Abstract
One of the main results in topological social choice states the non-existence of a continuous, anonymous, and unanimous aggregation rule on spheres. This note provides a proof based upon simple methods such as integration.
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Lauwers, L. A note on Chichilnisky's social choice paradox. Theory and Decision 52, 261–266 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019656013992
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019656013992