Classical World

The aim of this essay is to cast doubt on Sandra Peterson’s reading of the Theaetetus, and in turn to present an alternative to it. Against Peterson, I argue that we have no good reason to doubt Plato’s endorsement of the picture of the philosopher of the digression; that, while Socrates and the philosopher of his digression are indeed cast as different types of philosophers, this need not mean that they are incompatible. Quite the contrary, so I argue, is what Plato intends to show us in the Theaetetus. Both Socrates and the philosopher of the digression, while philosophizing in different ways, work together in achieving one overarching aim: betterment of self by means of intellectual activity. In addition, I argue against Peterson’s claim that the Socrates of the Theaetetus is the same as the Socrates of the Apology. I also show that her related reading of the close of the Theaetetus does not stand up to scrutiny. Lastly, I offer an alternative reading of the close of the Theaetetus.