SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME
LIFE AND ACTION IN ETHICS AND POLITICS
PRACTICES AS ACTUAL SOURCES OF
GOODNESS OF ACTIONS
BY
ARTO LAITIEN
© 2015 – Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series), Supplementary Volume (2015): 57-70
Luiss University Press
E-ISSN 2240-7987 | P-ISSN 1591-0660
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LIFE AND ACTION IN ETHICS AND POLITICS
Practices as Actual Sources of
Goodness of Action
Arto Laitinen
C
hapters Ten and Eleven in Michael Thompson’s Life and
Action discuss practices and dispositions as sources of
individual actions, and as sources of the goodness of the
individual actions.1 Thompson illustrates his views with “acts of
fidelity”. His special focus
is on what I will call the act of fidelity and its normative and evaluative
standing. An agent X’s doing A for another agent Y is an act of fidelity
where we can affirm, in a certain familiar sense, that X did A for Y because
she promised Y she would—that is, ‘precisely because’ or ‘just because’ she
promised this. We distinguish such acts of promise-keeping from those in
which, as we say, an ‘ulterior motive’ is at work. The Prichardian
conception of a promise as potentially exhausting the agent’s ground in the
keeping of it is an intuitive conception, one fitted to the everyday
enterprise of action explanation (151).
In many cases the thing promised would be worth doing
independently of the promise. On the other hand, there are cases
where the thing promised has so dire consequences, that one
should not do it. But relevantly for the practice of promising,
there are also “tight-corner” cases where one should act as
promised:
1
M. Thompson, Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical
Thought (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2008). Page numbers in the
text are to this book.
© 2015 – Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series), Supplementary Volume (2015): 56-70
Luiss University Press
E-ISSN 2240-7987 | P-ISSN 1591-0660
Philosophy and Public Issues – Life and Action in Ethics and Politics
the goods and evils to be pursued and avoided in the tight-corner context
are such as would make the faithful person’s conduct either morally
blameworthy or imprudent if it were performed by a similarly situated
person, but one who had not made a promise (153).
In what follows, I will first discuss the nature of actuality, then
the distinction between acting on a first-order consideration and a
second-order consideration and the possibly related distinction
between expressing a practice and merely simulating it, and then I
turn to varieties of goodness.
I
Actuality
One angle to Michael Thompson’s book is that it breathes
new life, from a Fregean-Aristotelean perspective into the
Hegelian distinction between moral considerations or principles,
that tell us what one ought to do, and ethical practices
constitutive of ethical life – the distinction between Moralität and
Sittlichkeit.2
Practices are “actual” in a way that moral principles are not:
one aspect of the difference between moral principles and ethical
practices is that the former have the character of “ought” (Sollen)
2
One can note in passing that Hegel’s theory of action must by Hegelian lights
seem limited by its context: it is located within the confines of Moralität, and is
about realizing one’s intentions, about translating something “inner” into
something “outer”. It is clear that Hegel thinks that a fuller account of action
should be given in the context of established practices, in the context of
Sittlichkeit. Perhaps what Thompson writes would be along the lines that would
fit: first of all, Thompson’s simple theory of action nicely accounts for how
something “outer”, what one does, and not merely “inner” (intentions, desires)
can stand in the explanatory relations to something else that one does. And
secondly, Thompson articulates what it is for a shared practice to be a source
of one’s actions.
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Arto Laitien – Practices as Actual Sources of Goodness of Actions
and may lack any other existence, whereas in ethical practices
“what is” and “what ought to be” coincide. In them, what ought
to be, is actualized. By contrast, moral principles which merely
articulate how things ought to be.
Second, in ethical practices something that ought to be, is
actualized. This distinguishes what is truly actual from what
merely exists—not everything that exists is a manifestation of
something good or rational, thought Hegel. Thompson draws a
similar contrast. Ethical practices differ e.g. from games of
different sorts in that they are good in some such sense that they
can transfer to individual actions.3 Thus, concrete practices differ
from abstract principles on the one hand, and from various
institutionalized regularities of action which do not possess any
particular worth on the other hand.
