Abstract
Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to searching for an explanation. Having an alternative in hand, one that shows promise of achieving explanatory adequacy, provides an additional reason to suspend the search for unique constituents. In short, a negative and a positive thesis are developed: we should cease looking for unique constituents and should seek to explain mineness in accord with the model developed here. This model rejects attempts to explain the phenomenon in terms of either a narrative or a minimal sense of self; it seeks to explain at a “molecular” level, one that appeals to multiple, interacting dimensions. The molecular-level model allows for the possibility that subjective perspective is distinct from a stark perspective (one that does not imply mineness). It proposes that the confounding of tacit expectations plays an important role in explaining mental ownership and its complement, disownership. But the confounding of tacit expectations is not sufficient. Because we are able to be aware of the existence of mental states that do not belong to self, we require a mechanism for determining degree of self-relatedness. One such mechanism is proposed here, and it is shown how this mechanism can be integrated into a general model of mental ownership. In the spirit of suggesting how this model might be able to help resolve outstanding problems, the question as to whether inserted thoughts belong to the patient who reports them is also considered.
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Notes
Cognates of “mineness” include “myness,” “my-ness,” “for-me-ness,” “mental ownership,” and “ipseity.” “Ipse” is a Latin pronoun that, in some contexts, means “self.”
Philosophers might wonder why, both here and elsewhere in this essay, I write of self, consciousness, and ownership, but refrain from using the appellation, “self-consciousness.” If we consider the usual division of labor within philosophy, problems pertaining to ownership tend to be addressed under the rubric, “self-consciousness.” “Self,” on the other hand, tends to be invoked more often in discussion of problems with a pronounced diachronic dimension: for example, what kind of thing is a self, such that it can persist over many decades in a body that is constantly changing? Because my concern is with ownership and my focus is on the synchronic, one might reasonably expect me to speak not of “self” and “consciousness,” but of “self-consciousness.” Nevertheless, I avoid the term, because it carries with it a baggage inconsistent with the thesis I develop. Succinctly, many (e.g., Bermudez 2007) who write of self-consciousness treat it as primarily a cognitive rather than an affective state. Moreover, it is commonly assumed about self-conscious that, if we have introspectively based thoughts to the effect that someone has a particular property, “we ipso facto know that we ourselves have that property” (Bermudez 2007: 460). Because I find these and several, related assumptions problematic, I prefer to avoid the term altogether.
CMS regions include the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and the posterior cingulate cortex. The CMS significantly overlaps with the default-mode network (Raichle 2010), which has also been implicated in self-referential processing (Buckner et al. 2008 and Wicker et al. 2003). The CMS also overlaps, in some respects, with what Feinberg (2009: 152–155) has called the “integrative self-system.”
The SS paradigm is elucidated below, in “Self-specificity” section; the revised version of SR is addressed in “Toward an explanatory framework: a multi-componential model” section.
Northoff et al. (2011: 54–55) cite evidence that suggests otherwise. See discussion below, “Toward an explanatory framework: a multicomponential model” section.
In particular, note Strawson’s discussion of the transience of self (2009: 323–360).
Often, the absence of temporal extension is taken as a mark of the minimal self; this is consistent with Legrand and Ruby’s view, as they are concerned with what happens in the nonce.
One version of the distinction between narrative and minimal selves has been perspicaciously drawn by Rosenthal (2005: 342–345), and the minimal conception has been felicitously marked by his term “raw bearer.”
Although instances of “co-consciousness”—one alter knows of that which is being experienced by another alter (Wilkes 1993: 112–127)—is not discussed here, the phenomenon supports the argument I am putting forward. Coconscious seems to be an instance for which perspective is the same, but ownership dissociates. It also enables us to distinguish two modes of introspection: one allows for experiencing the state as one’s own, while the other only allows for knowing of the state’s existence from, as it were, a third-person point of view.
Although the many who have espoused positions on the distinction between self as-subject and as-object disagree on some aspects of the proper way to distinguish the two, all agree that self-as-subject is the subject of experience and self-as-object is what one refers to when, say, while maneuvering through a crowd I suddenly recognize an image of myself projected on a security camera’s screen.
