Skip to main content
Log in

What’s so Transparent about Transparency?

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Representationalists often use intuitions about the transparency ofexperience to defend their view that qualitative content isrepresentational content. According to these intuitions, wecannot attend to our experience except by attending to theobject of that experience. Although the transparency intuitionappears to be widely shared, even among non-representationalists,in this paper I suggest that there are two ambiguities inherent indiscussions of transparency. One concerns the strength of thetransparency intuition, while the other concerns its scope. Oncewe bring these two ambiguities to the surface, we can see that therepresentationalists’ claim that experience is transparent turnsout to be considerably more controversial than ordinarily supposed.While the phenomenological data may support some kind of experientialtransparency, I argue that it does not support the kind of transparencyneeded for representationalism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Barthes, R. (1984): Camera Lucida, Richard Howard, trans., London: Flamingo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. (1996): ‘Mental Paint and Mental Latex’, in E. Villaneuva (ed.), Philosophical Issues 7, Perception (pp. 19-49), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. (1990): ‘Inverted Earth’, in Ned Block et al. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness (pp. 677-693), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (1997).

    Google Scholar 

  • Brook, D. (1986): ‘On the Alleged Transparency of Photographs’, British Journal of Aesthetics 26, 277-282.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, A. (2001): ‘Intentionalism Defended’, The Philosophical Review 110, 199-240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crane, T. (2001): Elements of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F. (2002): ‘Experience as Representation’, unpublished manuscript; available online at <http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/dretske1.htm>.

  • Dretske, F. (1995): Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge,MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friday, J. (1996): ‘Transparency and the Photographic Image’, British Journal of Aesthetics 36, 30-42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. (1990): ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, in Ned Block et al. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness (pp. 663-675), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (1997).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kind, A. (2003): ‘Restrictions on Representationalism’, unpublished manuscript.

  • Kind, A. (2001): ‘Qualia Realism’, Philosophical Studies 104, 143-162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leeds, S. (2002): ‘Perception, Transparency, and the Language of Thought’, Noûs 36, 104-129.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B. (2002): ‘Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia’, unpublished manuscript; available online at <http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/ loar2.htm>.

  • Lycan, W.G. (1996): Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M.G.F. (2001): ‘The Transparency of Experience’, unpublished manuscript; available online at <http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/ concepts/martin.html>.

  • McGinn, C. (1997): The Character of Mind, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C. (1991): ‘Consciousness and Content’, in Ned Block et al. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness (pp. 295-307), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (1997).

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G.E. (1925): ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, in Philosophical Papers (pp. 32-59), New York: Collier Books (1959).

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G.E. (1903): ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, in Philosophical Studies (pp. 1-30), Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co. (1965).

    Google Scholar 

  • Reid, T. (1764/1970): An Inquiry into the Human Mind, in Timothy Duggan (ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson, W.S. (1998): ‘Intrinsic Qualities of Experience: Surviving Harman’s Critique’, Erkenntnis 47, 285-309.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scruton, R. (1981): ‘Photography and Representation’, Critical Inquiry 7, 577-603.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. (1994): ‘Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner-Sense’ ’, in The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (pp. 201-268), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996).

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. (1991): ‘Qualia and Consciousness’, in The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (pp. 121-140), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996).

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. (1990): ‘Qualities and Qualia: What’s in the Mind?’ in The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (pp. 97-120), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996).

    Google Scholar 

  • Sturgeon, S. (2000): Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature, New York: Routledge Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (2000): Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (1995): Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge,MA: TheMIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (1992): ‘Visual Qualia and Visual Content’, in Timothy Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience (pp. 158-176), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (1991): The Imagery Debate, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton, K. (1984): ‘Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism’, Critical Inquiry 11, 246-277.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kind, A. What’s so Transparent about Transparency?. Philosophical Studies 115, 225–244 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025124607332

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025124607332

Keywords

Navigation