Pathologies of Recognition: An Introduction
by Arto Laitinen, Arvi Särkelä and Heikki Ikäheimo
This special issue focuses on two central concepts in contemporary critical
social theory: namely ‘recognition’ and ‘social pathology’. For defenders of
a theory of recognition, adequate recognition is itself a key normative
criterion for analysing social wrongs and pathologies which fall short of the
ideal. For critics, the focus on recognition – even at its best – rather conceals
social wrongs. While the contributors in this collection represent slightly
different approaches, the general consensus amongst them is that recognition
as such is a good ideal but like all good ideals it can go wrong in various
ways and take pathological forms itself. The papers published here are part
of a larger project that can be thought of as continuing what has been called
the ‘Jyväskylä school’ of recognition theories.1
In the first subsection we briefly introduce the notion of recognition
and trace its development from Fichte and Hegel to Honneth and his critics,
and in the second subsection turn to the concept of a social pathology. The
third section provides a brief look at the individual papers.
Recognition from Hegel to Honneth and His Critics
As much as it is agreed upon that recognition (Anerkennung) is of vital
importance for humans individually and collectively and that the lack of it
can therefore have serious consequences, the dynamics of the lack or denial
of recognition have not been extensively discussed in the literature.
On the trail of investigation starting from the post-Kantian German
philosophers Fichte and Hegel, recognition is a central distinguishing factor
of human sociality and thereby of both psychological and social structures
defining the human life-form. With some differences, both Fichte and Hegel
conceived of recognition as consisting of intersubjective attitudes whereby
individual structures of consciousness or intentionality become mediated by
those of other individuals, and whereby fundamental social relations and
structures come about. Through recognition of others, human individuals
begin to relate to themselves and their environment both epistemically and
motivationally partly from the perspectives of the others they recognize,
grasping themselves as Is and yous and thereby forming various basic kinds
of ‘we’-groups. Writing before Darwin, neither philosopher had a picture of
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the phylogenetic details of this phenomenon in the natural history of the
human species, but both had ideas about how it works ontogenetically in
the development of human infants in already ‘humanized’ societies. Most
importantly, they, and especially Hegel, developed conceptual tools that
marked the beginning of a paradigm for thinking about distinctively human
psychological and social capacities, patterns and structures as an
interconnected whole: a paradigm with great theoretical promise and a close
connection to everyday experiences of ‘recognition’ and the lack of it.
In addition to pioneering a way of thinking about distinctively human
psychological and social capacities and structures in a unified way, the
forefathers of the recognition-paradigm also opened up ways to synthetize
a purely descriptive account of the human life-form with a broad range of
normative considerations, ranging from purely functional considerations to
legal, moral, and political ones. In a nutshell: as they conceived of it,
recognition is not only ontologically necessary for the existence of structures
and capacities distinctive of the human life-form, it is also fundamental to
their functioning, as well as to the well-being of individuals and the ethical
or moral quality of their relationships, characters, motives and actions. On
Fichte’s (2000 [1796]) account, the process through which the human infant
gradually develops from a helpless animal into a self-conscious, rational and
autonomous being – or, as he says, a ‘person’ – involves mutual recognition
in the sense of attributing normative statuses to others and conceiving of
oneself and others as bound by these. One way to reconstruct Fichte’s
thinking (see Ikäheimo, 2014, chapter 3) is to understand recognition as
mutual attribution of authority over rules or norms of interaction and thereby
coming to conceive of oneself as an individual bound by norms and
responsible to others. Thus, mutual attribution of authority is needed for
establishing and administering a space of shared norms or rules. For Fichte
this is the basic ontological structure of the human life-form and
simultaneously the foundation of both the legal realm and of morality.
Importantly, this amounts to conceiving of morality as an inbuilt element of
the basic structure of human sociality.
One of Hegel’s many additions to the ideas of intersubjective
recognition pioneered by Fichte was to think of the phenomenon in a more
differentiated way, as having more than one form or dimension (see
Honneth, 1995).2 Whereas Fichte understood recognition in merely
deontological terms, as establishing a space of norms and thereby rights and
the duties they imply (or, as he writes, ‘a relationship of right’), Hegel added
a second – axiological – dimension of recognition in which intersubjective
recognition brings about a mediation of the individual’s motivational or
value-horizon through the value-horizons of others. To recognize in this
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5
axiological sense – which Hegel, following certain other post-Kantian
thinkers, calls ‘love’ (Liebe) – is to care for or to be moved by the well-being
of others non-instrumentally and thus to internalize their concerns as if they
were one’s own concerns. Analogically to the Fichtean deontological form
of recognition, this axiological form of recognition thus also introduces an
intersubjective mediation to the structure of intentionality or consciousness
of the individual, and it also adds a second dimension to the idea that
recognition is of fundamental moral or ethical significance.
