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Does every theory have empirically equivalent rivals?

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Abstract

The instrumentalist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data runs as follows: (1) every theory has empirically equivalent rivals; (2) the only warrant for believing one theory over another is its possession of a greater measure of empirical virtue; (3) therefore belief in any theory is arbitrary. In this paper, I examine the status of the first premise. Several arguments against the universal availability of empirically equivalent theoretical rivals are criticized, and four algorithms for producing empirically equivalent rivals are defended. I conclude that the case for the first premise of the argument from underdetermination is very strong. The disposition of the argument itself depends on the fate of the second premise.

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Kukla, A. Does every theory have empirically equivalent rivals?. Erkenntnis 44, 137–166 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00166499

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00166499

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