Classical World

One of the major puzzles in the Nicomachean Ethics is the ambiguity of what Aristotle considers the highest good. In most of the treatise he argues that it is a life of virtues with some measure of bodily and external goods. At the end of book 10, however, he announces that the happiest life is one in which everything is to be done for the sake of philosophical inquiry (Θεωρἰa). The ambiguity prompted many scholars to claim that book 10 did not originally belong to the main body of Nicomachean Ethics. The aim of Richardson Lear's book is to argue for the unity of the text, and offer an explanation of Aristotle's conception of the highest good by emphasizing its monistic character.

In order to support this case, Richardson Lear examines the various approaches to Aristotle's conception of the highest good. She rejects the inclusivist interpretation, according to which happiness is a set including many or all intrinsically valuable goods. Instead, she argues that morally virtuous action is a teleological approximation to theoretical inquiry. For this reason, although the final end is Θεωρἰa, the exercise of moral virtue is also valuable for its own sake. The concept of τέλος in book 1 is the same as the technical notion we come across in the Physics and biological works: a normative standard for the performance of an activity. This resolves the problem of how moral virtues can be constitutive elements of our final goal, which is happiness. In order to make this case firmly settled in the account of moral virtues, she examines three of them, courage, temperance, and magnanimity. The aim is to show that the exercise of these excellences can be viewed as an approximation to Θεωρἰa. Actions arising from these virtues are chosen because they are fine (κaλá). Persons acting courageously or with temperance may not understand that such actions are done for the sake of theoretical inquiry and thus are appropriate to the philosopher, who is the only agent in the position to understand the true reason for choosing virtuous actions. This is not to say, however, that moral virtue will be subordinated to theoretical inquiry. Choosing it for the sake of Θεωρἰa does not yield a wholesale revision of moral requirements. The investigation closes with an appendix on Plato's account of acting for love in the Symposium, which can be paralleled to Aristotle's discussion of the love for the divine.

One might be puzzled about the way a morally virtuous action can approximate to theoretical inquiry, conceived of as the highest good. It is clear that such an action involves the excellent exercise of practical insight (ϕρόνησιϛ), which aims at some truth about the good in action. But how can this truth be an approximation to the truth provided by Θεωρἰa? Approximation implies hierarchy, and the author does assume that Θεωρἰa is prior to all the other kinds of cognition. She grounds this thesis on Nicomachean Ethics 6.12.1143b33–34 and 6.13.1145a6–11. Both passages deal with the relationship with reference to health and medical science. Just as medical science does not control health, ϕρόνησιϛ cannot control Θεωρἰa (1145a6–7). The analogy may suggest that the structure of ϕρόνησιϛ and Θεωρἰa differs a great deal. The crucial difference between theoretical inquiry and practical insight lies not in the different extent of precision, because it is derived from the difference in subject matter. The difference in subject matter reflects the Aristotelian division of sciences into theoretical, practical, and productive branches (Meta. 6.1025b25–26; see also Top. 6.145a15). Because the subject matter is complex and empirical, generalizations in ethics are [End Page 165] not true without exceptions, but only roughly true (1094b19–22, 1142a18–19). The activities of practical insight and theoretical inquiry are said to be analogous because both aim at being truthful and precise (107). This may not amount to a structural...