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Computing Machines Can't Be Intelligent (...and Turing Said So)

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Abstract

According to the conventional wisdom, Turing (1950) said that computing machines can be intelligent. I don't believe it. I think that what Turing really said was that computing machines –- computers limited to computing –- can only fake intelligence. If we want computers to become genuinelyintelligent, we will have to give them enough “initiative” (Turing, 1948, p. 21) to do more than compute. In this paper, I want to try to develop this idea. I want to explain how giving computers more ``initiative'' can allow them to do more than compute. And I want to say why I believe (and believe that Turing believed) that they will have to go beyond computation before they can become genuinely intelligent.

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Kugel, P. Computing Machines Can't Be Intelligent (...and Turing Said So). Minds and Machines 12, 563–579 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021150928258

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