Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Rule Consequentialism and Scope

  • Published:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Rule consequentialism (RC) holds that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined by an ideal moral code, i.e., the set of rules whose internalization would have the best consequences. But just how many moral codes are there supposed to be? Absolute RC holds that there is a single morally ideal code for everyone, while Relative RC holds that there are different codes for different groups or individuals. I argue that Relative RC better meets the test of reflective equilibrium than Absolute RC. In particular, I contend that Relative RC is superior because it accommodates our convictions about costless benefits. Some have charged that Relative RC threatens our convictions about the generality of moral codes and that it leads inevitably to what Brad Hooker calls “runaway relativism.” I argue that Relative RC has principled reasons for stopping this imagined slide down the slippery slope.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Hooker (2000a 32). Here and throughout, I make no distinction here between consequentialism and utilitarianism. Of course, such a distinction can be made—and in a wide variety of ways. However, these distinctions do not have enough relevance for the purposes of this paper to warrant more than passing mention.

  2. For another version of Absolute RC, see Parfit (2011). Brandt (1996, pp. 140–141) and Mulgan (2001, pp. 54, 62, and 83; 2006, pp. 255–260) formulate, but do not accept, Absolute RC.

  3. Also see Brandt (1996, pp. 141–142).

  4. The question of determining the scope of a given moral code is hardly unique to RC. It is a question that must be answered, e.g., by any form of social contract theory, whether it is a general account of morality (see Gauither 1986 and Scanlon 1998) or a more specific account of some part of it, say, justice (see Rawls 1971, 1993). Work by Nussbaum (2005) and others have done much to clarify how deeply problematic it is for contractualists to deal with scope.

  5. See especially Brandt ([1965] 1992), Lyons (1965, pp. 138–142), Hooker (2000a, pp. 80–85), Arneson (2005), Mulgan (2006, pp. 136–137), Ridge (2006), Hooker and Fletcher (2008), Miller (2009), and Rosen (2009) as well as Kahn (Unpublished).

  6. Contra Hooker (2000a, p. 76), Mulgan (2001, p. 62), and Rosen (2009), I do not think that we are forced to choose between either acceptance of or compliance with these rules. Both are aspects of internalization in normal moral agents. Note that sense this understanding of internalization includes both acceptance and compliance, it does not open RC to the so-called “collapse objection.” See Mulgan (2006, pp. 146–150). Moreover, even if one wished to take a hard line and insist that “internalization” is not plastic enough to encompass compliance, an advocate of RC could circumvent the issue simply by formulating her theory in such a way that the morally ideal code is the one that would lead to the best consequences if it were both internalized and complied with.

  7. For discussion, see Brandt (1965 [1992], p. 117), Parfit (1984, pp. 30–31), Shaw (1999, pp. 164–167; 2001, p. 1074), Hooker (2000b, pp. 223–225), Kagan (2000, p. 134), Riley (2000, pp. 40–45), and Mulgan (2001, pp. 55–56). Of course, we must distinguish between RC and forms of act consequentialism that advocate the adoption of “rules of thumb.” See, e.g., Hare (1981), Mulgan (2001, p. 64), and Crisp (2006),

  8. For discussion, see Harsanyi (1977, 1985), Brandt (1979), Copp (1996, pp. 165–166), Cummisky (1996, pp. 62–64), Kagan (1998, pp. 198–199), Mulgan (2001, pp. 57–59; 2006, pp. 131–132), Gibbard (2008, pp. 59–82), Miller (2009), and Parfit (2011).

  9. On this point, see Hooker (1996, pp. 543–546; 2000a, pp. 4–31; 2000b, pp. 101 and 222–238), Miller (2000, p. 156), Thomas (2000, p.181), Montague (2000, p. 205), and Driver (2002). I differ from Mulgan (2001, p. 59) in thinking of reflective equilibrium as a “practical justification” for RC, but the details of our disagreement are not important here.

  10. See also Hooker (2000a, p. 88).

  11. Note also that in some cases it is worthwhile to distinguish between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium, but not here. See Daniels (1996, pp. 21–46), Miller (2000), and Hooker (2000b).

  12. Oddly enough even some rule consequentialists think that roughly something like this is true. See Brandt (1979, pp. 16–23; 1996, pp.120–121 and 134).

  13. Schwitzgebel (2009), for one, raises a number of worthwhile questions about this matter.

  14. Compare the derivation of “intuitively plausible principles” by Mulgan (2006, pp. 133–137).

  15. See also Singer (1972, 1974, 2005).

  16. See, e.g., Daniels (1996, pp. 47–64), Verwijj (1998, p. 31), and Brom (1998, p. 193). The expression “Archimedian point” is sometimes used in the evaluation of ethical theories outside the tradition of reflective equilibrium. See. e.g., Williams (1985, pp. 22–29). However, that is not at all what I intend to pick out here.

  17. I assume a fairly undemanding conception of transworld identity, such that, e.g., Obama in World 1 and Obama in World 2 are counterparts, not numerically identical agent in different possible worlds. See Lewis (1986).

  18. Whether knowledge of this sort is available to the likes of us is not at stake here. But for useful discussion, see Breakey (2009).

  19. Hooker (2000a, pp. 72–75) thinks that we should be concerned with expected value, instead of actual value. Contrast Mulgan (2001, p. 66; 2006, pp. 142–146). The issue between Hooker and Mulgan is a live one, worth careful attention. However, it is an unnecessary complications for the purposes of this paper, I remain neutral on this point and simply speak of “value” sans the phrase. But see Kahn (Unpublished).

  20. There are some similarities between this second scenario and a few thought experiments offered in Portmore (2009). I consider Portmore’s arguments in Sections 4 and 5.

  21. See also Mulgan (2006, p. 132).

  22. Of course, Portmore rejects RC in all its forms, but we can ignore this fact for the moment. His argument here concerns the superiority of Absolute RC to Relative RC.

  23. One might also understand Mulgan as claiming, not that the gratuitous action is not justified, but that the action is not undertaken for this or any other reason. However, if that it is the case, then I doubt that an action of this kind can never be ethically permissible. E.g., if 1,000 children will be tortured if I do not gratuitously torture one, then I suspect that I am ethically permitted, even required to do so if I can, though the usual problems (from the Toxin Puzzle, etc.) with getting myself to act for no particular reason threaten to make this very difficult.

  24. One might ask why the Runaway Argument stops with individual agents. Why doesn’t its logic force us to consider what codes would be appropriate to time-slices of agents? Though this question falls outside of the scope of the paper, the essence of my response to it can be reconstructed easily by the end of this section. At any rate, the possibility that the Runaway Argument takes us beyond individual agents is not a problem for me because, as I contend here, the argument is unsound.

  25. See Brandt ([1972] 1992, pp. 99–103), Parfit (1984, pp. 3–5), and Brink (1997, pp. 96–129).

  26. Of course, some, e.g., Lyons (1965) and Smart (1956) have argued that any form of RC ultimately collapses into act consequentialism. But this argument is not a special problem for the Strong Thesis, and, at any rate, it has been answered at length elsewhere. See Brandt ([1965] 1992) and Hooker (2000a, b, esp. pp. 93–99).

  27. E.g., Brandt (1979, p. 287) and Hooker (2000b, pp. 78–80).

  28. See, e.g., Shaw (1999, p. 164) and Hooker et al. (2000, pp. 1–2).

  29. I first formulated many of the ideas explored in this paper in conversation with Roger Crisp, Brad Hooker, and Derek Parfit, and if I have managed to say anything worthwhile here it is largely thanks to them. I am also very grateful for both generous comments and insightful criticisms to audience members at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 2012), the Joint Session of the Aristotelean Society and the Mind Association (July 2012), and the annual meeting of the British Society for Ethical Theory (July 2012). Finally, I am much in debt to members of my own Department at the U.S. Air Force Academy and of the Colorado Springs Philosophy Discussion Group, especially James Carey, Marion Hourdequin, and Ivan Meyerhoffer. Finally, my thanks to Kimberly Kahn for comments and questions on the final draft of this paper.

References

  • Arneson R (2005) Sophisticated rule consequentialism: some simple objections. Philos Issues 15:235–251

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R (1988) How to be a moral realist. In: McCord GS (ed) Essays on moral realism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandt RB ([1965] 1992) Some merits of one form of rule-utilitarianism. University of Colorado Studies. Reprinted in Brandt (1992), Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 111–136

  • Brandt RB ([1972] 1992) Rationality, egoism, and morality. J Philos 69. Reprinted in Brandt (1992), Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 93–108

  • Brandt RB (1979) A theory of the good and the right. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandt RB (1996) Facts, values, and morality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Breakey H (2009) The epistemic and informational requirements of utilitarianism. Utilitas 21:72–99

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brink D (1989) Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Brink D (1997) Self-love and altruism. Social Philos Policy 14:122–157

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brom FWA (1998) Developing public morality: between practical agreement and intersubjective reflective equilibrium. In: van der Burg W, van Willigenberg T (eds) Reflective equilibrium: essays in honor of Robert Heeger. Klewer Academic, pp 191–202

  • Copp D (1996) Morality, normativity, and society. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Crisp R (2006) Reasons and the good. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cummisky D (1996) Kantian consequentialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Daniels N (1996) Justice and justification: reflective equilibrium in theory and practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • de Lazari-Radek K, Singer P (2010) Secrecy in consequentialism: a defense of esoteric morality. Ratio 23:34–58

