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In this paper I try to fortify the nominalistic objectology (cf. Meinong's 'Gegenstandstheorie') with essentialist means. This also is intended as a preparation for introducing Information Monism
Research Interests:
In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the kind originally proposed by Spinoza (deus sive natura). Yet Spinoza was still stuck in the Cartesian paradigm and therefore rather gave a... more
In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the kind originally proposed by Spinoza (deus sive natura). Yet Spinoza was still stuck in the Cartesian paradigm and therefore rather gave a dual monism (extensio et intellectus) than a proper neutral monism. I propose that there are only two attributes of the one substance: existence and non-existence. Everything else is/are mere modes of them
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In this paper I will combine ideas of Meinong's objectology with earlier ideas of ethereal or intelligible gunk. I will try to make that useful for a better understanding of 'emergence'. I also spend some remarks on... more
In this paper I will combine ideas of Meinong's objectology with earlier ideas of ethereal or intelligible gunk. I will try to make that useful for a better understanding of 'emergence'. I also spend some remarks on mathematical theorie
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. In an earlier paper ‘The Topos of Emergence’ (‘TheTopos of Emrgence’, in: Boundaries - The Scientifc Aspects of ANPA 24, (ed. Keith G. Bowden), London 2003, pp 236 –250; cf.also:http://www.academia.edu/1549400/The_Topos_of_Emergence) I... more
. In an earlier paper ‘The Topos of Emergence’ (‘TheTopos of Emrgence’, in: Boundaries - The Scientifc Aspects of ANPA 24, (ed. Keith G. Bowden), London 2003, pp 236 –250; cf.also:http://www.academia.edu/1549400/The_Topos_of_Emergence) I introduced a mathematical structure called the topos PrePhys consisting of an ever propagating emergent hierarchy made of a strict n-categorical unfolding of automorphic objects obAM .Later I came to the conclusion that this topos PrePhys perfectly matchs the concept of Gunk introduced under this name by DavidLewis. (cf. D.Lewis, Parts of Classes, Oxford, Cambridge (Mass.)1991, pp 19 –2
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Pfeils vorgestellt werden, die auf moglichen Implikationen des Kontiguumbegriffs beruht, wie ihn Leibniz in mehreren Arbeiten zu den Grundlagen der Dynamik entwickelt hat. Wesentlich sind dabei wechselseitige thematische Bezuge seiner... more
Pfeils vorgestellt werden, die auf moglichen Implikationen des Kontiguumbegriffs beruht, wie ihn Leibniz in mehreren Arbeiten zu den Grundlagen der Dynamik entwickelt hat. Wesentlich sind dabei wechselseitige thematische Bezuge seiner Theoria Motus Abstracti und seines Dialogs Pacidius Philalethi. Aus der von Leibniz durchgefuhrten Analyse des Kontiguums als einer Voraussetzung der Moglichkeit von Bewegung ergibt sich, das das (scheinbar zwischen Kontinuum und Diskretheit angesiedelte) Kontiguum - in heutiger Terminologie - nicht durch solche Merkmale wie Machtigkeit oder Dichte bestimmt werden kann, sondern vielmehr eine besondere (topologische) Zusammenhangsstruktur aufweisen mus. In der Arbeit wird gezeigt, das die dynamisch begrundeten Anforderungen an eine solche Zusammenhangsstruktur von geeigneten topologischen Modellen einer Kette erfullt werden.
In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structures. I.e. we will follow the example of F.W.Lawvere's "An elementary theory of the category of sets" 1 where he introduced a... more
In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structures. I.e. we will follow the example of F.W.Lawvere's "An elementary theory of the category of sets" 1 where he introduced a categorised version of set theory.
The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the conceptual intricacy of the notion of '(primordial) emergence' by applying category- and topos- theoretical means. 1 This relates most... more
The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the conceptual intricacy of the notion of '(primordial) emergence' by applying category- and topos- theoretical means. 1 This relates most directly to what had been called 'the meontology of primordial emergence' in the corresponding paper "The Tower of Turtles" (see the "The Philosophical Aspects of ANPA 24"), namely the 'objects which are not intended entities'. A particularly interesting instance of such 'objects which are no entities' is the proposed mathematical structure from which in my understanding the most elementary (or fundamental) physical structure(s) have been emergent.