Italics added by the author. Elsewhere, Legrand (2007: 591) makes this point with equal clarity—“To consciously perceive a tree is already to be pre-reflectively conscious: it involves self-consciousness in the sense that the tree is perceptually given to me, there is a conscious first-person perspective, a dimension of mineness.” The italics are Legrand’s.
Their operational definition of self-specificity is intended to assist with “evaluating alternative conceptions of self” and to “guide new elaborations.” Clearly the sense of “operational” here is not the same as that which concerned a generation of philosophers of science, for although it aims at precision and reliability, it does not clearly evince “definite public criteria of application” (Hempel 1965: 142).
Italics added by author.
“Hypometabolism” refers to problems pertaining to the supply of or ability to metabolize glucose. It was confirmed by findings from an 18-fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography exam, 2 months after DP first complained of “double visions.”
Recall that SS does not presuppose constitution of a self prior to the entertaining of a perspective.
Note that these are scare quotes. Those that appear in the latter half of the sentence, however, are not.
The case of phantom limb phenomena is instructive in this regard: despite being commonplace and well-described for at least 500 years, until recently it has largely been neglected by clinicians and researchers. One reason for this neglect is that the very idea of sensations felt where there is no limb just strikes us as too counter intuitive (Halligan 2002).
Some of Shoemaker’s views might be representative of widely held presuppositions: (a) the relationship between a subject and an experience are as intimate as a “branch and a branch bending” (1996: 10), and (b) the proper way to regard the relationship between introspection and mental states is that “the reality known and the faculty for knowing it are…made for each other—neither could be what it is without the other” (1994: 289). In short, the relationship among subject, experience, and introspective access are so close that it is difficult for most of us to conceive of the possibility that they are not related, integrally.
Legrand and Ruby sometimes seem equivocal as regards “perspective”. Occasionally they say “perspective”; on other occasions, “subjective perspective.” The difference is suggestive of the distinction drawn by Blanke and Metzinger (2008: 8) between a weak first-person perspective (1PP) and a stronger 1PP, like “subject of experience.” On their construal, a weak 1PP is a “purely geometrical feature.” It alone is insufficient to make consciousness subjective—insufficient to constitute a subject of experience or a self-as-subject. If Legrand and Ruby are referring to a weak 1PP, then their claims court triviality and have no bearing on mineness. I believe, however, that on any charitable interpretation of their argument, they should be taken to be referring, consistently, to a subjective perspective, that at least approximates a strong 1PP.
Many verbs are used in contexts of this sort, most of which are intended to imply ownership. Among these are “possess,” “bear,” and “enjoy.”
If I am correct, some version of what are often called “inner sense” models must be assumed. As regards how best to understand this analogy to perception, Jack and Roepstorff (2003: 14–15) have proposed some minimal and plausible assumptions concerning possible mechanisms.
The issues here admittedly are complex: de Vignemont (2010), for example, has cautioned that for cases of this type, what we might call “mirror empathy,” the degree to which we can know another’s mental state is greatly “mediated by context.” But what tends to be neglected in discussions of this type is that we might be worrying less about contextual mediation in cases of introspection simply because we know so much less about introspection than we do about observing the external world. Furthermore, instances of mirror empathy vary greatly in the degree to which they might be mediated by context. Observation of the eyes alone, independent of the rest of the face, can be sufficient for awareness of the existence of a mental state as well as identification of its type (Adolphs et al. 2002; Dadds et al. 2006; and Morris et al. 2002).
Likewise, as efficient mobile creatures, we have no difficulty moving back and forth between egocentric and allocentric frames of reference.
For a recent, accessible, and comprehensive review, see McGilchrist (2010: 37–91).
