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Intellectual Humility, Confidence, and Argumentation

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the relationship of virtue, argumentation, and philosophical conduct by considering the role of the specific virtue of intellectual humility in the practice of philosophical argumentation. I have three aims: first, to sketch an account of this virtue; second, to argue that it can be cultivated by engaging in argumentation with others; and third, to problematize this claim by drawing upon recent data from social psychology. My claim is that philosophical argumentation can be conducive to the cultivation of virtues, including humility, but only if it is conceived and practiced in appropriately ‘edifying’ ways.

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Notes

  1. An excellent introduction to the literature is Aberdein (2014).

  2. See, for example, Jones (2012).

  3. See Hume (2000), A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 2, Part I, Sect. 2.

  4. See, e.g., Jones (2012: 697) and Roberts and Wood (2007: 69).

  5. See Pardue (2013) and Rushing (2013).

  6. Charles Taylor has characterized the emergence of ‘humanist secularism’ in terms of the displacement of ‘confidence in the saving power of God’, with a new, emergent ‘confidence in our own powers of moral ordering’ (2007: 27f and 75f).

  7. See Doris (2002).

  8. See Saul (2012) and Lloyd (1993).

  9. See further Jenkins and Hutchison (2012).

  10. See Baehr (2011) and Riggs (2010).

  11. See Roberts and Wood (2007: ch. 9).

  12. Wittgenstein intended something more specific when he offered this advice, but my more general use of it is, I hope, still within its spirit.

  13. See Baehr (2011) and Zagzebski (1996).

  14. See Tiberius and Walker (1998).

  15. See Kidd forthcoming.

  16. See, e.g., Confucius (2006) §§2.9, 3.15, 8.5.

  17. See, e.g., Confucius (2006) §§ 8.11, 11.25, 19.16.

  18. The relevant psychological work is documented in Gilovich et al. (2002) and Kahneman et al. (1982). Ahlstrom-Vij (2013) discusses its philosophical relevance to confidence regulation: ch. 1.

  19. See Nickerson (1998).

  20. See Correia (2012: §3).

  21. See Lee and Schunn (2011) and Valian (1999).

  22. See Greenwald and Banaji (1995).

  23. A useful discussion of psychologically informed strategies for reducing the influence of implicit cognition on argumentation is given is Correia (2012: §4).

  24. See Cohen (2004) and Lakoff and Johnson (2003: ch. 1).

  25. An account of ‘argumentative injustice’, inspired by Fricker’s work, is offered by Bondy (2010).

  26. An influential feminist reading of this passage is given in Le Doeuff (2006).

  27. The best source for academic philosophy is the body of anonymous testimonies recorded at the blog ‘What Is It Like To Be A Woman In Philosophy?’.

  28. See Aberdein (2010: 175). Stevens (2015) likewise argues that ‘cultivating all the adversarial and the cooperative virtues is important’, including recognising when to deploy them.

  29. I am grateful to Sarah Connell, David E. Cooper, an audience at Durham, the editors, and to the kind and generous referees for encouragement, criticism, and comments.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old Elvet, Durham, DH1 3HN, UK

    Ian James Kidd

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Kidd, I.J. Intellectual Humility, Confidence, and Argumentation. Topoi 35, 395–402 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9324-5

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