Abstract
In a recent paper, Gregor Betz has defended the value-free ideal: “the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. moral or political) values”against the methodological critique, by reference to the work of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This paper argues that Betz’s defence is unsuccessful. First, Betz’s argument is sketched, and it is shown that the IPCC does not avoid the need to “translate” claims. In Section 2, it is argued that Betz mischaracterises the force of the methodological critique. Section 3 shows why the methodological critique still applies to the work of the IPCC even on a refined version of Betz’s argument. Section 4 then considers an alternative way of defending the work of the IPCC which is in-line with, but does not clearly vindicate, the value-free ideal.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
All subsequent page number references are to this paper unless otherwise stated.
An important aspect of Betz’s article is that he very clearly distinguishes between logical and moral versions of the methodological critique, (pp.209–211): I agree completely with everything he says on this topic, so say nothing more on it in this paper.
Suggesting, for example, in response to a case suggested by Heather Douglas that “rather than opting for a single interpretation of the ambiguous data, scientists can make the uncertainty explicit through working with ranges of observational values” (p.212).
In further support of this proposal, and to show it does not rely specifically on the possibility of statistical testing, consider the case of the law (from where the concept of “beyond reasonable doubt” originates). If the only way of ensuring that our claims are “beyond reasonable doubt” is to adopt “hedged” rather than “plain” claims, then we could not make sense of how jurors could ever reasonably declare a defendant “guilty”.
For a more fleshed out version of such a case, see Douglas, 2000.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of argument
Dropping the notion of “beyond reasonable doubt” from Betz’s arguments might seem to collapse his claims into those suggested by Richard Jeffrey in earlier debates over inductive risk (Jeffrey, 1956), but this would overlook how Betz goes well beyond Jeffrey in his understanding of our options for assessing and communicating uncertainty.
Wilholt, 2013, p.239 provides a nice summary of this problem, albeit in the context of providing an alternative response to the methodological critique.
In this context, consider the controversy over the Fourth Assessment Report’s mistaken projection for melting of Himalayan ice caps, which arose from reliance on non-peer-reviewed sources (Pearce, 2010).
The following example relies heavily on O’Reilly et al. 2012.
I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for making me aware of the need to clarify my position on these issues.
See, for example, Cranor (1993)
This may seem rather strange, but note an interesting parallel with legal contexts here: courts which convict only when it is “beyond reasonable doubt” that some individual committed a crime might be thought to act in ways which reflect a concern with knowledge. Clearly, however, even if this is true, we might still seek to justify the importance of knowledge in this context by appeal to (broadly) moral considerations. I suggest, tentatively, that a similar two-level structure may be in place in the case of thinking through the role of non-epistemic values in science. This structure may, however, seem to raise a new question (suggested by an anonymous referee): if non-epistemic values are what ultimately justifies a practice which can be described as aiming at an epistemic good, then hasn’t one conceded that the relevant practice is, in some sense, value-laden (with non-epistemic values)? This is a tricky question which goes beyond the scope of this paper, but note that there seems to be a difference between saying that non-epistemic values should govern decisions within a practice and appealing to non-epistemic values to justify that practice as worthwhile. By analogy, note that one might hold an ultra-positivist account of science, which banishes any role for non-epistemic values from its proper practice, but still hold that such a practice should be pursued because ultimately it produces technological goods of significant practical utility. It would, I suggest, be strange to say a proponent of such a view denies the “Value Free Ideal”.
I am grateful to two anonymous referees for unusually helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Anna Alexandrova, Shahar Avin and Charlotte Goodburn for discussion of related issues. I also thank all of the final-year undergraduate students in HPS, Cambridge, who attended my seminars on the work of the IPCC and acted as an excellent first audience for the ideas presented above.
References
Betz, G. (2013). In defence of the value free ideal”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 3, 207–220.
Biddle, J. (2013). State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 44, 124–133.
Coady, D and Corry (2013)R The climate change debate: an epistemic and ethical inquiry (London: Palgrave Macmillan)
Cranor, C. (1993). Regulating Toxic Substances. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Douglas, H. (2000). Inductive risk and values in science”. Philosophy of Science, 67(4), 559–579.
Douglas, H. (2009). Science, policy and the value free ideal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Elliott, K. (2011). Is a little pollution good for you? London: Oxford University Press.
Hansen, J (2007) “Scientific reticence and sea level rise” Environmental Research Letters 2 (2) (April-June 2007)
IPCC (2013a) “Activities” web-page at http://www.ipcc.ch/activities/activities.shtml#.UgpPoW1Jp-w (accessed 13 August, 2013)
IPCC (2013b) “Principles and procedures” web-page at http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_procedures.shtml#.UgpQg21Jp-w (accessed 13 August, 2013)
Jeffrey, R. (1956). Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses. Philosophy of Science, 23(3), 237–246.
O’Reilly, J., Oreskes, N., & Oppenheimer, M. (2012). “The rapid disintegration of consensus: the West Antarctic Ice Sheets and the International Panel on Climate Change”. Social Studies of Science, 42, 709–731.
Pearce, F (2010) “Debate heats up over IPCC melting glaciers claim” New Scientist 2743; 16th January 2010
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steele, K. (2012). The scientist qua policy advisor makes value judgments”. Philosophy of Science, 79(05), 893–904.
Wilholt, T. (2013). Epistemic trust in science”. British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 64, 233–253.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
John, S. The example of the IPCC does not vindicate the Value Free Ideal: a reply to Gregor Betz. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 5, 1–13 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-014-0095-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-014-0095-4