In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emer- gence and reduction(ism). The motivation behind that is to try to overcome an inherent vagueness of the reductionist program which most obstinately shows up at the primordial... more
In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emer- gence and reduction(ism). The motivation behind that is to try to overcome an inherent vagueness of the reductionist program which most obstinately shows up at the primordial emergence, namely that of the intended elementary ontological structure(s) of the universe itself. I propose that for overcoming the alleged nearly paradoxical situation of reductionism with respect to primordial emergence one has to put the attached problems in a rigorously emergence-theoretical perspective. Thus I will also come to some uncommon ontological results, e.g. the postulate of objects which are no intended entities (and no mere ideas or fictitious concepts either) and by this to the postulate that the most fundamental physical structure(s) have to be seen as being emergent from a rigorously non-physical, i.e. an entirely mathematical structure.
In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emergence and reduction(ism). The motivation behind that is to try to overcome an inherent vagueness of the reductionist program which most obstinately shows up at the primordial... more
In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emergence and reduction(ism). The motivation behind that is to try to overcome an inherent vagueness of the reductionist program which most obstinately shows up at the primordial emergence, namely that of the intended elementary ontological structure(s) of the universe itself. I propose that for overcoming the alleged nearly paradoxical situation of reductionism with respect to primordial emergence one has to put the attached problems in a rigorously emergence-theoretical perspective. Thus I will also come to some uncommon ontological results, e.g. the postulate of objects which are no intended entities (and no mere ideas or fictitious concepts either) and by this to the postulate that the most fundamental physical structure(s) have to be seen as being emergent from a rigorously non-physical, i.e. an entirely mathematical structure. Physica ergo ... desinit in geometriam, nec ante ullum phaenomenon penitus in corporibus intelli...
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"This 'paper' is meant to be an introduction to three other papers of mine, namely: 'The "Emergence" of Existence' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310644/The_Emergence_of_Existence_-_from_Pregeometry_to_Prephysics), 'Names and Objects'... more
"This 'paper' is meant to be an introduction to three other papers of mine, namely: 'The "Emergence" of Existence' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310644/The_Emergence_of_Existence_-_from_Pregeometry_to_Prephysics),
'Names and Objects' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310705/Names_and_Objects_-_Outlines_of_an_Essentialist_Nominalism), and
'Information Monism' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310969/Information_Monism_-_and_its_Concepts_of_Substance_Attributes_and_Emergent_Modes).
In this introduction also some light shall be shed on the mutual dependence and interrelatedness of these mentioned papers. It also includes a hefty attack on Russell's 'On Denotation' with respect to his alleged refutation of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (objectology aka theory of objects)."
Research Interests:
In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the kind originally proposed by Spinoza (deus sive natura). Yet Spinoza was still stuck in the Cartesian paradigm and therefore rather gave a... more
In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the kind originally proposed by Spinoza (deus sive natura). Yet Spinoza was still stuck in the Cartesian paradigm and therefore rather gave a dual monism (extensio et intellectus) than a proper neutral monism. I propose that there are only two attributes of the one substance: existence and non-existence. Everything else is/are mere modes of them.
Research Interests:
In this paper I try to fortify the nominalistic objectology (cf. Meinong's 'Gegenstandstheorie') with essentialist means. This also is intended as a preparation for introducing Information Monism.
Research Interests:
In this paper I will combine ideas of Meinong's objectology ( my preferred translation of "Gegenstandstheorie") with earlier ideas of ethereal or intelligible gunk. I will try to make that useful for a better understanding of 'emergence'.... more
In this paper I will combine ideas of Meinong's objectology ( my preferred translation of "Gegenstandstheorie") with earlier ideas of ethereal or intelligible gunk. I will try to make that useful for a better understanding of 'emergence'. I also spend some remarks on mathematical theories.
Research Interests:
Der Autor macht in seinem Beitrag gegen das vorherrschende reduktionistische Selbstverständnis der modernen Physik geltend, daß eine umfassende Theorie von Allem (TOE) nicht schon durch eine Alles vereinheitlichende Theorie als Abschluß... more
Der Autor macht in seinem Beitrag gegen das vorherrschende reduktionistische Selbstverständnis der modernen Physik geltend, daß eine umfassende Theorie von Allem (TOE) nicht schon durch eine Alles vereinheitlichende Theorie als Abschluß des reduktionistischen Programms ...
This sketch of a perhaps future 'Elementary Theory of the Category of Mereological Sums (including Mereological Wholes and Parts)' relates to my previous papers "The Topos of Emergence" and "Intelligible Gunk". I assert that for... more
This sketch of a perhaps future 'Elementary Theory of the Category of Mereological Sums (including Mereological Wholes and Parts)' relates to my previous papers "The Topos of Emergence" and "Intelligible Gunk". I assert that for successfully categorizing Mereology one has to start with a specific setting of gunk.