Functional asymmetry seems to result from specialized information processing methods distinct to each hemisphere (or, some parts of each hemisphere). Perhaps a helpful way to think about this distinction is in terms of “hubs” and “nodes” (Nunez 2010: 29–30). While certain “critical nodes” or “hubs” might be lateralized, the performance of most activities likely involves widespread, regional networks, distributed across both hemispheres (and elsewhere) including some lesser “nodes” which themselves indicate brain tissue masses wherein substantial network connections occur. Were we to think of this in operational terms, fMRI might be more readily able to identify major hubs (assuming significant increases in blood oxygen), and somewhat less able to locate nodes in other parts of the network.
Recall fn. 21, discussion of the distinction between a strong and a weak 1PP (Blanke and Metzinger 2008). It is not altogether clear whether my subjective-stark contrast corresponds to their strong-weak contrast.
TMS is a noninvasive technique for inducing weak electric currents into the brain. Synchronized oscillation among distinct neural assemblies has been hypothesized to be a key mechanism for self-consciousness.
Various factors contribute to this feeling: one among them is “intentional binding,” wherein perceived time of initiating an act and perceived time of effect are closely bound (Moore and Haggard 2010).
To make less inchoate the sense of “objectification” intended here, Nelson et al. (2008: 387) invoke a centrifuge metaphor: “the hyperreflexive attitude spins aspects of the self outward until they form separated and estranged entities.”
Concerning “appropriate binding,” see fn. 31. Also, see Wegner’s (2002: 64–74) Humean interpretation of mental causation, which emphasizes that intentions be prior to, consistent with, and exclusive for a given behavior.
Candidate explanations for this phenomenon include: (a) asymmetry of callosal fibers, (b) hemispheric specialization, and (c) more fast-conducting, myelinated fibers in the right than in the left hemisphere.
I am grateful to Yasuo Deguchi and Hsu Hahn for pressing the point that “her eventual learning of how to control the two” implies the existence of what we might refer to as a “meta-me.” This observation raises important questions about the relationship between me and meta-me. Those questions I will address in subsequent work: here it is only necessary to observe that meta-me did not emerge until JJ was 16, assuming that the ability to control switching is the main indicator of its existence. Moreover, given JJ’s description of her phenomenology, it would seem that after meta-me emerged, switching to it should not be allowed as a tactic to absolve her of responsibility for subsequent actions. As a first pass at characterizing ethical implications here, it would seem to be that meta-me should be held responsible in the way that a gang leader is held responsible for arranging that a gang member commit a crime or moral infraction.
de Vignemont (2011) has observed that RHI tends to induce only a weak, elusive sense of ownership. I believe this observation to be accurate, when experimental subjects are considered in the aggregate. But formal studies of RHI, conducted in collaboration with my colleague Yeh Su-Ling, suggest that the experience of ownership or disownership varies greatly among subjects. PCE allows for this variation: it predicts that ownership and disownership are functions of the degree to which one’s expectations concerning the location of touch—the robustness of touch referral—are contravened. In effect, robustness of touch referral is an indicator of contravened expectations, such that the more robust is the sense of touch referral, the greater the feeling of ownership and disownership for rubber and real hands. (Standard measures of disownership consistently indicate that it is weaker than the ownership effect, but this result follows necessarily from experimental design—attention is directed toward the rubber hand and away from the biological hand.)
For discussion and assessment of competing explanations of Capgras syndrome, see Hirstein (2009).
Whenever possible, these probes are now extended so as to include sub-cortical midline structures, in particular the periaqueductal gray, the superior colliculi, the adjacent mesencephalic locomoter region, the hypothalamus, and the dorsomedial thalamus.
Because data of this type concerning subcortical regions are limited, the scope of this study is restricted to cortical regions, hence directly relevant to the CMS, but not the SCMS. This methodological limitation has no bearing on the use to which this study is put here, for the study does provide a framework for distinguishing between that which belongs to self and that which is familiar to self.
Note that in the discussion of Tsakiris (2011: 194–195) on the subjective experience of body ownership and disownership, he too emphasizes the role played by the right insular lobe.
A thorough examination of this point would need to consider more than just the concept “minimal.” A set of related concepts—the pre-reflective self, the self-as-subject, and the absence of explicit representation—have also tended to be wielded with insufficient precision and insufficient sensitivity to whether they reflect distinctions that are found in the world.