Another originally Hegelian innovation, one which has had a
profound influence in social and political thought, is the addition of a
conflictual aspect to the notion of intersubjective recognition. Hegel’s famous
parable of ‘master and slave’ illustrates the internal structure, dynamics and
tendency to self-overcoming of one-sided recognition, of being recognized
by others without having recognition for them or vice versa. In ways that
have also found resonance in 20th century psychological and
psychoanalytical thinking (see Benjamin, 1988), Hegel presents the figure of
the ‘master’ as one who demands recognition from others (the ‘slaves’) of
his absolute authority over them (the deontological dimension of
recognition) without recognizing them as having any authority over him (or
anyone else), and who demands recognition from others for his well-being
as having absolute value (the axiological dimension of recognition) without
recognizing their well-being as having any value that is non-instrumental.
Although Hegel is, generally speaking, optimistic about the functional
dynamics of one-sided recognition-relations eventually leading to more
equal relations of recognition, his introduction of the conflictual, egoistic, or
‘negative’ side of desires and relations of recognition does complicate the
picture and for many readers introduces an element of psychological realism
into it.
After its inception by Fichte and Hegel the idea of recognition has
played many roles in social and political thought as well as in psychology –
from an almost unconscious influence in Marx, Lukács and others in the leftHegelian tradition, surfacing here and there in the social theory of British
neo-Hegelians such as Bosanquet and pragmatists such as Dewey and Mead,
to being the central concept in Alexandre Kojève’s anthropological
philosophy of history and thereby massively influencing 20th century French
thought, including the Lacanian school of psychoanalysis and Sartrean
existentialism. Yet only during the last 20 years has recognition become a
topic of widespread and focused discussions in social and political
philosophy, as well as a topic of systematic philosophical investigation.
These discussions have largely concentrated on issues of
multiculturalism and various kinds of ‘politics of identity’ with the guiding
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idea that linguistic, ethnic, sexual and other particular identity-defining
features require ‘recognition’ in the form of not only legal support but also
positive societal appreciation. What is new in these debates is, first, the
introduction of a third form of recognition – positive appreciation or
valuation of particular features of individuals and groups – and, secondly,
a close connection to actual political movements, struggles and discourses
(among the central texts here are Taylor, 1994 and Fraser, 1995). However,
these discussions have tended to de-emphasize the Fichtean and Hegelian
ideas of the foundational significance of recognition for distinctively human
psychological and social structures, as well as the fundamentally moral or
ethical nature of recognition.
Generally acknowledged as presenting the most ambitious agenda in
contemporary social and political philosophy utilizing the idea of
recognition, and one with major importance for this special issue, Axel
Honneth (1995) presents the outlines of a ‘formal theory of the good life’
whose aim is to normatively evaluate the basic institutions of societies
according to how well they enable the development and maintenance of the
psychological resources that individuals need for autonomous and
subjectively meaningful self-realization. The idea – drawing on an
interpretation of Hegel and modern developmental psychology and
psychoanalysis – is that essential to such psychological resources are the
positive self-relations of self-trust, self-respect and self-esteem, and that these
positive self-relations are dependent on experiences of being an object of the
corresponding three forms of recognition of love, respect and esteem by
relevant others. Thus in Honneth’s view a society is good to the extent that
its basic institutions allow for, facilitate or embody these different forms of
recognition and thereby support psychological well-being and individual
self-realization. Honneth also draws heavily on the Hegelian idea of
‘struggles’ for recognition leading to better or more equal forms and relations
of recognition.
With all its merits, Honneth’s project has drawn criticism from various
sides. Much of the criticism has accused the project of uncritical optimism
regarding the content and results of demands and struggles of recognition.
For example:
A) Many have claimed that Honneth does not propose adequate means for
distinguishing good from bad (i.e. morally or politically unjustifiable)
desires, expectations and demands for recognition (Fraser in Fraser &
Honneth, 2003).
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B) There has been widespread scepticism about Honneth’s alleged Hegelian
optimism about struggles for recognition leading by default to social and
moral progress.
C) Relying on particular strands in developmental psychology and
psychoanalysis, Honneth introduces a relatively harmonistic picture of the
psychodynamics of recognition the details of which are controversial (Butler,
2008; Whitebook, 2009). Related to that, Honneth’s Hegelian
conceptualization of recognition as consisting of the positive (moral or
ethical) attitudes of respect, love and esteem has been challenged by more
‘pessimistic’ conceptualizations that emphasize the necessity of issues like
power-relations in the very dynamic of recognition (Butler, 2008; Whitebook,
2009). It remains contested why one should choose Honneth’s ‘harmonistic’
or ‘optimistic’ conceptualization of intersubjective recognition over more
‘agonistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ ones.
D) Honneth, alongside many others in the recognition-theoretical stream of
thought, has emphasized an inbuilt need for recognition in humans, but this
idea has not been systematically combined or contrasted with an account of
reasons that individuals and groups may have for denying or rejecting
recognition. This, one might argue, makes the overall picture too optimistic
and results in insufficient diagnostic power for understanding the dynamics,
reasons for, and possible outcomes of situations where recognition between
individuals or groups is not forthcoming.
