The structure of autoreferential statements that describe (or serve as a logical model for) the human conscious experience is analyzed. Autoreferential statements are introduced by autoreferential definitions, such as a=F(a, x), where F is a Boolean function and x is some atomic statement describing the content of the experience, or by analogous systems of inter-related definitions, such as a=F(b, x, y) and b=G(a, x, z). It is argued that only "noncreative" (systems of) definitions introduce statements that describe conscious experience, the noncreativeness meaning that no statement with non-tautological content can be derived from these definitions. The structure of such (systems of) definitions is comprehensively characterized in a series of theorems. A potential of the model in addressing empirical data is illustrated by applying it to the choice between two alternatives in the absence of a preference criterion. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.