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The Donation Paradox for Peremptory Challenges

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Abstract

A donation paradox occurs when a player gives an apparently valuable prerogative to another player, but ‘does better’, according to some criterion. Peremptory challenges, used in choosing a American jury, permit each side to veto a certain number of potential jurors. With even a very simple model of jury selection, it is shown that for one side to give a peremptory challenge to the other side may lead to a more favorable jury, an instance of the donation paradox. Both a theorem and examples are given concerning the existence of the donation paradox in the optimal use of peremptory challenges.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213

    Joseph B. Kadane, Christopher A. Stone & Garrick Wallstrom

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  1. Joseph B. Kadane
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  2. Christopher A. Stone
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  3. Garrick Wallstrom
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Kadane, J.B., Stone, C.A. & Wallstrom, G. The Donation Paradox for Peremptory Challenges. Theory and Decision 47, 139–155 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005190513334

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005190513334

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