This special issue addresses some of these worries, and thereby aims to
contribute to the further development of the recognition-theoretical
paradigm in social and political philosophy. It accepts as a working
hypothesis the two programmatic ideas of the founders of the recognitionparadigm: a) that intersubjective recognition is of fundamental constitutive
significance for distinctively human psychological and social structures, and
b) that it is of fundamental significance for these structures to function well,
for the well-being and freedom of individuals, and for the moral or ethical
quality of their relationships, characters, motives and actions.
The contributions to this issue will critically complement the Hegelinspired picture outlined by Honneth and others following him of successful
relationships of recognition and their generally optimistic conception of the
content, dynamics and results of needs, demands and struggles for
recognition with an account of denied, lacking or rejected recognition. The
papers examine psychological and social factors that may lead to the lack,
denial or rejection of recognition and the potential consequences these may
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have. As recognition is, arguably, of constitutive significance for the
psychological and social reality of humans, and as failures of recognition
may therefore have serious psychologically and socially pathological or
destructive consequences, it is essential to have an adequate philosophical
and theoretical grasp of this negative side of recognition-relationships as
well.
In the spirit of Immanuel Kant’s idea of ‘asocial sociability,’ the papers
in this collection will in different ways critically complement the
aforementioned idea that humans have an inbuilt need for recognition with
the general hypothesis that due to the very nature of recognition, there are
also universally human tendencies to the denial or rejection of recognition (see
most explicitly Ikäheimo’s paper ‘Conceptualizing Causes for Lack of
Recognition—Capacities, Costs, and Understanding’). Thus, although
humans need intersubjective recognition to exist and flourish as human
persons individually and collectively, they are also equipped with
mechanisms that present a constant threat to this condition being fulfilled
and thus to their existence and well-being. This can be thought of in terms
of specific kinds of psychological vulnerabilities and costs that recognition and
thus the recognition-dependence of humans introduce.
For example, taking others as having authority over one makes one
vulnerable to their judgments, including negative ones. It makes sense that
there would also be defensive tendencies to avoid psychic costs by denying
recognition to others as authorities. Being concerned for the well-being of
others, and loving them, makes one vulnerable to their suffering. The more
one cares the deeper one can be hurt and this introduces clear limits to the
individual’s capacity to love or care intrinsically. The capacity of repressing
one’s concern for others as a defence mechanism would not be a surprising
part of the normal psychic makeup of individuals. And acknowledging the
value of the contributions by others or one’s dependence on them may be a
blow to one’s self-image, creating anxiety and again necessitating defence
mechanisms. Interestingly, in addition to these tendencies to repress one’s
recognition for others or deny it to them, there may well be tendencies to try
to reject the significance of the recognition one gets or fails to get from others.
This is easy to see in cases of negative judgements one would like to avoid,
but accepting positive judgements may be experienced as taking part in a
social dynamic that is threatening in other ways – by opening oneself to the
views of others, one risks being vulnerable in a new way. There may be a
number of psychological, institutional and/or cultural factors that play a role
in determining how open or closed people are to relations of mutual
recognition.
While various factors that shed light on tendencies to suppress mutual
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recognition need to be studied by means of empirical research, theories about
the very nature of mutual recognition can help clarify the intersubjective
dynamics of mutual misrecognition. It is rewarding to be recognized, and
being recognized in turn motivates the recognizing of others. Similarly,
experiences of misrecognition motivate one to deny recognition to others, as
it is easy to spot in downward spirals of revenge or in frozen conflicts. After
such violations, it is very hard to repair the relationships, and very easy to
deepen the harms. The psychology of group processes reveals how easily
the division into ‘us’ and ‘them’ emerges, and unfortunately such division
does not go away as easily: when a division becomes operative, especially
in a negative way, it will have a dynamic of its own. One way to
conceptualize such negative developments of relations of recognition is as
‘social pathologies.’
Social Pathologies
Among the social pathologies discussed in the tradition of critical theory are
such social evils as reification, alienation, invisibilization, ideological social
practices including ideological recognition, distributive injustice, social
inequality, economic exploitation and pathologies of rationality. Whether
these are indeed pathologies of recognition is contestable and depends on to
the extent to which they can be understood to denote different ways in which
social reality fails to actualize adequate recognition. Further, one may ask
whether the dynamics of misrecognition can generate a distinct kind of
pathology, which is not best grasped in terms of these other traditional social
evils.
There are several questions that an account of social pathologies
should answer. One is why philosophers should characterize social evils
with this concept at all, as it comes with notable historical baggage, having
medical, biological, and psychiatric connotations and a strong hint of
‘organismic’ conceptions of society (see Honneth, 2014b). To attempt an
answer, let us distinguish three different conceptions of a social pathology
that each accept that social pathologies are something pervasive and (at least
partly) socially caused.3 The first view A) studies the shared conceptual
structure of the pathologies without stressing the medical, biological or
organismic aspect of the concept, the second B) takes seriously the idea of a
social organism and the third C) builds on the crucially different idea of the
process of social life.
