Abstract
Both Putnam and Searle have argued that that every abstract automaton is realized by every physical system, a claim that leads to a reductio argument against Cognitivism or Strong AI: if it is possible for a computer to be conscious by virtue of realizing some abstract automaton, then by Putnam's theorem every physical system also realizes that automaton, and so every physical system is conscious--a conclusion few supporters of Strong AI would be willing to accept. Dennett has suggested a criterion of reverse engineering for identifying "real patterns," and I argue that this approach is also very effective at identifying "real realizations." I focus on examples of real-world implementations of complex automata because previous attempts at answering Putnam's challenge have been overly restrictive, ruling out some realizations that are in fact paradigmatic examples of practical automaton realization. I also argue that some previous approaches have at the same time been overly lenient in accepting counter-intuitive realizations of trivial automata. I argue that the reverse engineering approach avoids both of these flaws. Moreover, Dennett's approach allows us to recognize that some realizations are better than others, and the line between real realizations and non-realizations is not sharp.
- Borges, J. L. (1964). The library of babel. In J. E. Irby and D. A. Yates (Eds.), Labyrinths: selected stories (pp. 51-58). New Directions Publishing.Google Scholar
- Chaitin, G. (1975). Randomness and mathematical proof. Scientific American, 5 , 47-52Google ScholarCross Ref
- Chalmers, D. (1996a). The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory . Oxford University Press Google Scholar
- Chalmers, D. (1996b). Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton? Synthese, 108 , 309-333Google ScholarCross Ref
- Chrisley, R. L. (1994). Why everything doesn't realize every computation. Minds and Machines, 4 , 391-402Google ScholarCross Ref
- Dennett, D. (1990). The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1 , 177-194. Supplement, Fall 1990Google ScholarCross Ref
- Dennett, D. (1991). Real patterns. The Journal of Philosophy, 88 , 27-51Google ScholarCross Ref
- Harnad, S. (1990). Discussion during a talk of his at MIT, and later in his Symbol Grounding electronic mail forumGoogle Scholar
- Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and reality (pp. 121-125, and pp. 94-103). MIT Press Google Scholar
- Quine, W. V. (1987). Quiddities: an intermittently philosophical dictionary . Harvard University PressGoogle Scholar
- Scheutz, M. (1999). When physical systems realize functions. Minds and Machines, 9 (2), 161-196 Google ScholarDigital Library
- Scheutz, M. (2001). Computational versus causal complexity. Minds and Machines, 11 (4), 543-566 Google ScholarDigital Library
- Searle, J. (1992). The rediscovery of the mind . MIT Press Google Scholar
- Spafford, E. H. (1988). 'The internet worm program: An analysis', Technical Report CSD-TR-823, Purdue UniversityGoogle Scholar
- Weisstein, E. W. (2004). 'Pi digits', From MathWorld--A Wolfram Web Resource, http://math-world.wolfram.com/PiDigits.htmlGoogle Scholar
Index Terms
- Real realization: Dennett's real patterns versus Putnam's ubiquitous automata
Recommendations
How Would You Know if You Synthesized a Thinking Thing?
We confront the following popular views: that mind or life are algorithms; that thinking, or more generally any process other than computation, is computation; that anything other than a working brain can have thoughts; that anything other than a ...
Intuition Pumps
The award of the 2003 Barwise Prize to Daniel Dennett by the American Philosophical Association signifies Dennett's importance in the developing area of philosophical inquiry into computing and information. One source of Dennett's intellectual stature ...
The Puzzling Resilience of Multiple Realization
AbstractAccording to the multiple realization argument, mental states or processes can be realized in diverse and heterogeneous physical systems; and that fact implies that mental state or process kinds cannot be identified with particular kinds of ...
Comments