Abstract
Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response tothis charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value.
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Kraay, K. Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 56, 297–317 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016307111148
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016307111148