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AQUINAS AND THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE SOUL: NOTES ON A DIFFICULTY After St. Thomas argues in his Summa Theologiae that any soul, because it is the act and form of body, is opposed to matter and not a body,1 he attempts to prove that the human soul, unlike the forms of all other bodies,8 does not depend upon body for its being.3 His argument that the soul exists independently of the body does not successfully overcome the methodological difficulty posed for it by his acceptance of the Aristotelian position that the soul is a substantial form and by his admission, which functions as a premise in his argument, that man performs intellectual activities. In this paper we intend to clarify the nature of this difficulty. In the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas' argument for the subsistence of the soul has two parts. In the first he argues that the soul is the source of an operation in which the body does not share : Dicendum quod necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens. Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura ; quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter, impediret cognitionem aliorum; sicut videmus quod lingua infirmi quae infecta est cholerico et amaro humore, non potest percipere aliquid dulce, sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere . Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per Organum corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum; sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum in pupilla sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus eiusdem coloris videtur. Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus.4 In the second part of his argument, St. Thomas concludes that the human soul subsists : Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu; unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est. Propter 1 I, 75. i-2 I. 75. 3-3 I, 75. 2-4 Idem. 214MATTHEW J. KELLY quod non dicimus quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens.5 Clearly, if St. Thomas is to prove that the soul of man subsists, he must first establish that it has an operation in which the body does not share. In his proof of the latter, "homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum" and "Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura" function as premises. "Man" is the subject of the first statement quoted, and some man, say Socrates, is its referent. But if man in fact knows all corporeal things, either Socrates is not a body or the second statement quoted, '"What knows some things can have nothing of these in its own nature," is not true. For, at this stage in St. Thomas' argument, it is not possible to assume that the subject of the second statement refers to the soul alone, as though it were the only source of intellectual activity. This would be to assume what the statement is used to prove, namely, that the soul, because it is the only source of the operation of knowing all bodies, is what knows all bodies.6 If we accept for the moment the context of St. Thomas' argument, the soul of man, as are the souls of plants and animals, is the formal source by which there is an agent that moves itself, senses, and understands. But until proof is presented that the human soul, because it is the only source of intellectual activity, is an agent source in addition to being a formal source, there is no reason to identify the form by which Socrates is a living thing which understands all bodies with the agent which understands all bodies. In the absence of proof of such identification the...

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