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Locked-in Syndrome and BCI - Towards an Enactive Approach to the Self

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Abstract

It has been argued that Extended Cognition (EXT), a recently much discussed framework in the philosophy of cognition, would serve as the theoretical basis to account for the impact of Brain Computer Interfaces (BCI) on the self and life of patients with Locked-in Syndrome (LIS). In this paper I will argue that this claim is unsubstantiated, EXT is not the appropriate theoretical background for understanding the role of BCI in LIS. I will critically assess what a theory of the extended self would comprise and provide a list of desiderata for a theory of self that EXT fails to accommodate for. There is, however, an alternative framework in Cognitive Science, Enactivism, which entails the basis for an account of self that is able to accommodate for these desiderata. I will outline some first steps towards an Enactive approach to the self, suggesting that the self could be considered as a form of human autonomy. Understanding the self from an enactive point of view will allow to shed new light on the questions of whether and how BCIs affect or change the selves of patients with LIS.

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Notes

  1. In accordance with Fenton and Alpert, as well as Walter I refer to “Extended Cognition” as the position originally put forward by Clark and Chalmers.

  2. I owe this example to Ezequiel Di Paolo.

  3. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this worry.

  4. Even if we take the self to be based on cognitive processes, a claim about the nature of the vehicle of some cognitive processes would not be telling without understanding what self is, and what exactly the cognitive processes involved are.

  5. They do admit that extended cognition is in principle possible, but argue that “as a matter of contingent empirical fact” cognition takes place in the brain (pp.55,70) [23].

  6. As an anonymous reviewer has correctly pointed out, this does not rule out that it is in principle possible to combine both approaches. The crucial point is that while EXT maybe applied to the relation of BCI and LIS with respect to specific cognitive processes, ENC is a better theoretical framework to account for the self in LIS/BCI. However, given the more general problems of EXT, e.g. the lack of definition of cognition, and its widespread ignorance of the role of the subjective experience a combination of both approaches may be unwarranted after all. Furthermore, if explanatory efficiency matters, than it maybe better to not combine a framework that is explanatorily less encompassing with a second one, but opt for a single, explanatorily more fruitful framework, if such a framework is available.

  7. I propose that these social interactions of distinction and participation are by and large established by communication, which is not restricted to linguistic or verbal communication—bodily postures, touch, gestures and facial expressions etc. are included.

  8. The above considerations have at least two implications. First, the constitutive processes of distinction and participation have to be constantly realized. This is to say that human autonomy would necessarily be affected to the degree that its constitutive processes are; it might even cease to exist, when these processes are absent for a critical time. Secondly, if self is seen as coinciding with human autonomy, which is not constituted by the organism alone, but through social interactions, it cannot be innate and it is also questionable whether very young infants would have it.

  9. Note that I by no means assume that these considerations exhaustively account for the role of BCI. This would indeed require a much more thorough investigation, and is a task for future work. The purpose here is to highlight new avenues for addressing this question and rethinking the role of BCI for LIS. I have to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this worry.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Markus I. Eronen, Rudolf Müllan, Frank Schumann and Sven Walter for valuable comments on earlier versions of the manuscript. My research is funded by a scholarship of the Research Training Group “Adaptivity in Hybrid Cognitive Systems”, University of Osnabrück, Germany.

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  1. Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück, Albrechtstraße 28, 49069, Osnabrück, Germany

    Miriam Kyselo

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Kyselo, M. Locked-in Syndrome and BCI - Towards an Enactive Approach to the Self. Neuroethics 6, 579–591 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9104-x

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