cognitive Science: Essays in Honour of Phil Johnson-Laird, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 155–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, Ruth M. J., and Handley, Simon J. (in press), ‘Reasoning Strategies for Suppositional Deductions’, Cognition

  • Fetzer, James H. (1993), ‘The Argument for Mental Models Is Unsound’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, pp. 347–348.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fetzer, James H. (1998), ‘Deduction and Mental Models’, Minds and Machines 8: 000–000.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garnham, Alan, and Oakhill, Jane V. (1996), ‘The Mental Models Theory of Language Comprehension’, in Bruce K. Britton and Arthur C. Graesser (eds.), Models of Understanding Text, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 313–339.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1997), ‘Rules and Illusions: A Critical Study of Rips's’ The Psychology of Proof', Minds and Machines 7: 387–407.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Bell, Victoria A. (1997), ‘A Model Theory of Modal Reasoning’, Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (Stanford University), Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 349–353.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Byrne, Ruth M. J. (1991), Deduction, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Goldvarg, Yevgeniya (1997), ‘How to Make the Impossible Seem Possible’, Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (Stanford University), Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 354–357.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P. N.; Legrenzi, Paolo; Girotto, Vittorio; Legrenzi, Maria S.; and Caverni, Jean-Paul (1997), ‘Naive Probability: A Model Theory of Extensional Reasoning’, under submission.

  • Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Savary, Fabien (1996), ‘Illusory Inferences about Probabilities’, Acta Psychologica, 93, pp. 69–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Savary, Fabien (1997), ‘Truth and Illusory Deductions’, under submission.

  • Marr, David (1982), Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Osherson, Daniel N. (1974–1976), Logical Ability in Children, Volumes 1–4, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Partee, Barbara H. (1979), ‘Semantics-Mathematics or Psychology?’, in Rainer Bauerle, Urs Egli, and Arnim von Stechow (eds.), Semantics from Different Points of View, Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, Willard Van Orman (1974), Methods of Logic; 3rd edition. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rips, Lance (1994), The Psychology of Proof. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J. Models Rule, OK? A Reply to Fetzer. Minds and Machines 9, 111–118 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008381700909

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008381700909

Keywords

Navigation