Abstract
In the space of possible worlds, there might be a best possible world (a uniquely best world or a world tied for best with some other worlds). Or, instead, for every possible world, there might be a better possible world. Suppose that the latter is true, i.e., that there is no best world. Many have thought that there is then an argument against the existence of God, i.e., the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being; we will call such arguments no-best-world arguments. In this paper, we discuss ability-based objections to such arguments; an ability-based objection to a no-best world argument claims that the argument fails because one or more of its premises conflict with a plausible principle connecting the applicability of some type of moral evaluation to the agent’s possession of a relevant ability. In particular, we formulate and evaluate an important new ability-based objection to the most promising no-best world argument.
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Notes
Like most philosophers, we do not take talk of possible worlds to be literal talk of concrete entities, but instead assume it is to be understood in some other way. Also, in this paper, we always use terms like ‘best’, ‘better’ and ‘ought’ to express moral notions. Finally, in contexts where the space of possible worlds is at issue, and in similar contexts, we always use terms like ‘might’ and ‘could’ to express notions of epistemic possibility.
Other philosophers who have considered the view that there is no best possible world (or a view very similar) include Kraay (2010a), Kraay (2010b, p. 357), Almeida (2008, p. 13), O’Connor (2008, pp. 113–114), Hasker (2004, p. 167), Rowe (2004, p. 88), Sobel (2004, p. 467), Turner (2003, pp. 144–146), Morris (1993, p. 237), Nozick (1989, p. 225). Quinn (1982, p. 204), Schlesinger (1977, pp. 62 and 77), Blumenfeld (1975, pp. 163–165), Plantinga (1973, p. 539) and Adams (1972, pp. 317–318).
Which worlds are actualizable depends on which world-actualizer is in question (X can actualize a world in which Y does not exist, but Y cannot do so). As a result, maximum rigor would require that we acknowledge this dependence in our discussion (say, by indexing our quantifiers over worlds to world-actualizers). But since none of our points would be affected, we refrain from doing so in order to keep things simpler.
Where harmless, we leave universal quantifiers implicit. Also, in our discussion, we often leave implicit the necessity operator attaching to various claims.
The seeds of such an argument can be found in Blumenfeld (1975, pp. 175–177), who argues that Leibniz himself would acknowledge the claimed inconsistency in the combination of a morally perfect world-actualizer and the absence of a best world.
This objection has been recognized by many, including Rowe (2004, p. 90), Morris (1993, p. 244) and Kretzmann (1991, p. 238). Adams (1972) would object to premise 3 for a different reason: even if there is a best actualizable world, a morally perfect world-actualizer might not create it. He defends this claim on the Judeo-Christian ground that God need only refrain from wronging any of his creatures and instead treat them all with perfect kindness, and on the ground that God can achieve this by creating a world that is less than the best. Adams’ view is challenged by Rowe (2004, Chap. 5), Morris (1993, p. 236) and Quinn (1982).
For no-best-world arguments similar to our Direct Comparative Argument, see Kraay (2010a), Grover (2004, pp. 102–105), Rowe (2004, Chap. 6), Sobel (2004, pp. 466–474) and Wielenberg (2004, pp. 56–59). Our argument is most similar to Kraay’s; our premise 3 corresponds to his P1, and our premise 4 is a generalization of his P2. The arguments in Grover and Rowe are put in terms of the possibility, for any world-actualizer, of a (perhaps distinct) world-actualizer better than him; see Rowe’s Principle B below. Sobel introduces perfect rationality into his argument, taking moral perfection only to concern an agent’s preferences.
Rowe (2004, p. 91). We attach the explicit necessity operator; otherwise this is a direct quote.
For discussion of some objections of these other sorts, see Kraay (2010a), Grover (2004, pp. 105–112), Rowe (2004, Chap. 6) and Sobel (2004, pp. 474–479). One could also reject the argument on the ground that the negation of the conclusion in line 7 (i.e., the claim that God possibly exists) is antecedently more plausible than premises 3 and 4; see Kraay (2010a). As we read Almeida (2008, pp. 27–34), his response is similar in spirit; it amounts to: although Principle 34 is prima facie a priori, so also is the negation of the conclusion, and thus the argument fails to be persuasive.
