Abstract
In this paper I shall offer a response to Paul Boghossian’s recent criticism of “replacement relativism”. Replacement relativism is the main semantic strategy for making sense of philosophical forms of relativism. Replacement relativism was first formulated by Gilbert Harman (1996a, b). It models philosophical relativism on relativization in the natural sciences.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
This paper grew out of my contribution to a symposium on Fear of Knowledge organised by the Institute of Philosophy in London, in November 2006. Boghossian acted as commentator. Despite the fact that we found little common ground, I have learnt much from his reply. – I have also benefited from discussing Boghossian’s work with Arif Ahmed, David Bloor, Adrian Haddock, Jeff Kochan, Richard Raatzsch, Simon Schaffer, and Barry Smith. For comments on previous drafts, I am grateful to Stephen Grimm, Jeff Kochan, Markus Lammenranta, Peter Lipton, Ram Neta, Richard Raatzsch, Mark Sprevak and David B. Wong. I have presented this paper to philosophical audiences in Cambridge, Edmonton, Madrid and Tilburg, and have learnt much from questions asked on these occasions.
References
Boghossian P (2006a) Fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Boghossian P (2006b) What is relativism? In: Greenough P, Lynch MP (eds) Truth and realism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 13–37
Harman G (1975) Moral relativism defended. Philos Rev 84:3–22
Harman G (1996a) Harman’s response to Thomson’s Part II. Moral relativism and moral objectivity. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 157–187
Harman G (1996b) Moral relativism. Moral relativism and moral objectivity. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 1–64
Harman G, Thomson JJ (1996) Moral relativism and moral objectivity. Blackwell, Oxford
Williamson T (2000) Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Wong DB (1984) Moral relativity. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA
Wong DB (2006) Natural moralities: a defense of pluralistic relativism. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kusch, M. (2009). Epistemic Replacement Relativism Defended. In: Suárez, M., Dorato, M., Rédei, M. (eds) EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-3262-1
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-3263-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)