Abstract
In this paper, I argue for a view largely favorable to the Thirder view: when Sleeping Beauty wakes up on Monday, her credence in the coin’s landing heads is less than 1/2. Let’s call this “the Lesser view.” For my argument, I (i) criticize Strict Conditionalization as the rule for changing de se credences; (ii) develop a new rule; and (iii) defend it by Gaifman’s Expert Principle. Finally, I defend the Lesser view by making use of this new rule.
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Kim, N. Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization. Synthese 168, 295–312 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9443-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9443-2