Abstract
When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can think of it either from a functional standpoint or from a physical standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people’s mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking difference between two kinds of states—those that involve phenomenal consciousness and those that do not. Specifically, it appears that ascriptions of states that involve phenomenal consciousness show a special sort of sensitivity to purely physical factors.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
We thank Uriah Kriegel for his extremely helpful comments on the formulation of these distinctions.
Here we want to single out for special praise the work of Block (1978; 1995). His pioneering research in consciousness studies has deeply influenced the experimental studies presented below. In fact, the very term ‘phenomenal consciousness’ is borrowed from Block (1995), where he argues explicitly that people grasp the distinction between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states. Of course, Block’s primary aim in those papers is somewhat different from our own, in that he is trying to use facts about people’s intuitions as part of an inquiry into the true nature of consciousness.
For detailed methodological and statistical information, see Knobe and Prinz (2006).
We were surprised that subjects gave such high ratings for ‘experiencing a sudden urge,’ and we therefore ran a quick follow-up study to get a better handle on the phenomenon. Some subjects received the sentence ‘Acme Corp. is experiencing a sudden urge to pursue internet advertising.’ Others received a sentence that was exactly the same except that the word ‘experiencing’ was replaced with ‘feeling.’ The mean rating for subjects who received the version with ‘experiencing’ was 2.9; the mean for subjects who received the version with ‘feeling’ was 3.9. The overall mean was 3.5. These results suggest that the original ratings may have been artificially high as a result of sheer chance.
In a striking development, Michael Bruno, Bryce Huebner and Hagop Sarkissian (unpublished data) have conducted a cross-cultural study demonstrating that this effect also arises among subjects in Hong Kong. (Even more interestingly, the study showed a significant effect such that the difference between ascriptions to groups and ascriptions to individuals is smaller for Hong Kong subjects than it is for American subjects.)
Here it is natural to wonder whether people would also be willing to ascribe phenomenal states to the corporation if it had been enchanted by a sorceress. We do not yet have any experimental data on this question, but Adam Arico and Shaun Nichols are designing a study to address the issue.
As the researchers rightly emphasize, phenomenal consciousness is specifically relevant to judgments of moral patiency (judgments about whether it would be wrong to do certain things to a given entity) rather than to judgments of moral agency (judgments about whether it would be wrong for the entity itself to do certain things). Judgments of moral agency appear to depend more on ascriptions of non-phenomenal states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions.
References
Arico, A., Fiala, B., & Nichols, S. (2006). The folk psychology of consciousness. Unpublished manuscript. University of Arizona.
Block, N. (1978). Troubles with Functionalism. In C. Wade Savage (Ed.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, Volume IX. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 261–325.
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about the function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227–247.
Bloom, P., & Veres, C. (1999). The perceived intentionality of groups. Cognition, 71, B1–B9.
Cushman, F. (2006). Judgments of morality, causation and intention: Assessing the connections. Unpublished manuscript. Harvard University.
Gilbert, M. (1992). On social facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997). Words, thoughts, and theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gray, H., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. (2007). Dimensions of mind perception. Science, 315, 619.
Huebner, B. (in prep.) Ph.D. dissertation. University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
Inagaki, K., & Hatano, G. (1991). Constrained person analogy in young children’s biological inference. Cognitive Development, 6, 219–231.
Jack, A. I., Roepstorff, A., & Robbins, P. (2006). The genuine problem of consciousness: Trusting the subject. Manuscript under revision.
Johnson, S. (2000). The recognition of mentalistic agents in infancy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 22–28.
Kashima, Y., Kashima, E., Chiu, C-Y., Farsides, T., Gelfand, M., Hong, Y-Y., et al. (2005). Culture, essentialism, and agency: Are individuals universally believed to be more real entities than groups? European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 147–169.
Knobe, J. (2005). Theory of mind and moral cognition: Exploring the connections. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 357–359.
Knobe, J. (2007). Folk psychology: Science and morals. In Hutto, D., & Ratcliffe, M. (Eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Kluwer/Springer Press.
Knobe, J., & Prinz, J. (2006). Experimental studies of intuitions about consciousness: Methodological and statistical details. http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/ConscDetails.pdf>
Leslie, A., Knobe, J., & Cohen, A. (2006). Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: ‘Theory of mind’ and moral judgment. Psychological Science, 17, 421–427.
McCann, H. (2005). Intentional action and intending: Recent empirical studies. Philosophical Psychology, 18, 737–748.
Mele, A. (2003). Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology, 16, 325–340.
Morris, M., Menon, T., & Ames, D. (2001). Culturally conferred conceptions of agency: A key to social perception of persons, groups, and other actors. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 169–182.
O’Laughlin, M., &. Malle, B. F. (2002). How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 33–48.
Pettit, P. (2003). Groups with minds of their own. In F. Schmitt (Ed.), Socializing metaphysics (167–193). New York: Rowan and Littlefield.
Searle, J. (1995). The construction of social reality. New York: Free Press.
Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M. (1999). Modularity, development and ‘theory of mind.’ Mind & Language, 14, 131–153.
Solan, L. (2005). Private language, public laws: The central role of legislative intent in statutory interpretation. Geo. L.J., 93, 427.
Tollefsen, D. (2002). Organizations as true believers. Journal of Social Philosophy, 33, 395–410.
Tuomela, R. (1995). The importance of us: A philosophical study of basic social notions. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Velleman, D. (1997). How to share an intention. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, 29–50.
Acknowledgement
For helpful comments and suggestions, we wish to thank Ned Block, Paul Bloom, Bryce Huebner, Tony Jack, Uriah Kriegel, Tania Lombrozo, Bill Lycan, Bertram Malle, Ram Neta, Shaun Nichols, Philip Pettit, David Velleman, and the anonymous author of Mixing Memory. We are especially grateful to Kriegel, whose incisive comments led to major changes in a number of aspects of our paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Knobe, J., Prinz, J. Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies. Phenom Cogn Sci 7, 67–83 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y