Abstract
We often face a bewildering array of different explanations for the same social facts (e.g. biological, psychological, economic, and historical accounts). But we have few guidelines for whether and when we should think of different accounts as competing or compatible. In this paper, I offer some guidelines for understanding when custom or norm accounts do and don’t compete with other types of accounts. I describe two families of non-competing accounts: (1) explanations of different (but similarly described) facts, and (2) accounts which seem to differ but are really different parts or versions of the same underlying explanation. I argue that, while many types of apparent competitors don’t really compete with customs, there are some that do. I also describe some of the central problems, which suggest that custom accounts will compete poorly with their rivals.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Armstrong D. (1980) A theory of universals universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Audi, P. (2009). An argument against disjunctive properties. http://www.paulaudi.net/Audi_Disjunctive_Properties.pdf.
Bechtel W., Mundale J. (1999) Multiple realizability revisited. Linking cognitive and neural states. Philosophy of Science 66: 175–207
Bennett J. (1988) Events and their names. Hackett, Indianapolis
Bontly T. D. (2005) Exclusion, overdetermination, and the nature of causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30: 261–282
Castelfranchi, C., Rosaria, C., & Paolucci, M. (1998). Normative reputation and the costs of compliance. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 1(3), http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS/1/3/3.html.
Churchland P. (2005) Functionalism at forty: A critical retrospective. Journal of Philosophy 102(1): 33–50
Coser L. (1956) The Functions of Social Conflict. Free Press, Glencoe, IL
Craver C. (2007) Explaining the brain. Oxford University Press, New York
Derkse W. (1992) On simplicity and elegance. Eburon, Delft
Durkheim E. (1982) Rules of the sociological method. The Free Press, New York
Freud S. (1990) Beyond the pleasure principle. Norton, New York
Gibbs J. (1968) The Study of Norms. In: Sills D. (eds) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (vol 11). Macmillan, New York
Hall E. (1976) Beyond culture. Anchor Books, New York
Hall N. (2008) Causation. In: Jackson F., Smith M. (eds) The oxford handbook of contemporary philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 505–533
Harford T. (2008) The logic of life: The rational economics of an irrational world. Random House, New York
Henderson D. (2005) Norms, invariance, and explanatory relevance. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35: 324–338
Hofstede G. (2001) Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
Hui C. H., Triandis H. C. (1986) Individualism–collectivism: A study of cross-cultural researchers. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 17(2): 225–248
Jones T. (2003) The failure of the best arguments against social reduction (And what that failure doesn’t mean). Southern Journal of Philosophy 41(4): 547–581
Jones T. (2004a) Reduction and anti-reduction: Rights and wrongs. Metaphilosophy 25(5): 614–647
Jones T. (2004b) Special Sciences: Still a flawed argument after all these years. Cognitive Science 28(3): 409–432
Jones T. (2006) We always have a beer after the meeting. How norms, customs, conventions, and the like explain behavior. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36(3): 251–275
Jones T. (2007) What’s done here—Explaining behavior in terms of customs and norms. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45: 363–393
Jones T. (2008) Unification. In: Psillos S., Curd M. (eds) The Routledge companion to the philosophy of science. Routledge, New York, pp 97–106
Jones T. (2009) Norms and Customs: Causally important or causally impotent?. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39(4): 1–35
Kim J. (1969) Events and their descriptions: Some considerations. In: Rescher N. (eds) Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 198–215
Kim J. (2000) Mind in a physical world. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Kim J. (2005) Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Lewis, D. (1986). Events. In Philosophical papers (Vol. II, pp. 241–269). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leiter, B. (2007). Explaining theoretical disagreement. University of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 124. Available from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1004768.
List, C., & Menzies, P. (2009). Non-reductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20118/.
Loewer B. (2009) Why is there anything except physics?. Synthese 170(2): 217–233
Mackie J. (1993) Causes and conditions. In: Sosa E., Tooley M. (eds) Causation. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 33–55
Marx K. (1906) Capital: A critique of political economy. Charles H. Kerr, Chicago
McClamrock R. (1995) Screening-off and the levels of selection. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy 42(1): 107–112
McGrath M. (1998) Proportionality and mental causation: A fit?. Philosophical Perspectives 12: 167–176
McGuire M., Troisi A. (1998) Darwinian psychiatry. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Melnyk M. (1995) Two cheers for reductionism: Or, the dim prospects for non-reductive materialism. Philosophy of Science 62: 370–388
Parsons T. (1964) The social system. Routledge & Paul, New York
Parsons P., Shils E. (1951) Toward a general theory of action. Harper and Row, New York
Perkins H. W., Haines P., Rice R. (2005) Misperceiving the college drinking norm and related problems: A nationwide study of exposure to prevention information, perceived norms, and student alcohol misuse. Journal of Studies on Alcohol 66: 470–478
Polger T. (2008) How to test for multiple realization. Philosophy of Science 75: 537–547
Prentice D., Miller D. (1996) Pluralistic ignorance and the perpetuation of social norms by unwitting actors. In: Zanna M. (eds) Advances in experimental social psychology. Academic Press, New York
Raatikainen, P. (2009). Causation, exclusion, and the special sciences. Erkenntnis (forthcoming).
Saam, N., & Harrer, A. (1999). Simulating norms, social inequality, and functional change in artificial societies. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2(1). http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS/2/1/2.html.
Sherif M. (1967) Formation of social norms: The experimental paradigm. In: Sherif M. (eds) Social interaction. Aldine, Chicago
Skinner B. (1953) Science and human behavior. Free Press, Glencoe, IL
Sober E. (1999) The multiple realizability argument against reductionism. Philosophy of Science 66: 542–564
Woodward J. (2003) Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Yablo S. (1992) Mental causation. Philosophical Review 101: 245–280
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Jones, T. Do customs compete with conditioning? Turf battles and division of labor in social explanation. Synthese 184, 407–430 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9794-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9794-3