Abstract
This paper argues that morality depends on prudence, or more specifically, that one cannot be a moral person without being prudent. Ethicists are unaware of this, ignore it, or imply it is wrong. Although this thesis is not obvious from the current perspective of ethics, I believe that its several implications for ethics make it worth examining. In this paper I argue for the prudence dependency thesis by isolating moral practice from all reliance on prudence. The result is that in the actual world in which we live one cannot be moral unless one is prudent. In order to show that morality depends on prudence for the entire range of moral situations, we put prudence to the test against the most extraordinary of moral situations: moral dilemmas. Doing so shows that for all practical purposes moral dilemmas are prudential problems for agents, giving further support to the prudence dependency thesis.
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Notes
One clear exception to the rule in ethics is Tiberius, who claims that ‘perspective is a prudential virtue’ and ‘that the person with perspective will be more inclined to value certain moral ends and more able to act on the moral commitments she has’(2002, 305). If correct, this would establish an additional way in which morality is dependent on prudence.
Many ethicists used to hold that, since prudence is strictly selfish it is opposed to morality. ‘In philosophical theory...the tacit assumption is that not only are all selfish considerations prudential, but all prudential considerations are selfish’ (Pincoffs 1986, 123). See also Frankena 1973, 7, Zemach 1987, 209, and Davie 1973. A promising recent development of ethics is that morality and prudence are more frequently seen to be often compatible.
Not long ago many virtue ethicists attempted to establish virtue as an alternative subject matter of ethics. Recently, however, all that has changed. Prominent virtue ethicists are now considering their approach to ethics a ‘fairly recent addition to contemporary moral theory’ (Hursthouse 1999, 1).
David Wiggins defines ethics thus, ‘Ethics is the philosophical study of morals or morality’ (Wiggins 2006, 9). According to Mark Timmons, ‘“ethics” refers to that area of philosophy that inquires into morality’ (Timmons 1999, 9). Robert Arrington states that, ‘“ethics” or “ethical philosophy”...refers to the philosophical study of morality’ (Arrington 1998, viii). Robert Holmes states, ‘Simply put, ethics is the study of morality’ (Holmes 1998, 2)
Actually, the mainstream view that duties to oneself are impossible is based on a proposition related to the proposition that prudence and morality are opposed. Namely, that prudence and morality each have their exclusive spheres. See Neblett 1969, 70. This presupposition is a main reason why duties to oneself are ‘surprisingly controversial’ (Kagan 1998, 145). More recently, however, ethicists such as Denis 1997, Hills 2003, and Timmermann 2006 have argued for duties to oneself, partly by arguing that the spheres of prudence and morality are not exclusive. As Hills states, ‘Moral and prudential concerns are not entirely separate; in fact, the two spheres are connected by duties to the self’ (131). In this paper I am simply arguing that there is another connection between the two spheres.
Being minimally prudent, generally prudent, or highly prudent are differences of degree, not of kind. In contrast to the minimal prudence of the average adult, an adolescent, all else being equal, will engage in more behavior that is ‘associated with some probability of undesirable results’ (Boyer 2006, 291–334). Being minimally prudent is having prudence to the lowest degree. Minimally prudent agents are prudent because they have learned through experience what to do, and what to avoid, in order to advance through life. Their prudence rests largely on habit. They stay out of jail, pay their bills, keep their jobs, and don’t do things which would make them social outcasts. They can often be imprudent, but rarely in ways catastrophic to their lives. Hobbes seems to have minimal prudence in mind when he says ‘prudence, is but experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men’ (Hobbes 1957, 80). Generally prudent people are prudent across a wider range of areas of their lives than the minimally prudent. They are often quite successful. They share many habits with minimally prudent agents, but have, in addition, developed the capacity for foresight and use it to their advantage in ways that the minimally prudent person cannot. However, generally prudent agents can have some prudence lapses in some areas of their lives, even as they are prudent in most other areas. Highly prudent agents only very rarely act imprudently, and are consequently quite rare.
