Abstract
We present an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of stories and combine it with an account similar to Walton’s account of truth in fiction to yield truth conditions for counterfactuals. We discuss unusual features of this account, and compare it to other main approaches. In particular, we argue that our analysis succeeds in accounting for counterpossibles and counterfactuals with true antecedents while the other two main approaches fail, and we give reasons for thinking that it is important to have an adequate account of these two areas.
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Kim, S., Maslen, C. Counterfactuals as Short Stories. Philos Stud 129, 81–117 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3022-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3022-x