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Driver J (2002) Review of ideal code, real world by Brad Hooker. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1136

  • Gauither D (1986) Morals by agreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard A (2008) Reconciling our aims. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goodman N ([1955] 1983) Fact, fiction, and forecast, 4th edn. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

  • Hare RM (1981) Moral thinking: its level, methods, and point. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi J (1977) Rule utilitarianism and decision theory. Erkenntnis 11:25–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi J (1985) Does reason tell us what moral code to follow and, indeed, to follow any moral code at all? Ethics 96(1):42–55

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hooker B (1994) Rule consequentialism, incoherence, and fairness. Proc Aristot Soc 95:21–35

    Google Scholar 

  • Hooker B (1996) Ross-style pluralism versus rule consequentialism. Mind 105:531–552

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hooker B (1998) Rule-consequentialism and obligations to the needy. Pac Philos Q 79:19–31

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hooker B (2000a) Ideal code, real world: a rule-consequentialist theory of morality. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hooker B (2000b) Reflective equilibrium and rule consequentialism. In: Hooker B, Mason E, Miller D (eds) Morality, rules, and consequences: a critical reader. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp 222–238

    Google Scholar 

  • Hooker B (2005) Reply to Arneson and McIntyre. Philos Issues 15:264–281

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hooker B, Fletcher G (2008) Variable versus fixed-rate rule-utilitarianism. Philos Q 58:344–352

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hooker B, Mason E, Miller D (eds) (2000) Morality, rules, and consequences: a critical reader. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

  • Kagan S (1998) Normative ethics. Westview, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • Kagan S (2000) Evaluative focal points. In: Hooker B, Mason E, Miller D (eds) Morality, rules, and consequences: a critical reader. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp 134–155

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahn L (Unpublished) Rule consequentialism and compliance

  • Lewis D (1986) On the plurality of worlds. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyons D (1965) Forms and limits of utilitarianism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Miller D (2000) Hooker’s use and abuse of reflective equilibrium. In: Hooker B, Mason E, Miller D (eds) Morality, rules, and consequences: a critical reader. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp 156–178

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller R (2009) Actual rule utilitarianism. J Philos 106

  • Montague P (2000) Why rule consequentialism is not superior to Ross-Style pluralism. In: Hooker B, Mason E, Miller D (eds) Morality, rules, and consequences: a critical reader. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp 203–221

    Google Scholar 

  • Mulgan T (2001) The demands of consequentialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Mulgan T (2006) Future people. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mulgan T (2009) Rule consequentialism and non-identity. In: Roberts MA, Wasserman DT (eds) Harming future persons. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine 35

  • Nussbaum M (2005) Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, and species membership. Harvard Belkanp, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (2011) On what matters, vol 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Portmore D (2009) Rule-consequentialism and irrelevant others. Utilitas 21:368–376

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard Belkanp, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1993) Political liberalism. Columbia University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Ridge M (2006) Introducing variable-rate rule-utilitariansim. Philos Q 56:242–253

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Riley J (2000) Defending rule utilitarianism. In: Hooker B, Mason E, Miller D (eds) Morality, rules, and consequences: a critical reader. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp 40–70

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosen G (2009) Might Kantian contractualism be the supreme principle of morality? Ratio 22:78–97

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross WD (1930) The right and the good. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Scanlon TM (1998) What we owe to each other. Harvard Belkanp, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Scanlon TM (2002) Rawls on justification. In: Freedman S (ed) The Cambridge companion to rawls. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwitzgebel E (2009) Do ethicists steal more books? Philos Psychol 22:711–725

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shaw W (1999) Contemporary ethics: taking account of utilitarianism. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Shaw W (2001) Ideal code, real world: a rule-consequentialist theory of morality, by Brad Hooker. Mind

  • Singer P (1972) Moral experts. Analysis 32

  • Singer P (1974) Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium. Monist 58

  • Singer P (2005) Ethics and intuitions. J Ethics 9

  • Smart JJC (1956) Extreme and restricted utilitarianism. Philos Q 6:344–354

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomas A (2000) Consequentialism and the subversion of pluralism. In: Hooker B, Mason E, Miller D (eds) Morality, rules, and consequences: a critical reader. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp 179–202

    Google Scholar 

  • Verwijj M (1998) Moral principles: authoritative norms or flexible guidelines? In: van der Burg W, van Willigenberg T (eds) Reflective equilibrium: essays in honor of Robert Heeger. Klewer Academic, pp 29–20

  • Williams B (1985) Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, United States Air Force Academy, 2354 Fairchild, Drive, USAF Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, 80840-6256, USA

    Leonard Kahn

Authors
  1. Leonard Kahn
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Leonard Kahn.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kahn, L. Rule Consequentialism and Scope. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 15, 631–646 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9357-4

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9357-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation