Abstract
Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explanatory yet ineliminably exception-laden? Do we need them to endow our epistemology with a substantial explanatory structure? Mark Lance and Margaret Little argue for the claim that we do. I will argue that we can just as well do without them – at least in epistemology. So in the paper, I am trying to very briefly sketch an alternative contextualist picture. More specifically, the claim will be that although an epistemic contextualist should commit himself to epistemic holism he can nevertheless appeal to epistemic principles other than defeasible generalizations in order to provide his epistemology with a structure.
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Kompa, N. Moral Particularism and Epistemic Contextualism: Comments on Lance and Little. Erkenntnis 61, 457–467 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-9284-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-9284-4