There seems to be a third point as well, which serves to
distinguish between moral principles that have been realized, and
practices in which something morally good or rational has been
realized. So, interestingly, Thompson seems to suggest that
practice can be said to differ from principles in that the latter
have no causal power. Thus, the third point concerns causal
efficacy of some sort—what is actual is not merely something
“actualized”, it is also something that has causal power, that is
actual as it were. While in their realizations (realizations of agents’
intentions which are in line with what they ought to do) moral
principles are actualized and thus do not remain mere “oughts”,
3
As has been often noted to make the Hegelian thesis that “everything that is
actual is rational” slightly less counter-intuitive: not everything that “exists” is
“actual” in the Hegelian sense—not everything is a manifestation of a rational
essence.
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they nonetheless do not have causal power. By contrast, practices
are causes of events in the world.4
the character of realist relations of fitness or deontological ‘principles’ can
be summed up in Hegel’s ironic formula: they are “something far too
excellent to have actuality, or something too impotent to procure it for
themselves.” Such things could, for example, only ‘act’ through an agent’s
granting them significance— that is, in a way in which even non-existent
relations of fitness and false or imaginary principles could (160).
So is the idea that principles can lead to action only if the
agent understands their validity, and then act on them. Practices,
it seems, can in some sense be action-guiding independently of
any reflective endorsement: a person who has been brought up to
keep one’s word may do so in tight corners while perhaps
regretting that it makes no sense to do so, as some other course
of action would have more beneficial consequences. And even
when not regretting that, the person may simply not care whether
it is right or wrong.
But while not presupposing reflective endorsement (like
principles), practices presuppose that the participants are aware of
the relevant concepts, and that they regard relevant
considerations as reasons. So in some sense, the practices, too,
function via the “agents’ granting them significance.”5 And the
false or imaginary principles have a counterpart in worthless
practices, which could falsely be thought to be worthwhile. Yet,
the relation of the individuals to the practices can perhaps better
be called “embodiment” than “reflective endorsement.”
4
Perhaps it is helpful to think of them as self-reproducing in some sense, but
at least they stand in a special relation to actions.
5 Thompson does not discuss sanctioning mechanisms via which the practices
could have ‘external’ causal power but focuses on the dispositions of
participants who are as they ought to be.
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Arto Laitien – Practices as Actual Sources of Goodness of Actions
II
“Simulating a practice” and acting reflectively on a practice:
reasons and second-order considerations
The consideration for which X acts is “I promised Y I would
do A”, not accompanied with any selfish, altruistic or malevolent
ulterior motives. It is rather clear that such ulterior motives would
ruin the praiseworthiness of the act. It is less clear whether
Thompson suggests that reflective second-order considerations
would do the same.
Call the consideration for which X acts, “I promised Y I
would do A”, a first-order consideration. That could in principle
be accompanied with second-order considerations “that I
promised Y I would do A is a normative reason for me to do A”
or “I ought to do A because I promised Y I would” or “the
principle that promises ought to be kept demands that I do A” or
“the practice of promising requires that I do A like I promised Y
I would”.
At first look, there’s nothing wrong with such reflectivity that
humans are capable of. Being consciously aware of what one does
and why (say, that one is painting a wall because it needed
painting; and that one is acting for a good reason; and that one is
acting as one ought to) need not change the nature of the activity.
Thompson seems to allow for harmless reflection as well: “a
practice is something of which its bearers are or can become
conscious in an emphatic sense; articulate knowledge of it can come
to them by reflection” (198).
So what could be wrong with the second-order
considerations? Of course, some kind of self-consciousness of
one’s good deeds might be detrimental to the virtue of modesty,
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and some practical tasks may be more fluent when one does not
pay attention to them, but those sorts of worries do not seem to
be at issue here. Thompson distinguishes sharply cases where one
acts as a participant of a practice, “within” a practice as it were,
manifesting or expressing that practice, and cases where one
follows a principle citing the practice, in which case one is
“externally” related to the practice, simulating that practice.
