Abstract
Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal characters and properties. In Sect. 2, I provide a conceptual analysis of intellectually virtuous perseverance that places perseverance in opposition to its vice-counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. The virtue is a matter of continuing in one’s intellectual activities for an appropriate amount of time, in the pursuit of intellectual goods, despite obstacles to one’s attainment of those goods. In Sect. 3, I explore relations between intellectually virtuous perseverance and other intellectual virtues. I argue that such perseverance is necessary for the possession and exercise of several other intellectual virtues, including courage. These connections highlight the importance of perseverance in a comprehensive account of such virtues.
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Notes
In this connection see Duckworth and Seligman (2005), a study showing that self-discipline of the sort characteristic of perseverance outperforms IQ as a predictor of academic success. See Peterson and Seligman (2004, Chap. 10) for a survey of the psychological literature on persistence as a character strength.
See Sosa (1991), (2007), (2009), and Greco (2010). All of these works put faculty-virtues to work in addressing traditional epistemological topics (e.g., the analysis of knowledge and the proper response to skepticism). Some philosophers who emphasize character virtues put such virtues to similar work. See, e.g., Zagzebski (1996).
Like Sosa’s and Greco’s, Zagzebski’s account of intellectual virtue includes a reliability component: intellectually virtuous agents possess knowledge in part because their character enable them reliably to form true beliefs. The account of perseverance developed in this paper neither requires nor excludes such a reliability component on intellectual virtue. What results is an ecumenical account of perseverance that can be adapted to suit the purposes of virtue epistemologists of several different stripes.
Thus, Greco and Turri (2011): “[I]t is plausible that a complete epistemology must feature both faculty-virtues and character virtues. Faculty-virtues seem indispensable in accounting for knowledge of the past and the world around us. Character virtues seem equally indispensable in accounting for richer intellectual achievements such as understanding and wisdom, which may presuppose knowledge, but which may also exceed it.” For more on the ways in which character and faculty-based virtue epistemology can complement each other, see Baehr (2011, Chap. 4), and Greco (2002) and (2010).
This is not to say that an agent must be consciously aware of such motivation in order to exhibit intellectual virtue; in many cases, the agent may exhibit the motivation while in “default mode.”
Brooks (1956, p. 17).
For a sampling of Bannister’s work in these areas, see Matthias and Bannister (2002). For a helpful summary of Bannister’s medical research, see Bascomb (2004, Chap. 7). No doubt Bannister’s research was aimed, not just at understanding, but also at improved athletic performance. But given his strict amateurism and early retirement from running in order to pursue a vocation in medicine, only those unfamiliar with Bannister’s life could confuse him for someone solely interested in winning races; he clearly valued epistemic goods. On Bannister’s amateurism see his (1955, p. 218 f.f.). Crucially, exclusive focus on epistemic goods is no requirement of intellectual virtue. See Sect. 2.6 for discussion on this point.
See Pannekoek (1961, Chaps. 20–23) for a summary of Brahe’s observations and the use to which Kepler put them.
One might think that the Keller and Bannister cases are primarily examples of intellectual courage rather than of perseverance. But on extant accounts of courage, courage is a character that requires persistence in the face of fears or threats. In the cases of Keller and Bannister, however, the relevant obstacles to intellectual goods are such items as discomfort, discouragement, and frustration. Thus, though Keller and Bannister seem to exhibit perseverance, their cases seem not to be paradigm cases of courage. See Sect. 3 for more on the distinction between courage and perseverance.
The indifferent person will fail to satisfy our definitions of intellectually virtuous perseverance because he won’t engage in intellectual projects for an appropriate amount of time; and he won’t engage precisely because of his indifference. But indifference, though opposed to perseverance in this way, is more proximately opposed to virtues like conscientiousness and proper curiosity.
Not all cases in which one fails to care about some particular item of knowledge are cases of vicious indifference. If I have no interest in the 40th entry in the Wichita, KS phonebook, I don’t ipso facto exemplify vicious indifference. But presumably there are cases of vicious indifference. Indifference to large stretches of inquiry relevant to human flourishing is among them.
In the realm of academic philosophy, one thinks of Hume’s struggles to disseminate the ideas of his Treatise of Human Nature. In the realm of popular literature, one thinks of J. K. Rowling’s enduring a dozen rejections before the publication of her Harry Potter series. Such examples could be multiplied.
On this point see Jason Baehr’s discussion of practical wisdom in connection with intellectual courage (Baehr 2011, pp. 187–90). This section owes much to that discussion.
Of course, practical wisdom will not sanction just any project in which an agent is interested. Such endeavors as reading the phone book straight through, or counting the blades of grass on one’s front lawn, are unlikely to win the approval of practical wisdom.
In odd cases, questions on the second list may become more important than those on the first. This would happen if, e.g., I planned to wager my life on having the correct belief about Keaton’s dress designer.
What shall we say about those rare, terrifically intelligent individuals who never encounter difficulty in their intellectual pursuits? Given the above account, do these individuals of necessity fail to possess intellectually virtuous perseverance? No. The distinction between having the virtue and exercising the virtue is helpful here. Perhaps those geniuses who never actually encounter difficulty nevertheless possess the virtue of perseverance, and so would exercise it if difficulty presented itself.
In Adventurer 138, Samuel Johnson nicely captures the phenomenology of struggling with distraction: “Composition is, for the most part, an effort of slow diligence and steady perseverance, to which the mind is dragged by necessity or resolution, and from which the attention is every moment starting to more delightful amusements” (Johnson 2003). Thanks to Fred Johnson for drawing this passage to my attention.