A) One may try to define social pathologies without any organismic hints
by suggesting that what makes social evils ‘pathologies’ is that they share a
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particular relational conceptual structure, as suggested by Christopher
Zurn’s (2011) interpretation of Axel Honneth’s (and the Frankfurt School’s
critical theory’s) writings. Zurn characterizes pathologies as socially caused
and pervasive ‘second-order disorders’. By this he means that in cases such
as reification, invisibilization and ideological recognition one finds
‘constitutive disconnects between first-order contents and second-order
reflexive comprehension of those contents, where those disconnects are
pervasive and socially caused’ (Zurn, 2011, 345-6). This proposal is critically
discussed in the chapter by Laitinen.
Explicitly referring to Zurn, Axel Honneth draws upon a structure
much like this in his Freedom’s Right. He describes social pathologies as the
ways in which one-sided conceptions of freedom, such as juridical freedom
and moral freedom, necessarily distort recognitive relationships if they are
taken to be authoritative as such and are not integrated within a more
inclusive picture of social freedom (Honneth, 2014a, part II). Here, again, the
pathology is that the first-order content of social practice is not fully grasped
by conceptions of juridical and moral freedom on the level of second-order
reflection, making the practice not only one-sidedly comprehended but also
intrinsically distorted.
On this reading, the naturalist or medical connotations of ‘pathology’
do not seem important for the implementation of the concept within social
phenomena. Even if the concept of pathology here is clearly intended as a
critical tool for diagnosing social disorders not grasped thoroughly enough
by ‘mere’ moral or political criticism, this view of pathologies of recognition
is thus not immediately tied to the wider pathology diagnostic tradition in
social philosophy that Honneth traces back to Rousseau in his early essay
on ‘Pathologies of the Social’ (cf. Honneth, 2007). One advantage here is that
the concept of pathology seems a handy way of distinguishing the project
of ‘critical social philosophy’ from the projects of ‘political philosophy’ or
‘moral philosophy’ that apply standards of legitimacy and moral rightness
on social conditions. An intuition behind this use of the concept of pathology
seems to be that it adds a distinct layer of social wrongs or evils to the
picture. Under pathological conditions, the questions of moral rightness and
political legitimacy appear as one-sided and do not grasp the specific
disorder addressed.4
A difficulty might be that the concept risks ending up as too abstract:
firstly, it is not clear whether such diverse phenomena as ideology,
reification, invisibilization, organized self-realization, etc. can be understood
as having one common conceptual structure of ‘second-order disorders’ (see
Laitinen’s ‘Social Pathologies, Reflexive Pathologies, and the Idea of Higher
Order Disorders’ below in this collection, as well as Freyenhagen, 2015). This
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worry can perhaps be avoided by having a more encompassing view about
the shared conceptual structure of social pathologies, reserving the term
‘reflexive pathologies’ for Zurn’s proposal, but other open issues remain.
Secondly, it seems that according to this view the terminology of
‘pathologies’ remains an optional – and perhaps in some sense misleading –
way to speak about pervasive forms of ideologically concealed socially
caused suffering. There seem to be no really compelling reasons why these
social evils be called ‘pathologies,’ as the word comes with a historically
loaded significance much more specific than the relational ‘second-order
disorder’-structure. Arguably, something that is central to influential
diagnoses of pathology seems to be missing in this picture. For instance,
Hegel’s story of ‘Lord and Bondsman,’ Adorno’s concept of ‘damaged life,’
and even Durkheim’s diagnosis of ‘anomie’ all clearly share a fundamentally
pathology-diagnostic claim, yet their diagnoses do not necessarily feature a
disconnect between first and second orders. This disconnect is thematized
by all three authors by means of ‘subconcepts’ (of ‘ideology critique’
perhaps) such as ‘Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy Consciousness’ in
Hegel’s case, ‘Verblendungszusammenhang’ in Adorno, and ‘market
individualism’ in Durkheim. Only in the case of these ideology-analytical
‘subconcepts’ do we have an explicit thematization of a necessary disconnect
of first-order contents and second-order reflection. Pathology can
conceptually go on without them in all three authors’ accounts: a ‘first-order’
content can be systematically distorted without the disconnect between it
and its reflexive comprehension being the problem at hand. Thus these and
other authors seem to offer reasons for a ‘strict’ conception of pathology that
includes first-order systematic disturbances of social reproduction. Those
phenomena also demarcate the class of social facts that comes close to the
naturalistic connotations of the concept of a pathology and that have
traditionally been linked with it. It seems fair to assume that critical social
theory might need some sort of conception of those social facts.
In social philosophy, the concept of a pathology has often been
employed in circumstances that emphasize either its medical (Canguilhem)
or biological (Durkheim) connotations. Such uses might point to disorders
that are ‘first order,’ ‘third order’ or even render the vocabulary of different
orders unnecessary. Thus it seems that the second-order disorder conception
cannot account for the influential use of the concept of social pathology but
does not challenge that use either. Thus it does not give us an adequate
answer to the question previously asked: why should the concept of social
pathology be the one to use to define all those phenomena that share the
specific relational structure of second-order disorders?
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B) An alternative, then, is to conceive of a social pathology as an ‘illness’ or
‘disease’ that infects a society. In contrast to the first conception, here the
medical and biological metaphor comes to the fore: instead of regarding
pathologies of recognition as ‘second order’ deviations from recognitive
norms implicit in social practices, this perspective takes them to be
deviations from the reproductive values or ends of a society.
In the wider tradition of social philosophy, we know this use from
classical views such as Durkheim’s diagnosis of anomie. Such approaches
draw upon a metaphorical conception of the social organism that is
supposed to have fallen ill. They thus take pretty literally the pathologyanalogy with a biological vocabulary and the diagnosis-analogy with a
medical vocabulary: the society is conceived of as the kind of thing that can
fall ill, that is, an “organism”; and human organisms that do fall ill need a
physician to diagnose them if they want to get well again. Thus these
approaches try to take pretty literally the role of the ‘pathologist,’ the
pathology-diagnostic social theorist, as well.
The idea behind these accounts seems to be roughly that the different
social ‘organs’ appear to be dead or failing in that they do not serve the
reproductive end of the social whole. In social and political philosophy this
idea can already be seen in Plato’s Republic and came to be pervasive for
modern social thought through Auguste Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive.
In the tradition of recognition theory, it might be read as dating back to
Hegel’s concept of objective spirit. It has been reactualized by Honneth in
his recent article on ‘The Diseases of Society,’ where he states his skepticism
about any conception of pathology which does not rely on a rehabilitation
of the long-dead idea of a social organism (Honneth, 2014b).
An obvious advantage of this conception is that in contrast to the
‘second-order’ conception, it clearly delineates the idea of a social pathology
as a critical tool in its own right as something which appears next to reification,
ideology, invisibilization etc. and not merely as the generic (possibly
optional) term for all conceivable social evils beyond mere political and
moral wrongs. By taking the biological connotations seriously, it aims at not
just any disorders with the suitable ‘second-order’ structure, but at
systematic problems in the reproduction of the recognitive whole. It thereby
situates itself within a long tradition of philosophical diagnoses of social
pathologies as disturbances on a superindividual, distinctively societal level.
This conception has its disadvantages as well. Many strictly
intersubjective disorders or difficulties as dealt with in this special issue (see
e.g. Gregoratto’s ‘Pathology of Love as Gender Domination: Recognition and
Gender Identities in Axel Honneth and Jessica Benjamin’, or Hietalahti’s
‘Laughing at Oneself: On the New Interactive Social Character’) fall outside
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13
the picture as they do not build on the idea of a social organism and do not
address societal dysfunctions at a macro-level. While those who adhere to
the organismic view of pathology may be able to offer sound reasons for not
using the concept of social pathology to explicate such disorders, those
concerned with such strictly intersubjective disorders might well reply that
although the organismic conception is recognition-theoretically construed,
as seems implicit in Honneth’s latest take on it, it still aims at societal
disorders at such a macro-level that it becomes hard to see how they actually
work as pathologies of recognition. This might render the organismic
conception useless for social-theoretical endeavours such as those presented
in this issue, and, symptomatically, none of the articles below make use of
it. In contrast to the wide conception of structural ‘higher-order disorders,’
the organismic view of social pathologies appears to be too narrow for a
diagnosis of pathologies of recognition.
A more serious problem concerns the organismic view’s socioontological commitments. The view of late-modern capitalist societies
according to the model of the social organism has been repeatedly
challenged within critical social theory and has even been labelled
ideological and, thus, ironically seen as reproducing the pathology it intends
to cure, as it casts society in such static terms that it renders radical critique
impossible (Adorno, 2003). The papers ‘Social Freedom in Contemporary
Capitalism: A Reconstruction of Axel Honneth’s Normative Approach to the
Economy’ (Arentshorst) and ‘Hegel on Women as Instruments in the
Dialectics of the Nation’ (Lagerspetz) in this collection criticize certain uses
of organismic conceptions in Hegel and Honneth.
C) A third conception of pathology might be seen as attempting to combine
the advantages and avoid the difficulties of the previous two. It considers
social pathology not via the model of the illnesses of the organism but in
terms of the reproductive disturbances in the process of social life. It thus
preserves the vitality of the naturalistic metaphor by conceiving society in
terms of social life while avoiding the relatively static model of the social
organism. This conception can perhaps be seen as implicit in Honneth’s early
recognition-theoretical account of social pathologies (Honneth, ‘Pathologies
of the Social’, reprinted in Honneth 2007), where he makes extensive use of
the concept of social life.