Hasker (2004, pp. 167–173). Although Hasker presents his objection using the term ‘God’, we put it in terms of world-actualizers more generally.
Of course, one could instead reject No Best World, but then the argument would fail for a different reason: premise 1 would be false. In any case, like us, Hasker is exploring the consequences of No Best World for the existence of God.
Almeida (2008, pp. 21–25).
At one point, Almeida makes this point by reference to “the assumption that an essentially perfectly good being possibly exists” (Almeida 2008, p. 25). But in such discussion, Almeida’s quantification is often implicitly restricted to “the domain of essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, and necessarily existing beings” (Almeida 2008, p. 19).
In discussing something similar to the apparent conflict among Principle H, No Best World and Imperfection Implies Avoidability, Almeida quotes Hasker as saying “… the only way God could be freed from the charge of ‘failing to do better than he did’ is if there were a maximally excellent world, one than which even God could not create better” (2004, p. 172). And then Almeida says, “There is obviously another way that God is freed from the charge of failing to do better than he did. God is freed from the charge if he does not exist” (2008, p. 23).
It’s interesting to observe that, if Almeida’s reply to Hasker’s objection to the Direct Comparative Argument were to succeed, then a parallel reply to the ability-based objection to the Direct Non-Comparative Argument (from Sect. 3) would also succeed. This parallel reply runs as follows: premise 3 of the Direct Non-Comparative Argument conflicts with No Best World and Imperfection Implies Avoidability only if it’s also true that God possibly exists; but that begs the question against the proponent of the argument. However, this reply fails in the same way that Almeida’s own reply does. What’s true is that premise 3 of the Direct Non-Comparative Argument conflicts with No Best World and Imperfection Implies Avoidability only if it’s also true that a world-actualizer possibly exists; and that doesn’t beg the question.
Rowe (2004, p. 91, fn. 4) in effect admits that, for dramatic effect, he speaks of “God” when instead he should speak more generally of world-actualizers.
See Rowe (2004, pp. 104–111). Rowe’s illustration usually involves imagining a world-actualizer who actualizes the least good world, but this is inessential to his point.
Keeping in mind that a world-actualizer necessarily actualizes a world (cf. Sect. 2), it might seem that the two formulas in the main text are equivalent (in the sense of necessarily having the same truth value). However, this is mistaken. They would be equivalent if ‘thereby’ were removed from both of them, but the term makes a crucial contribution to what they say. Consider the following:
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(for all agents X, Y) [if X kills Y, then X is thereby morally imperfect],
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(for all agents X, Y) [if (X kills Y and 2 + 2 = 4), then X is thereby morally imperfect].
These two claims are not equivalent, but they would be were ‘thereby’ removed from both of them. The explanation of what’s going on is that, roughly, any claim of the form
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If A, then thereby B
is equivalent to the corresponding claim of the form
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If A, then [B and (A’s being the case grounds B’s being the case)].
(For this to explain the above failure of equivalence, we must understand grounding in a pure or minimal fashion: a true grounding claim includes nothing extraneous in what is said to do the grounding.) We suspect that Principle B’s failure to include ‘thereby’ (or anything equivalent) helps to explain why Hasker fails to see Rowe’s point, but we don’t have the space here to discuss further.
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As with Hasker’s objection, one could reject No Best World, but then the argument would fail for a different reason: premise 1 would be false.
This step in the objection implicitly assumes that refraining from an action is itself an action.
This step in the objection implicitly assumes the following:
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(for all worlds W) (W = W1, or W = W2, or W = W3 … <and so on for each world>).
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Our objection implicitly assumes that a world-actualizer possibly exists (but not that God possibly exists). Otherwise, all the steps of the objection are vacuously true and there is no contradiction with Oughtmp Implies Can. Compare the discussion of Almeida’s reply to Hasker’s objection in Sect. 5.
In any case, no proponent of the Direct Comparative Argument could reject No Best World; cf. fn. 20.
