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Relevant identity

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Abstract

We begin to fill a lacuna in the relevance logic enterprise by providing a foundational analysis of identity in relevance logic. We consider rival interpretations of identity in this context, settling on the relevant indiscernibility interpretation, an interpretation related to Dunn's relevant predication project. We propose a general test for the stability of an axiomatisation of identity, relative to this interpretation, and we put various axiomatisations to this test. We fill our discussion out with both formal and philosophical remarks on identity in relevance logic.

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Kremer, P. Relevant identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28, 199–222 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004323917968

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004323917968

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