In the wider tradition of recognition theory this use can be found in
Hegel’s famous transition from ‘mere’ life via recognition and domination
to ‘spiritual’ life in his Phenomenology of Spirit, in Nietzsche’s genealogical
account of social illnesses, and perhaps also in Adorno’s conception of
damaged life. In contemporary recognition theory (Neuhouser 2013 is an
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exception), it is probably at least as uncommon as Honneth’s organismic
view, which makes an assessment of its disadvantages difficult. In this
volume, Arvi Särkelä’s article ‘Ideology as Artificial Respiration: Hegel on
Stoicism, Skepticism, and Unhappy Consciousness’ attempts to rehabilitate
it.
A Look at the Papers
The papers in this special issue start with contributions studying the general
nature of pathologies of recognition, social pathologies and ideology in
general. After that, pathologies in the different spheres are discussed,
starting from the sphere of the personal and singular (intimate love, family,
the culture of self-ridicule), turning next to issues of civil society (market
economy, the ideology of merit, precarious relations of recognition in the
practice of social work) and finally, to collective, political and democratic
agency (collective agents, the challenge to democracy that unreasonable
views pose, and the global ideological conflicts arising from the challenge
of labelling others as ‘evil’). Diverse explanatory factors such as cultural
ideologies or relations of power are variably discussed along the way.
The first three papers analyse the notions of lack of recognition and
social pathology. The paper ‘Conceptualizing Causes for Lack of
Recognition—Capacities, Costs and Understanding’ by Heikki Ikäheimo
asks why it is the case that people so often fail to give others recognition, or
at least adequate recognition. There are several candidates for an
explanation. First, it may be that recognition—the giving or receiving of it
or both—requires capacities or skills that are not always available. Secondly,
it may be that recognition, even though it is (all things considered) good,
involves costs, which leads to a reluctance on the part of the participants in
the recognition relation. Thirdly and relatedly, even if recognition would be
objectively good for the individuals or groups involved, fathoming this, or
being able to experience its goodness, especially against experienced costs
that it may incur, may nevertheless require intellectual capacities or
understanding that individuals do not necessarily possess. The paper
explores these different answers against the broadly Hegelian framework of
recognition and ‘concrete freedom’ Ikäheimo has defended elsewhere.
In the paper ‘Social Pathologies, Reflexive Pathologies, and the Idea
of Higher Order Disorders,’ Arto Laitinen critically examines Christopher
Zurn’s suggestion mentioned above that various social pathologies
(pathologies of ideological recognition, maldistribution, invisibilization,
rationality distortions, reification and institutionally forced self-realization)
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15
share the structure of being ‘second-order disorders’: that is, that they each
entail ‘constitutive disconnects between first-order contents and secondorder reflexive comprehension of those contents, where those disconnects
are pervasive and socially caused’ (Zurn, 2011, 345-346). The paper argues
that the cases even as discussed by Zurn do not actually match that
characterization, but that it would be premature to conclude that they are
not thereby social pathologies, or that they do not have a structure in
common. It is just that the structure is more complex than originally
described, covering pervasive socially caused evils (i) in the social reality,
(ii) in the first order experiences and understandings, (iii) in the second order
reflection as discussed by Zurn, and also (iv) in the ‘third order’
phenomenon concerning the pre-emptive silencing or nullification of social
criticism even before it takes place.
The paper ‘Ideology as Artificial Respiration: Hegel on Stoicism,
Skepticism, and Unhappy Consciousness’ by Arvi Särkelä draws upon
Hegel’s analysis of Stoicism, Skepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness as
intellectual reactions to social pathology. He argues that, in Hegel’s view,
the true and the false are held together in ideology by its being recognitively
educational: ideology presents both a moment of social pathology and a
moment of its overcoming. It gives, so to speak, artificial respiration for a
social life fallen ill. The paper argues against two readings of these passages
(as distinguished by Robert Stern). For the ‘historical materialist’
interpretation put forward by Alexandre Kojève, Stoicism, Skepticism and
Unhappy Consciousness are treated as servile ‘ideologies’ and given a
‘purely socio-political rationale.’ The conceptual realist reading, by contrast,
identifies a clear conceptual progress in these shapes as they bring selfconsciousness forth from what initially appeared to be a dead-lock in the
preceding relation of Lordship and Bondage. The paper argues that both
readings are partly right and partly wrong: the conceptual realist gets it right
that Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy Consciousness are indeed
distinctively novel shapes of consciousness; the historical materialist
correctly points out that Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy Consciousness
are ideologies functionally sustaining the dead equilibrium of Lordship and
Bondage. Both aspects can be reconciled by regarding ideology as productive
and potentially educative. Ideology works not only to maintain the dead
equilibrium of Lordship and Bondage, but also revives the organic means
of overcoming it. Thereby this paper argues for the necessity of ideologycritique as a component of an inclusive diagnosis that understands social
pathologies as systematic disturbances in the reproduction of
characteristically social life.
16
Laitinen, Särkelä & Ikäheimo: Pathologies of Recognition
The next three papers discuss pathologies of recognition in the
relatively intimate spheres of love, family and self-ridicule. Federica
Gregoratto, in her article ‘Pathology of Love as Gender Domination:
Recognition and Gender Identities in Axel Honneth and Jessica Benjamin,’
aims at giving a critical account of gender domination by drawing on the
concepts of recognition as presented in the work of Axel Honneth and Jessica
Benjamin. Gender domination is here understood as a pathology of love,
which concerns especially the heterosexual sentimental bond. The
argumentation proceeds in three steps. First, it reconstructs, via Honneth,
the type of social normativity regulating relations of loving recognition,
which is identified as a normativity of interdependence. Accordingly, love
partners are both dependent on and independent from each other. Second,
by relying on Benjamin, Gregoratto argues that the interdependence bond
is to be understood as implying mutual exercises of power: power is a
positive feature in the transformative process of recognition qua love. Third,
the pathology of loving recognition is framed as a disruption of the
interdependence relation, due to the emergence of a sharp opposition
between identities of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ – namely between an identity
privileging independence and an identity privileging dependence
respectively as their particular constitutive features. Gender domination
consists then in the unilateral exercise of power that blocks the
transformative force of love.
Sari Roman-Lagerspetz’s paper ‘Hegel on Women as Instruments in
the Dialectics of the Nation’ adds a new line to Feminist critiques of Hegel.
The paper starts with the observation that Feminist critics often emphasize
women’s exclusion from the public sphere in Hegel’s account, but that less
attention is paid to the way Hegel sees the role of family ethics, the guardians
of which are women, as constitutive for the dialectics of the nation. The paper
argues that gender hierarchy is necessary for Hegel’s rational state. For this
reason, recognition can never become fully universal for Hegel. The paper
argues that Hegel’s view of women as not-fully-rational beings, and his
uncritical acceptance of the system of nation-states, are interconnected. These
aspects of Hegel’s system are for good reason often found less appealing; it
is an important observation that they are interrelated. Implicitly, the paper
challenges contemporary defenders of universal recognition to do better than
Hegel in these respects in trying to combine universal recognition with
recognition of such particularities as gender and nationality.
The paper ‘Laughing at Oneself: On the New Social Character’ by
Jarno Hietalahti examines certain practices of humour, especially selfridicule, as a kind of social pathology, drawing on the work of Erich Fromm.
The paper starts with the observation that laughing at oneself is typically
Laitinen, Särkelä & Ikäheimo: Pathologies of Recognition
17
considered to be a positive trait. In general, self-ridicule reveals that the joker
does not consider him- or herself to occupy a high ground, to be above
ridicule. This kind of affirmative attitude towards laughing at oneself is also
present in many philosophers’ thinking. Morally, it is stated, it is better to
laugh at oneself than at others. The paper challenges some of these general
ideas. Not every kind of self-ridiculing is positive. Laughing at oneself can
eventually be problematic in relation to recognizing oneself and others (this
is not unrelated to the forms of pathology discussed by Honneth as
pathologies of legal and moral freedom – they provide a protected ‘leave’
from the social world, which is important, but can turn pathological if it
turns into an obstacle to ordinary participation in the social world. The same
goes for excessive self-irony as a form of distancing oneself not only from
the social world, but from one’s own orientation in life). The critique is based
on Erich Fromm’s social philosophy, especially contemporary versions of
Fromm’s notion of ‘social character.’
The next three papers discuss issues in civil society, such as market
economy, the ideology of merit and precarious relations of recognition in
the practice of social work. In his paper ‘Social Freedom in Contemporary
Capitalism: A Reconstruction of Axel Honneth’s Normative Approach to the
Economy’ Hans Arentshorst discusses two related issues, namely how to
adequately describe the economy within the framework of a critical social
theory, and how to understand the interrelation between the socio-economic
and political dimensions of democracy. Concerning the first issue Honneth
stresses the moral quality of social integration, and concerning the second
issue he develops a conception of ‘democratic Sittlichkeit.’ In reconstructing
these issues, both the promises and problems of Honneth’s work for
analyzing and criticizing contemporary developments in the economy are
explored. The paper concludes that the unresolved challenge for Honneth is
not to succumb to a nostalgic return to 19th century solutions – a nostalgia
that can also be found in the recent article where Honneth (2014b) argues
for a return to an organic conception of society – but to combine the insights
of Hegel and Durkheim concerning our fundamental interdependence with
insights concerning the new emancipatory aspects of contemporary forms
of individualism.