The “telephone syndrome,” described by Ramachandran (2011: 245–247) is strikingly illustrative of this view: this syndrome occurs in those who suffer from akinetic mutism or vigilant coma—the inability to move, to talk, or to initiate actions. Ramachandran describes a case wherein the patient, Jason, had a normal sleep–wake cycle and when awake could follow, with his eyes, people moving about his room, but he had no ability to recognize others or interact meaningfully. The cause of akinetic mutism in Jason’s case was damage to the anterior cingulate and the visual pathway. The auditory pathway, however, was intact. Had both visual and auditory pathways been impaired, Jason would have lived in a permanent twilight state, unable to interact with others, regardless of the circumstances. But because Jason’s auditory pathway was largely intact, when Jason’s father would leave the room and phone him, Jason “suddenly became alert and talkative, recognizing his dad and engaging him in conversation.” When his father returned to the room—so that Jason could see him—Jason “lapsed into his semiconscious ‘zombie’ state.” According to Ramachandran, the “visual Jason is essentially dead and gone as a person…but the auditory Jason lives on.” Because our brains emphasize “visual processing, the visual Jason stifles his auditory twin.” (Recall the phenomenon of “visual capture,” discussed in “Toward an explanatory framework33 for mineness: the principle of confounded expectations (PCE)” section.)
Galen Strawson’s (2009, pp. 338–425) development of ideas concerning “thin subjects”—subjects who “don’t and can’t exist in the absence of experience”—exemplifies one strategy for teasing out the implications.
There are many reasons for preserving a certain looseness to the connection between experience and experient: one empirical reason is that some subjects in persistent vegetative states preserve the ability to communicate by modulating brain activity such that yes-no answers can be interpreted from fMRI data (Monti et al. 2010). This suggests the empirical possibility of selves—perhaps even selves that exhibit “an inner hub of information and locus of control” (Ismael 2007: 211)—persisting even when the capacity to experience is greatly diminished.
The same is true—even more so—for emotions.
Of course, though the mechanisms involved would differ. Carruthers (2009) is useful in helping to mark the difference between representing our own thoughts and representing the thoughts of others.
Northoff and Qin (2011) and Northoff (2011: 288–297) develop much of their account with respect to their views on “resting states”—neural activity that is intrinsic to or generated by the brain itself. The details need not concern us here, but it should be born in mine that although this view of “resting state” is related to the default-mode network (see above, fn. 3), it is distinctive in that, among other things, it emphasizes that intrinsic neural activity is not restricted to the regions typically regarded as being part of the default mode.
I am here assuming that a verisimilar ordering of theories can be achieved.
Although for the sake of convenience philosophers often use locutions of the sort, “mind supervenes on the brain,” it is important to keep in mind that this phrase is just an elliptical formulation; it is more accurate to say that mind supervenes on the brain, the endocrine system, the immune system, and the spinal cord.
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Acknowledgments
I express heartfelt gratitude to Tim Bayne, Georg Northoff, and Roland Zahn for their careful reading of and constructive comments on previous versions of this manuscript. I am also grateful to several others for discussions—some recent, some from many years ago—concerning various issues that are treated herein. Among those to whom I am most deeply indebted are Tony H. Y. Cheng, Patricia Churchland, Frederique de Vignemont, Carl Hempel, Julian Jaynes, Thomas Metzinger, David Rosenthal, Daniel Stoljar, and Su-Ling Yeh. Previous versions of these ideas were presented at the 15th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (Kyoto, Japan); at the International Workshop on Self-Consciousness, sponsored by National Yang Ming University (Taipei, Taiwan); and, at the International Workshop on Self in Humans and Machines: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, and Robotics, sponsored by National Chung Cheng University (Chiayi, Taiwan). I am grateful to participants in these conferences for their many helpful comments, as well as to the referees for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences for their constructive critiques. Funding for this research was, in part, provided by a National Science Council of Taiwan research grant, 100-2410-H-004-139-MY3.
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Lane, T. Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership. Phenom Cogn Sci 11, 251–286 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4