Abstract
Two notions of evidence are focused on in this essay, Carnap's positive-relevance notion of evidence (1962, pp. 462 ff.), and Achinstein's notion of potential evidence (1978; and 1983, pp. 322–350). Achinstein creates several interesting examples in his attempt to find faults in Carnap's notion of evidence; his motive, ultimately, is to impel us towards potential evidence. The purpose of this essay is to show that positive relevance is significantly more promising than potential evidence with respect to capturing the scientific sense of the term “evidence.” This is accomplished by finding faults in the notion of potential evidence, and by defending positive relevance against Achinstein's examples.
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References
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I am especially indebted to Peter Achinstein, Edwin Allaire and Bob Kane for many valuable suggestions. I would also like to thank my colleagues Donald Becker and Jean Kazez for their constructive criticisms and other useful suggestions. (The defense of the positive-relevance notion of evidence provided here fulfills an obligation made in an earlier essay (Kronz, 1988).)
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Kronz, F.M. Carnap and Achinstein on evidence. Philos Stud 67, 151–167 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00373695
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00373695