The issue is not merely that one is or is not a participant a
practice – after all, there are no injunctions for a non-participant
to follow, so there is nothing even to simulate. Thompson writes
of middle Rawls’s and Scanlon’s accounts that in them
the ideally respectable agent is plainly to be depicted as responding to the
practice and its merits as an external element of the situation in which she
is operating. In this respect, she is related to the practices under which she
lives as a faithful agent is related, on any view, to the past promises she has
made. Rawls’s and Scanlon’s hero acts by reference to the practice she faces, in
consideration of its merits, but the practice itself in no sense governs her
operation: her action is at best governed by the Principle of Fairness or of
Established Practices, taken now as a principle of action that she has
internalized”(174).
Referring to the “transfer principles” according to which the
goodness of acts of fidelity is derived from the goodness of the
practice, Thompson further writes that
If an agent were somehow to ‘act on’ one of our transfer principles—and
thus in view of the merits of one of the practices or dispositions she herself
bears, considered as a mere circumstance of her action—then her action
would surely merely simulate action that genuinely instances that practice or
disposition”(174).
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It is not entirely clear why it would be bad kind of reflectivity
to “act in view of the merits”. 6 It sounds benign enough to be a
case of second-order considerations accompanying the first-order
consideration. Say, knowing that the practice of promising has
merits should be ok.
In the context of the “transfer principles”, the crucial
difference between the real thing and the simulation seems to be
this: there is the consideration, and then the explanatory (or
causal) connection between the consideration and action.
Thompson warns us that thoughts about the explanatory
connection should not be mistaken for the considerations that are
the reasons.
The idea is perhaps that it is harmless to take “I promised” as
a reason, accompanied with the thought “I am such that I keep
my promises” or “the practice is to keep one’s promises” or by an
endorsement of the practice of promising as a valuable practice
(there need not be cases of “one thought too many”). What is
harmful to raise the considerations “I am such that I keep my
promises” or “the practice is to keep one’s promises” to be
reasons of one’s action—then one is perhaps merely simulating.
By contrast, suppose Jack is not motivated by “I promised”,
but needs to think about the value of the practices of promising
(in general) before is motivated to act. That perhaps is a situation
where Jack is promoting the practice of promising; not
expressing, but merely “simulating” it.
6
Take a case where one has come to realize one has unwanted racist
tendencies, and acts cautiously in view of those tendencies (making sure one
does not act on them). There at least one is well-advised to act in view of those
tendencies without manifesting the tendencies.
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But consider what goes on in such “simulation”: there is a
transfer of the normative and motivational force from “keeping
one’s promises is good” via “I promised Y to A” to “I do A”.
The transfer works, so at one point in the chain of transfer “I
promised to” does function as a reason. It is not clear what the
difference is to the practice of promising.
One more example: suppose Jack has recently come aware of
the sexism of some of our practices, and now wonders whether
keeping one’s promises is a sexist practice. He comes to the
conclusion that it is not. He continues to be governed by the
practice, not blindly, but in a self-reflective way, on guard so that
if he will come to the conclusion that the practice is not morally
ok he will try not to be governed by it anymore. The situation can
be described as Jack expressing the practice, but also acting in
light of the merits of the practice. This, I suppose, cannot be
described as Jack merely simulating the practice.
So I take it that having both “I promised to” and “keeping
one’s promises is good” in one’s motivational field is expressing
the practice of promising, whereas having merely “keeping one’s
promises is good” in one’s motivational field might be simulating
the practice.
III
Goodness
It is less clear whether the practice-based and the principlebased approaches that Thompson distinguishes differ in their
account of the normative or evaluative features at stake—that is,
whether they disagree on how and why keeping one’s promises is
good and right. The difference between Moralität and Sittlichkeit
might lie somewhere else—both can for example demand
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keeping one’s promises in the tight-corner situations. My
suspicion is that for many senses of “good”, the distinction
between expressing a practice and acting on a principle does not
make a difference. The distinction may concern only the way in
which practices are the sources of individual actions (the etiology
of actions) not the way in which practices are the sources of the
goodness of individual actions (the evaluative and normative
standing of actions).