Wielenberg (2004, p. 50) makes the same point.
Compare the discussion of the grammar of ‘perfect’ and the definition of ‘superlatively good moral agent’ in Quinn (1982, pp. 208–209).
Anyone who denies this faces the awkward question: what then does moral perfection require? Presumably, where there is a best option, we’ll still want to say that moral perfection requires performing it. But some sort of cut-off line will be needed for cases where there is no best option. Whatever that cut-off line is, we’ll have this unhappy result: performing an option which is inconsistent with moral perfection (in a situation where there is a best option) can become consistent with moral perfection simply by adding some better options (in such a way that there is no longer a best option in the situation), since then it may turn out to be above the cut-off line.
Zimmerman (1996, Chap. 7) contains a nice discussion of, and helpful references to the literature on, the issue over moral dilemmas. His own view on the issue is in the spirit of what I say in the rest of this paragraph; cf. fn. 29.
If there happens to be a moral tie between the two options, then you ought to (either give a lecture in Kansas City at 6 pm or give a lecture in St. Louis at 6 pm). The idea is that an agent ought to perform one or another of the morally best options available to him; in the special case where there is a unique best option, the agent ought to perform it. This idea is less controversial than it sounds, given how ‘morally best’ is to be understood in this context; cf. fn. 30.
Zimmerman (1996, Chap. 2) defends a view based on a version of this idea (using the notions of “accessible worlds” and “deontic value”) and, in the rest of his book, uses this view to elucidate a whole range of quasi-logical and other high-level features of what one ought to do and related matters. Interestingly, Zimmerman considers the possibility that “an agent be faced with an infinite number of accessible worlds and that each world is such that there is a deontically better one” (p. 60) and, for such a possibility, persuasively defends the implication of his view that the agent “cannot avoid doing something wrong” (p. 61), i.e., that the agent faces a “prohibition dilemma” (p. 62). He observes that his view nonetheless implies that “obligation dilemmas” are impossible, i.e., that it’s impossible that an agent “ought to do some act A and ought to do some act B but cannot do both” (p. 62). However, Zimmerman’s view has this implication because obligation dilemmas, as he understands them, are restricted to two acts. His view in fact implies the possibility of moral dilemmas in the sense I’ve defined them (so long as refraining from an action is itself an action); an agent will face one whenever there is no deontically maximal accessible world. Relatedly, Zimmerman’s view is inconsistent with Ought Conjunction in its full generality; Zimmerman correctly observes that his view entails his principle (2.40′b) (p. 68), but this is only Ought Conjunction as restricted to two conjuncts.
So one ought, and oughtmp, to do what is morally best? Yes, that’s the thought, but only under different interpretations of ‘morally best’. In the case of ‘ought’, it means something like “highest degree in meeting moral requirements”; compare the notion of “deontic value” in Zimmerman (1996, pp. 14–20). On this interpretation, if an agent is not morally required to engage in significant sacrifice to save a life, then doing nothing can be (at least tied for) morally best. In the case of ‘oughtmp’, it means something like “highest degree in satisfying moral values”. Plausibly, meeting one’s moral requirements is one, but not the only, thing of moral value in the relevant sense.
It may be that Oughtmp Conjuction as applied to all cases has some degree of intuitive plausibility owing to the fact that it is a “logical looking” principle. Notice how it parallels the principle: if P, and if Q, then P&Q. But this sort of intuitive plausibility carries little weight on its own. After all, consider Permissibility Conjunction:
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If it is permissible for X to do C and permissible for X to do D and …, then it is permissible for X to do (C and D and …).
This principle may have some degree of intuitive plausibility because it’s similarly “logical looking”, but reflection upon cases makes us (rightly) quickly give it up.
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Acknowledgments
For helpful feedback on an ancestor of this paper, we thank Brad Monton and audiences at University of Missouri and Boise State University. In addition, we thank Andrew Moon, Eric Roark and Alan Tomhave for helpful early conversations on these issues.
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Kierland, B., Swenson, P. Ability-based objections to no-best-world arguments. Philos Stud 164, 669–683 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9868-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9868-9