Abstract
The nature of the distinction between rational andnon-rational accounts of the development of science isanalyzed. These two kinds of accounts differ mostlyin the status which they give to methodologicalprinciples. It is shown that there are severaldimensions with respect to which the status of suchprinciples can resemble more or less the kind ofstatus that a paradigmatic rational account would givethem. It is concluded that, under the most plausibledefinitions of a rational account, the extent to whicha philosophical account of scientific change isrational is a matter of degree, and that there is nosuch clear distinction between the two kinds ofaccounts which some supporters of rational and ofnon-rational accounts have assumed to exist.
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Kieseppä, I. Rationalism, Naturalism, And Methodological Principles. Erkenntnis 53, 337–352 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026457222365
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026457222365