Abstract
The naive structuralist definition of truthlikeness is an idealization in the sense that it assumes that all mistaken models of a theory are equally bad. The natural concretization is a refined definition based on an underlying notion of structurelikeness.
In Section 1 the naive definition of truthlikeness of theories is presented, using a new conceptual justification, in terms of instantial and explanatory mistakes.
In Section 2 general constraints are formulated for the notions of structurelikeness and truthlikeness of structures.
In Section 3 a refined definition of truthlikeness of theories is presented, based on the notion of structurelikeness, using a sophisticated version of the conceptual justification for the naive definition.
In Section 4 it is shown that ‘idealization and concretization’ is a special kind of potentially refined truth approximation.
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I would like to acknowledge that van Benthem (1987) played in several respects a crucial role in the research for a new refined definition. Moreover, I like to thank David Miller, Ilkka Niiniluoto, and two referees for their comments on an earlier version. One of the referees notes that the Miller version of the naive approach (in model-theoretic terms, and identifying the truth with the truth about the actual world) has been criticised on several occasions for its failure to accommodate likeness between structures by Oddie (notably Oddie, 1986). The idea that likeness between structures should be a guiding idea behind truthlikeness is said to be a constant theme of Oddie's work. All this may well be true, but I should add however that Oddie's publications did not play any role in my research. The local references to Oddie are based on the suggestions by the referee.
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Kuipers, T.A.F. Naive and refined truth approximation. Synthese 93, 299–341 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01089273
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01089273