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Justification as Truth-Finding Efficiency: How Ockham's Razor Works

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Abstract

I propose that empirical procedures, like computational procedures, are justified in terms of truth-finding efficiency. I contrast the idea with more standard philosophies of science and illustrate it by deriving Ockham's razor from the aim of minimizing dramatic changes of opinion en route to the truth.

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Kelly, K.T. Justification as Truth-Finding Efficiency: How Ockham's Razor Works. Minds and Machines 14, 485–505 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:MIND.0000045993.31233.63

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