Moral prudence concerns a particular end of prudence: morality. People can be prudent with regard to different ends. They can be financially prudent, socially prudent, prudent concerning their health, or morally prudent. And someone can be morally prudent regardless of whether they intend to act morally ‘for the sake of duty alone’ or merely out of expedience. Given the distinctions introduced in the previous note, and combining them with different prudential ends, agents can in principle be minimally financially prudent, generally financially prudent, highly financially prudent, or minimally morally prudent, generally morally prudent, highly morally prudent, and so on.
The fears of our predecessors had some justification. The recent closing of the gender gap in marital infidelity is partly explained by the greater presence of women in the workplace, a major ‘opportunity factor’ in infidelity (Atkins et al. 2001, 737, 745). Concerning juvenile delinquency, ‘Many variables impact delinquency, but deviant peers consistently emerge as one of the most robust risk factors’ (McGloin 2009, 465).
For a philosophical treatment of the sizable empirical psychology literature which shows that circumstances have a much greater influence on our moral decision-making than we would expect, see Doris 2002.
The extent to which we deprive Immanuel of ordinary traits might be thought to be extreme. But recall that most of us are minimally prudent. So to depict a truly imprudent person requires that ordinary capacities for practical common sense be removed.
H.L.A Hart’s discussion of the ‘bond binding the person obligated, which is buried in the word ‘obligation” (Hart 1994, 87) is relevant here. He states, ‘In this figure, which haunts much legal thought, the social pressure appears as a chain binding those who have obligations so that they are not free to do what they want’ (Ibid.) A highly prudent person such as Pericles will want not only to be free to act, but will want to keep his options open. Minimizing his promises will help him with both concerns.
Books on success by entrepreneurs counsel one to make few promises (or agreements or commitments) for reasons of self-interest. Cf. Canfield with Switzer 2005, 361 and Ringer 2004, 211–214. By contrast, it is significant that discussions of the principle in the ethics literature are apparently nonexistent.
Granted, another immoral action which is of the same type as a can be committed in a subsequent situation. All that is being asserted is that when the particular necessary condition for a is removed, it’s impossible to perform the one particular action a.
I’m aware that the principle ‘avoid trouble’ is intuitive enough to be grasped and held without requiring an analysis of it. I analyze it only because doing so should help us to better grasp the prudence dependency thesis, which is not as immediately evident.
The following two cases are examples of the especially potent symmetrical dilemma. See Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, 54.
I select these two examples of a moral dilemma to make the structure of moral dilemmas intelligible, and to help us focus on the prospective outlook agents must have to avoid them. We can’t do justice here to many of the important moral issues involved in moral dilemmas. For example, it can be said that the problem with moral dilemmas is not the decision one must make, but living with the decision. Also, less neat cases, such as the dilemma faced by the main character in the novel Sophie’s Choice give us a better sense of the personal dimension of the tragedy involved in dilemmas. For a discussion of both of these issues, see Greenspan, 1983. Lastly, it should be pointed out that although dilemmas force agents to do either a or b, and so do what is wrong either way, that is better than doing neither a nor b. Recognition of this helps us to see that responding to one of the two options presented in a dilemma is not the worst thing an agent in such a situation can do. An agent who is aware of such a ‘default alternative’ can thereby be pushed into choosing a or b.
Gowans claims that moral dilemmas are something that we ‘confront potentially if not actually in our lives’ (Gowans 1987, 4).
“You morally ought not to enter moral dilemmas” implies “You can avoid entering moral dilemmas.”
‘Necessarily’, once again, signifies a natural necessity.
Such might be called a ‘dual-source’ ethics. See Crisp 1996.
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I would like to thank Tom Nickles, Dena Jackson and an anonymous reviewer for Philosophia for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Kaspar, D. Can Morality Do Without Prudence?. Philosophia 39, 311–326 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9299-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9299-9