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On The Meaning Of Owen–Banzhaf Coalitional Value In Voting Situations

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Abstract

In this paper we discuss the meaning of Owen's coalitional extension of the Banzhaf index in the context of voting situations. It is discussed the possibility of accommodating this index within the following model: in order to evaluate the likelihood of a voter to be crucial in making a decision by means of a voting rule a second input (apart from the rule itself) is necessary: an estimate of the probability of different vote configurations. It is shown how Owen's coalitional extension can be seen as three different normative variations of this model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad de Alicante, Spain

    A. Laruelle

  2. Departamento de Econom:ía Aplicada IV, Universidad del País Vasco, Spain

    F. Valenciano

Authors
  1. A. Laruelle
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  2. F. Valenciano
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Laruelle, A., Valenciano, F. On The Meaning Of Owen–Banzhaf Coalitional Value In Voting Situations. Theory and Decision 56, 113–123 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5639-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5639-1

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