Thompson writes about “normative and evaluative standing”
(151) in a deliberately loose way. Let us ask however what
varieties of “goodness” of actions are at stake in the transfer
principle stating that an action is good if it expresses, manifests,
instances or exemplifies (executes, falls under, realizes, accords
with, is part of) a good practice. Goodness comes in many
varieties, here are some main ones. Officially, Thompson does
not care which evaluative or normative quality is at stake (he is
interested in the transfer from the practice to the acts), but it may
be more plausible concerning some senses of “good”. Further,
each of these senses of goodness seems to be ruled out by
something Thompson says, but then again, each of them may be
among the intended meanings.
First, something can be not merely of instrumental value, but
of intrinsic or final value, when it is worth pursuing for its own
sake, or when its realization or existence is worth hoping for –
perhaps happiness, or friendship, or knowledge are such (typically
this kind of value is attributed to states of affairs). Final value is
non-instrumental value that makes things that have the value
worth desiring, hoping for, loving, appreciating, engaging with,
realizing and respecting.
This is prima facie a strong candidate for being the relevant
sense of goodness: if so, the transfer principle states that an
action can be of final value, be good in itself and not merely
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instrumentally, when it expresses, manifests or instances a
practice, which also is of final value, or good in itself. The
goodness of the practice transfers final value to the action that
manifests the practice.
There is however some reason to think that it is not such
“final value” that Thompson is interested in. This category of
value is what consequentialism tells us to maximize – in classical
utilitarianism happiness is sole such value, but different versions
of consequentialism will have different lists. Consequentialism
tells us that actions are morally right if they maximize value in this
pre-moral but morally relevant sense of final value. However,
deontological theories may deny that rightness of actions depends
on value in this sense at all, but can be e.g. a matter of formal
universalizability of the way of acting. Given that the “transfer
principle” Thompson is interested in can be plugged into
deontological or consequentialist “standards of appraisal” it
seems that this kind of pre-moral final or intrinsic value is not at
stake. Thompson grants that some such standard of appraisal is
right, he does not here care which, and he focuses on the transfer
of goodness from practices to actions.
Notwithstanding this interpretive problem, this sense of
goodness can well be the kind of goodness transferred from the
practice of promising to individual deeds.
Second, the moral “goodness” of an action may in fact stand
for the moral “soundness” or rightness of action, the opposite of
its wrongness or impermissibility. That some action maximizes
pre-moral value can be a right/good-making feature, and moral
goodness in the sense of rightness is the feature thus “made”.
There is a further consideration that suggests that “rightness”
is in fact at stake. Remember how promised deeds come in three
categories: first, there are cases where the promised deed would
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be worth doing even when not a token of keeping one’s promise,
second, tight corner cases where it would be wrong to do the
deed, if it were not for the fact that it is a case of keeping one’s
promise, and third, cases where it would be wrong to do the deed
despite the fact that it was a case of keeping one’s promise.
Thompson is interested in the tight corner cases. In those
cases, the act is right and worth doing only thanks to its being an
instance of a general practice – and the value and worthwhileness
of the general practice tranfers its “goodness” to the individual
action. What is so created is strictly speaking rightness.
Further, Thompson explicitly allows that this sense of
rightness may be at stake—he speaks about “evaluative and
normative quality” (168) in a deliberately loose sense and lists a
number of possible alternatives (“rationality, moral goodness,
moral rightness, fairness, reasonableness, or any number of other
things”). However, given that goodness and rightness are
mentioned here separately, it suggests Thompson does not mean
rightness with goodness. So let us continue to search for the
sense of “goodness” at stake, but agree that indeed moral
rightness is among the features that acts of fidelity can have, in
virtue of having the right expressive relation to the practice.
Third, the goodness of action can be more densely not merely
a matter of doing the right thing, but doing it for the right
motives or reasons—here the moral worth or praiseworthy
quality of the will with which one acts is at stake. Doing the right
thing for a wrong reason might be devoid of moral or
praiseworthiness. Suppose that keeping one’s promise also
slightly harms to one’s neighbour one does not like so much, and
one is malevolently motivated by that consideration to keep one’s
promise. It is still the right thing to do to keep one’s promise, but
the act is devoid of any moral goodness.
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By contrast, acts of fidelity without ulterior motives seem to
have precisely this kind of moral value, goodness or
praiseworthiness. It is harder to see whether and how such moral
praiseworthiness can be a quality of a practice—so perhaps it is
not the same kind of goodness that “actions” and “practices”
have. So this third sense of goodness cannot be something
transferred from the practices, as practices arguably cannot
instantiate this sense of goodness.