Thanks to Josh Orozco and an anonymous referee for helpful discussion on this point.
In countenancing a range of intellectual goods, I do not hereby enter the debate between epistemic value pluralists and value monists. All parties agree that knowledge and understanding are epistemic goods, at least by virtue of their relation to true belief. The debate over epistemic value concerns whether there is more than one fundamental epistemic value or goal. My account is silent on this matter; pluralists and monists are free to “plug-in” their own views accordingly. For a helpful introduction to work on epistemic value, see Pritchard (2007).
The distinction between mere perseverance and virtuous perseverance gains further support from the case of the person who “perseveres” through a very easy project, taking a long time to do so only because he is slothful (see Sect. 2.4). Again: not all cases in which one perseveres in some minimal sense are cases in which one virtuously perseveres. Cases of slothful and ill-motivated perseverance both suffice to illustratethis point. The distinction between perseverance and intellectually virtuous perseverance also provides a plausible reply to the concern that, because perseverance can aim at bad ends, it isn’t a virtue at all. Though some varieties of perseverance may aim at bad ends, perhaps this can’t be the case for virtuous perseverance. Thanks to Wayne Pomerleau for pressing me on this point.
An additional case worthy of mention is that of the dogmatist, who seeks above all to retain his current beliefs. Does he count as intellectually persevering? And if so, is that a problem for the present account of perseverance? There’s much to say here, but the following two points will have to suffice. First, the dogmatic agent fails to satisfy the motivation condition for intellectual virtue of any sort (including perseverance). For the dogmatist is chiefly concerned with retaining his beliefs come what may. He is not suitably sensitive to evidence against his view. And those who aren’t sensitive to contrary evidence are not plausibly considered motivated for truth or knowledge. (On this point see Zagzebski 1996, pp. 192–3.) Second, the virtue that most directly combats dogmatism is not perseverance, but humility. This explains why dogmatism is not treated extensively here. Recall, however, that practical wisdom plays an important role in the “appropriateness condition” of the present view. Among other things, practical wisdom is a virtue that enables those who possess it to balance the virtues. Thus, the agent with practical wisdom will characteristically balance perseverance with humility and other virtues (e.g., carefulness) that combat dogmatism.
Cases of perseverance proper help to distinguish perseverance from such virtues as courage, which carry a thicker psychological profile than the former. Such cases also show that perseverance isn’t merely a species of (say) courage. They thereby put significant pressure on taxonomies of the intellectual virtues which locate perseverance as a species of courage [see, e.g., Montmarquet (1993, p. 23) for such a taxonomy].
For details on Stapp’s exploits, see Frisbee (1983) and the History Channel film, “Modern Marvels: Edwards Air Force Base.” Thanks to Nathan Ballantyne for drawing Stapp’s career to my attention.
Aristotle, 1984 BK III, Chap. 7, line 10.
Roberts and Wood (2007, p. 217). In some places, Roberts and Wood construe courage chiefly as a response to perceived threats. However, they also argue that the concept of fear plays a fundamental role in paradigm cases of courage. It is this aspect of their account that I highlight here.
Such cases call into question a tempting argument for the conclusion that intellectual courage is a species of intellectual perseverance. The argument runs as follows. By the traditional definition of courage, (1) If a person X exhibits intellectual courage, then X exhibits a disposition to overcome X’s fears for the sake of some intellectual good. But (2) If X exhibits a disposition to overcome X’s fears for the sake of some intellectual good, then X exhibits a disposition to overcome an obstacle to her pursuit of the good in question. In other words, fears are a kind of obstacle. It follows from (1) and (2) that (3): If X exhibits intellectual courage, then X exhibits a disposition to overcome an obstacle to X’s pursuit of some intellectual good. Now, the virtue of intellectual perseverance just is a disposition to overcome obstacles to the achievement of intellectual goods. Thus, (4): If X exhibits a disposition to overcome obstacles to the pursuit of the given intellectual good, then X exhibits intellectual perseverance. It follows from (3) and (4) that (5): If X exhibits intellectual courage, then X exhibits intellectual perseverance; that is, cases in which courage is exhibited are cases in which perseverance is exhibited. Cases of courage are a subclass of cases of perseverance.
The case of the person whose fears positively contribute to good intellectual performance (rather than serving as an obstacle) shows that step (2) in this argument is false. The argument is nevertheless instructive—for it is plausible that in the vast majority of cases in which it is present, fear does serve as an obstacle to the successful pursuit of intellectual goods. And in such cases, the courage needed to overcome fear itself requires perseverance.
Baehr (2011, p. 177). As Baehr notes, the relevant sense of “apparent threat” is that of having a rational belief that something is a threat to one’s well-being. The threat need not be actual in order for one to exhibit courage.
Roberts and Wood (2007, p. 59) (emphasis mine).
Baehr (2011, p. 21).
For generous comments and helpful discussion, I thank Andrew Bailey, Nathan Ballantyne, Robert Garcia, Gordon Jackson, Fred Johnson, Richard McClelland, Josh Orozco, Adam Pelser, Wayne Pomerleau, Kamesh Sankaran and two anonymous referees. Thanks also to audiences at Baylor University, the Gonzaga University Socratic Club, and the 2012 Pacific APA. This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from The Character Project at Wake Forest University and the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Character Project, Wake Forest University, or the John Templeton Foundation. Finally, thanks to Whitworth University for providing research leave for this project.
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King, N.L. Perseverance as an intellectual virtue. Synthese 191, 3501–3523 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0418-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0418-1