Skip to main content
Log in

How internal can you get?

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper examines Laurence BonJour's defense of internalism inThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge with an eye toward better understanding the issues which separate internalists from externalists. It is argued that BonJour's Doxastic Presumption cannot play the role which is required of it to make his internalism work. It is further argued that BonJour's internalism, and, indeed, all other internalisms, are motivated by a Cartesian view of an agent's access to her own mental states. This Caretsian view is argued to be untenable, and, accordingly, so is internalism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • BonJour, Laurence: 1985,The Structure of Empirical Justification, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kornblith, Hilary: 1983, ‘Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action’,Philosophical Review 92, 33–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kornblith, Hilary: 1985, ‘Ever Since Descartes’,The Monist 68, 264–76.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kornblith, Hilary: 1986, ‘Naturalizing Rationality’, in P. Hare and N. Garver (eds.),Naturalism and Rationality, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, pp. 115–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kornblith, Hilary: (in preparation a), ‘Introspection and Misdirection’.

  • Kornblith, Hilary: (in preparation b),Psychologism: An Essay in Inferential Apologetics.

  • Malcolm, Norman: 1963,Knowledge and Certainty, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nisbett, Richard and Lee Ross: 1980,Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nisbett, Richard and Timothy Wilson: 1977, ‘Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes’,Psychological Review 84, 231–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O.: 1969,Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, Sydney: 1963,Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stroud, Barry: 1968, ‘Transcendental Arguments’,Journal of Philosophy 65, 241–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, Timothy: ‘Self-Deception Without Repression: Limits on Access to Mental States’, in Mike Martin (ed.),Self-Deception and Self-Understanding, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, pp. 95–116.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kornblith, H. How internal can you get?. Synthese 74, 313–327 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869633

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869633

Keywords

Navigation