Abstract
In this article, we present an analysis of defeasible generalizations – generalizations which are essentially exception-laden, yet genuinely explanatory – in terms of various notions of privileged conditions. We argue that any plausible epistemology must make essential use of defeasible generalizations so understood. We also consider the epistemic significance of the sort of understanding of context that is required for understanding of explanatory defeasible generalizations on any topic.
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Lance, M., Little, M. Defeasibility And The Normative Grasp Of Context. Erkenntnis 61, 435–455 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-9286-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-9286-2