Abstract
In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpretation of the Lockean account of diachronicity (i.e., one’s sense of personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in one’s personal narrative. I argue that recent case studies show that while this critique may hold with regard to some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant with respect to accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic self-knowledge. The second issue I address concerns the question of diachronicity from the vantage point that there are (at least) two aspects of self—the self of psycho-physical instantiation (what I term the epistemological self) and the self of first person subjectivity (what I term the ontological self; for discussion, see Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474–518, 2012). Each is held to be a necessary component of selfhood, and, in interaction, they are appear jointly sufficient for a synchronic sense of self (Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474–518, 2012). As pertains to diachronicity, by contrast, I contend that while the epistemological self, by itself, is precariously situated to do the work required by a coherent theory of personal identity across time, the ontological self may be better positioned to take up the challenge.
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Notes
Full empirical documentation for each of these 8 points is available and, for those interested, references can be found in Klein and Gangi 2010.
It might strike the reader that my use of the terms “epistemological” and “ontological” in reference to the self are a bit confused. Such concern is warranted particularly with regard to the epistemological self. After all, epistemology refers to the process of acquisition of knowledge. In this light, such a term might seem better reserved for what I have labeled the ontological self. However, I have chosen to use the term “epistemological” self is as the designator of self-relevant content (primarily neural in nature), rather than as a process of content-extraction. If the reader finds it helpful, she or he may think of the epistemological self and ontological self, respectively, in terms of dichotomies such as “self as object and self as subject,” “self as known and self as knower,” “self as experienced and self as experiencer,” “the self of science and the self of experience,” etc. With respect to the “ontological” self, my intent is that pick out the aspect of self that refers to the first-person subjectivity that is aware of the epistemological self (i.e., the neuro-cognitive instantiation of self-knowledge). The ontological self is able to know about specific neuro-cognitive content relevant to first-person subjective experience.
This is a strong interpretation of Locke—i.e., that consciousness means consciousness and not memory. Of course, Locke also notes that as far as consciousness can be extended back to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of the person. Accordingly, while I adhere to Strawson’s interpretation of Locke’s use of the word “consciousness,” I acknowledge that Locke’s writings do not unambiguously exclude memory from the mix.
It is, of course, an open question whether his trait-self knowledge remained intact. Based on the evidence discussed in “Memory and the sense of personal identity,” I assume semantic dispositional self-knowledge was, to some degree, available. However, since Luria offers no evidence in this regard to this particular case study, the question necessarily must remain open.
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Klein, S. The sense of diachronic personal identity. Phenom Cogn Sci 12, 791–811 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9285-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9285-8