Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Counterfactuals as Short Stories

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We present an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of stories and combine it with an account similar to Walton’s account of truth in fiction to yield truth conditions for counterfactuals. We discuss unusual features of this account, and compare it to other main approaches. In particular, we argue that our analysis succeeds in accounting for counterpossibles and counterfactuals with true antecedents while the other two main approaches fail, and we give reasons for thinking that it is important to have an adequate account of these two areas.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • S. Akama (2000) ‘Relevant Counterfactuals and Paraconsistency’ Batens Mortensen Priest Bendegem ParticleVan (Eds) Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic Research Studies Press Baldock

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Bennett (1988) ArticleTitle‘Farewell to the Phlogiston Theory of Conditionals’ Mind 97 509–527

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Bennett (1995) ArticleTitle‘Classifying Conditionals: The Traditional Way is Right’ Mind 104 331–354

    Google Scholar 

  • A. Byrne (1993) ArticleTitle‘Truth in Fiction: The Story Continued’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 IssueID1 24–35 Occurrence Handle10.1080/00048409312345022

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • R.M. Chisholm (1946) ArticleTitle‘The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional’ Mind 55 219–307

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Edgington (1995) ArticleTitle‘On Conditionals’ Mind 104 IssueID414 235–329

    Google Scholar 

  • N. Goodman (1983) Fact, Fiction, and Forecast Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA & London

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Grice (1975) ‘Logic and Conversation’ P. Cole J.L. Morgan (Eds) Syntax and Semantics NumberInSeriesVol. 3 Academic Press New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, S. (1999): Fiction, Mathematics and Modality: A Unified Fictionalism, Princeton Doctoral Dissertation.

  • I. Kvart (1986) A Theory of Counterfactuals Hackett Publishing Company Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • D.K. Lewis (1978) ArticleTitle‘Truth in Fiction’ American Philosophical Quarterly 15 37–46

    Google Scholar 

  • D.K. Lewis (1979a) ArticleTitle‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’ Nous 13 455–476

    Google Scholar 

  • D.K. Lewis (1979b) ArticleTitle‘Scorekeeping in a Language Game’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 339–359 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00258436

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D.K. Lewis (1982) ArticleTitle‘Logic for Equivocators’ Nous 16 431–441

    Google Scholar 

  • D.K. Lewis (2001) Counterfactuals Blackwell Malden & Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • E.J. Lowe (1995) ArticleTitle‘The Truth about Counterfactuals’ Philosophical Quarterly 45 IssueID178 41–59

    Google Scholar 

  • W.G. Lycan (2001) Real Conditionals Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • E. Mares (1997) ArticleTitle‘Who’s Afraid of Impossible Worlds?’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 IssueID4 516–526 Occurrence Handle10.1305/ndjfl/1039540767

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D.H. Mellor (1993) ArticleTitle‘How to Believe a Conditional’ Journal of Philosophy 90 IssueID5 233–248 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2940911

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • T. Merricks (2001) Objects and Persons University Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Nolan (1997) ArticleTitle‘Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 IssueID4 535–573 Occurrence Handle10.1305/ndjfl/1039540769

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • R. Nozick (1981) Philosophical Explanations Belknap Press Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • G. Priest (1997) ArticleTitle#x2018;Sylvan’s Box: A Short Story and Ten Morals’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 IssueID4 573–582 Occurrence Handle10.1305/ndjfl/1039540770

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • G. Rosen (1995) ArticleTitle‘Modal Fictionalism Fixed’ Analysis 55 IssueID2 67–73

    Google Scholar 

  • T. Sider (1999) ArticleTitle‘Presentism and Ontological Commitment’ Journal of Philosophy 96 IssueID7 325–347 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2564601

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D. Sperber W. Deirdre (1995) Relevance: Communication and Cognition EditionNumber2 Blackwell Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Tichý (1984) ArticleTitle‘Subjunctive conditionals: two parameters vs. three’ Philosophical Studies 45 147–179 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00372476

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • B.C. Fraassen ParticleVan (1980) The Scientific Image Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • K.L. Walton (1990) Mimesis as Make-Believe Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • E. Wierenga (1998) ArticleTitle‘Theism and Counterpossibles’ Philosophical Studies 89 87–103 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1004239104009

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D. Wilson D. Sperber (1992) ArticleTitle‘On Verbal Irony’ Lingua 87 53–76 Occurrence Handle10.1016/0024-3841(92)90025-E

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • L.T. Zagzebski (1990) ‘What If the Impossible had been Actual?’ M. Beatty (Eds) Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Liberal Arts, Seoul National University of Technology, South Korea

    Seahwa Kim

  2. Philosophy Programme, Victoria University at Wellington, New Zealand

    Cei Maslen

Authors
  1. Seahwa Kim
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Cei Maslen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Cei Maslen.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kim, S., Maslen, C. Counterfactuals as Short Stories. Philos Stud 129, 81–117 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3022-x

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3022-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation