Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Blameworthiness and Wrongness

  • Published:
The Journal of Value Inquiry Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Notes

  1. See Michael Slote, “Agent Based Virtue Ethics,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 20 (1996), and Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

  2. See Thomas Nagel, “Moral Luck,” in Daniel Statman, ed., Moral Luck (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982).

  3. See Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 169–177.

  4. See Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 48 (1962).

  5. See Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68 (1971).

  6. See R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994); also see Angela Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics, vol. 115 (2005); Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Nomy Arpaly, Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

  7. Holly Smith, “Culpable Ignorance,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 92 (1983), p. 556.

  8. Ibid., p. 556.

  9. Ibid., p. 568.

  10. Ibid., p. 570.

  11. Nomy Arpaly, Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage, p. 91.

  12. Ibid., p. 15.

  13. Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, p. 84.

  14. Ibid., p. 72.

  15. Ibid., p. 70.

  16. Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 6.

  17. Ibid.

  18. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary J. Gregor, ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 8.

  19. See Nagel, op. cit.; also see Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

  20. See Michael Slote, “Agent Based Virtue Ethics,” and Michael Slote, Morals from Motives.

  21. See Ishtiyaque Haji, Moral Appraisability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); also see Michael J. Zimmerman, “A Plea for Accuses,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 2 (1997); also see T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008).

  22. See Haji, op. cit., ch. 8; also see Zimmerman, op. cit.; and Michael J. Zimmerman, Living With Uncertainty (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

  23. See Parfit, op. cit.; also see Andrew Sepielli, “What to Do When You Don’t Know What to Do,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

  24. See Wallace, op. cit.

  25. See Scanlon, op. cit.

  26. For helpful discussion and comments I would like to thank Cheshire Calhoun, Peter French, Douglas Portmore, Margaret Walker, and an audience at Arizona State University where an earlier version of this article was presented. I would also like to thank four anonymous referees and Thomas Magnell, the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry, for helpful comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 874102, Tempe, AZ, 85287-4102, USA

    Andrew C. Khoury

Authors
  1. Andrew C. Khoury
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Andrew C. Khoury.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Khoury, A.C. Blameworthiness and Wrongness. J Value Inquiry 45, 135–146 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-011-9272-2

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-011-9272-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation