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A proper understanding of Millikan

  • Language And Mind
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Abstract

Ruth Millikan’s teleological theory of mental content is complex and often misunderstood. This paper motivates and clarifies some of the complexities of the theory, and shows that paying careful attention to its details yields answers to a number of common objections to teleological theories, in particular, the problem of novel mental states, the problem of functionally false beliefs, and problems about indeterminacy or multiplicity of function.

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Kingsbury, J. A proper understanding of Millikan. Acta Anal 21, 23–40 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1008-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1008-8

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