It seems however that moral goodness or praiseworthiness of
this sort is meant to be had by the acts of fidelity, cases of doing
the promised deed just because one had promised to. And it is
precisely goodness or praiseworthiness in this sense that is
threatened by ulterior motives or perhaps the wrong kinds of
second-order considerations.
Fourth, something can be good for me, beneficial for me, if it
furthers my well-being or my “good”.7 This goes with the
prudential value of my actions—are they good for me?
Thompson, following Gauthier and Foot, discusses this sense of
goodness as the “rationality” of actions, so this is not the sense of
“goodness” he has in mind in discussing the transfer principle. So
let us keep searching for the relevant sense of goodness, but agree
that prudential rationality of this sort is also at stake in the acts of
fidelity, and in the transfer of evaluative and normative status
from practices to actions.
Fifth, something is a good, excellent, non-defective K, if it
functions as a K ought. A watch ought to show time, and a heart
ought to pump blood, for example. A participant in a practice of
7
Note that my well-being cannot be good for my well-being, so it does not
make sense to say that my well-being is good for me; or if it does, then effects
to my “well-being” are not what determines whether something is beneficial
for me.
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promising ought to be such that he or she keeps his or her
promises. This kind of normativity of the defective and the nondefective items is relevant for the analogue between biological
life-forms and social practices, central to Thompson’s project.
The problem with sticking to this sense of “goodness” is that
it is trivial, and there is hardly any room for either denying or
affirming the “transfer”. If rules of the game tell us to do X when
in C, then a non-defective player does X when in C. If goodness
was meant to distinguish practices from mere games, this sense of
goodness cannot do it, as there is the possibility of defects in any
game.
Further, it is not clear that the practice can instantiate this kind
of goodness at all (can a practice be as it ought to be?). And if it
can what is the broader context that gives the practice its value?
Perhaps the functions of human nature?
Thompson distinguishes between games, that have
constitutive rules, and genuine practices. The key seems to be that
the practices have the relevant sense of goodness to be
transferred to the actions. What is transferred, then, must be
more than mere non-defectiveness – that would not distinguish
games and such practices as promise-keeping.8
So the fifth sense of goodness is not the main sense of
goodness. But nonetheless, the relevant kind of nondefectiveness, goodness as a K, is also meant here: acts of fidelity
are good tokens of the practice. And what distinguishes promisekeeping from tic-tac-toe is that promise-keeping as a practice is
8
Compare to how Alasdair MacIntyre defined a practice in “After Virtue” as
something that has goods internal to practices, and standards of excellence,
and suggested that something really counts as a practice if it adds to the variety
of human flourishing, and it can do so only if it is of final, non-instrumental
value. Trivial games such as tic-tac-toe do not meet that criterion.
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good (as having final value, as transferring morally rightness or
praiseworthiness to the deeds, as being beneficial to human
flourishing and one’s true self-interest—or possibly, as being
itself a non-defective token in the type “practices that realize the
human function”).
So ultimately, it looks like we did not find the sense of
“goodness” at stake, but that goodness in all the five senses can
be had by actions. Promise-keeping arguably is good in many
ways so it may not matter that Thompson also seems to have had
in mind different ways in which promise-keeping is good in
different passages. Nonetheless, it would clarify things if the
nature of the goodness transferred from practices to actions were
made clearer.
Let us end by asking which of the senses of “good” are
relevant for drawing the distinction between practices as a source
of goodness, and goodness that the actions may have
independently. Acts of keeping one’s promise might be (i) of
final, non-instrumental value, (ii) morally right, (iii) morally
praiseworthy and (iv) prudential even though their goodness
would derive from some other source than the practice. Similarly,
the nature of promising might enable us to define defective
promisors in terms of individual actions and principles; so (v) the
idea of defectiveness of actions need not be derived the practice
either.
If that is right, then it seems that the difference between
“Moralität” and “Sittlichkeit” is not in the evaluative or normative
status of the good, rational actions, but more for example in
actuality in the relevant sense.
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