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Don't Take Unnecessary Chances!

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Abstract

The dominant argument for the introduction ofpropensities or chances as an interpretation of probabilitydepends on the difficulty of accounting for single caseprobabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the``single case'' application of probability can be accountedfor otherwise. ``Propensities'' are needed only intheoretical contexts, and even there applications ofprobability need only depend on propensities indirectly.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 14627, U.S.A

    Henry E. Kyburg Jr.

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  1. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
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Kyburg, H.E. Don't Take Unnecessary Chances!. Synthese 132, 9–26 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019610615497

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019610615497

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