Heidi Elmgren’s paper ‘Recognition and the Ideology of Merit’
discusses pathological forms that the ideal of merit takes in ideological uses
of meritocratic ideas. According to the French philosopher Dominique
Girardot (2011) the possibility of our genuinely recognizing one another is
impaired by the ideology of merit: this new ideology standardizes
recognition and forces competition, thus creating hierarchies and what Axel
18
Laitinen, Särkelä & Ikäheimo: Pathologies of Recognition
Honneth calls social pathologies. The ideology also threatens the category
of action in Hannah Arendt’s (1958) sense. The paper elucidates Girardot’s
stance and sketches a comparison between Honneth’s and Girardot’s views
on recognition. Despite the explicit connection to Honneth’s theory, Girardot
actually creates an Arendtian theory of recognition. It is against the
background of that theory that the pathological forms of contemporary
meritocracy best come to light.
In Petteri Niemi’s article ‘The Professional Form of Recognition in
Social Work,’ the theory of recognition is applied to the context of social
work, where relations of recognition can easily be strained due to the
differences in status, power, and vulnerability to stigmatization. A specific
form of recognition suitable for professional contexts is outlined and
defended. The professional form of recognition is an essential part of efficient
and ethical professional support to human development and well-being, in
social work but also in many other helping and teaching professions. This
form of recognition involves respect, esteem and care for clients. These
attitudes contribute to the self-respect, self-esteem and self-love of the clients.
On the other hand, professional disrespect, disesteem and indifference may
deeply harm the self-feelings and self-relations of clients.
The last three papers discuss collective recognition and the political
and democratic challenge of facing allegedly unreasonable or evil others. In
the paper ‘Political liberalism and the preventive containment of
unreasonable beliefs and behavior’ Joonas Pennanen examines the ways in
which illiberal and unreasonable views can be legitimately contained in a
politically liberal society, and discusses some of the pressing reasons to
undertake, or abstain from, such measures. Theoretical background for the
discussion is provided by Rawlsian political liberalism. The paper focuses
on the particular justification for the preventive containment of unreasonable
views offered by Jonathan Quong (2011). It is claimed that Quong’s approach
raises some significant worries (not unrelated to the ‘third-order pathologies’
discussed above in Chapter 2). The suggestion is put forward that political
liberals would do well to pay more attention to respect and relations of
recognition.
Onni Hirvonen’s paper ‘Pathologies of Collective Recognition’ maps
the theoretical possibilities of what pathologies of collective recognition might
be. It argues that collectives have a twofold role in recognition: they can
function either as normative frameworks that enable recognition, or as
agents of recognition. From this it follows that pathologies of collective
recognition can be either systemic or agential. Furthermore, accepting the
agential role of collectives opens possibilities for specific forms of
Laitinen, Särkelä & Ikäheimo: Pathologies of Recognition
19
pathologies. The paper concludes with remarks on the ontological
commitments that need to be made if one wants to understand pathologies
of recognition as including collective agents.
Olli Pitkänen’s paper ‘(Pathologies of) Recognition in Schelling’s
Thought on Evil’ departs from the observation that there is on several levels
a growing antagonism in our society between two opposite mentalities: a
liberal, universalistic mentality that trusts in rationality (termed ‘McWorld’
by political theorist Benjamin Barber in Barber, 1992), and a conservative
mentality that relies on the weight of tradition (Barber’s term for this is
‘Jihad’). The argument in this paper is that these mentalities are not
absolutely incompatible, but that the hostility between them results largely
from fundamental internal inconsistencies that are suppressed and projected
onto the other. In explicating this argument, the paper uses F.W.J. Schelling’s
(1992 [1809]) metaphysical theory of evil, as a theory of recognition, where
great emphasis is put on self-recognition as a condition for proper
recognition of the other.
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Endnotes
1
The research project ‘Pathologies of Recognition’ is funded by the Academy
of Finland and hosted by the University of Jyväskylä. See e.g. Kotkavirta,
1993; Ikäheimo, 2002; Laitinen, 2002; Honneth, 2002; Ikäheimo & Laitinen,
2007; Laitinen, 2010; Ikäheimo & Laitinen (eds.), 2010; Ikäheimo, 2014.
Despite the moniker, the contributors are currently located not only in
Jyväskylä but also in Tampere, Sydney, Frankfurt, Lucerne, St.Gallen, and
Helsinki.
2
Honneth’s conception of the deontological dimension is somewhat
different. See Ikäheimo, 2014, chapter 6.
3
The third, naturalist conception of social pathology (Nietzsche, Adorno,
the Hegel of Phenomenology of Spirit and Dewey) does not accept a clear
distinction between natural and social causation. However, they would all
maintain that social pathologies have their roots in pre-human nature.
4
Indeed, most papers in this collection belong to this approach in critical
social philosophy, not stressing the medical or biological connotations of
pathologies of recognition, but nonetheless stressing the pervasive and
socially produced character of the social evils in question.