Abstract
Choi (Philosophia, 38(3), 2010) argues that my counterexamples in Lee (Philosophia, 38(3), 2010) to the simple conditional analysis of disposition ascription are “bogus” counterexamples. In this paper, I argue that Choi’s arguments are not satisfactory and that my examples are genuine counterexamples.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For the details of this distinction, see Choi 2008
For the details of this counterexample, see Salmon (1989).
One might argue that in fact we cannot explain my death with my taking the tablet, because redundancy is fatal to the explanatory relation. But this reply misses my point. My point is that, unlike in the case of the H-solubility example, here we have a strong tendency to think (or to be misled to think) that there is a causal explanatory relation. This asymmetry itself undermines Choi’s argument.
Note that this is quite different from the controversial semantics to which Gundersen-style examples appeal. In this case, this counterfactual’s truth does not depend on the simultaneous truth of P and Q because it is true even if P is false. This is not a controversial semantics at all. For the details of Gundersen-style examples, see Lee 2010, 576–7.
Again, note that its truth is not based on the controversial semantics to which Gundersen-style examples appeal.
Choi says, “In describing his second example, Lee implicitly restricts his attention to deterministic cases. For the sake of discussion, I will follow suit.” But this restriction is not essential to the example’s force. Since it is weird to say that the characteristic manifestation of cold-cure in the deterministic setting is radically different from that in the indeterministic setting, extending our attention to indeterministic setting should be no problem.
Gundersen’s Ice-cream example is based on a similar idea even though he does not have Choi’s SCA-CON in his mind and hence he does not call his example an ordinary mimicker example. I thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this similarity. (Gundersen 2002).
Note that this is an instance of the ordinary fink example because the ordinary condition (i.e. the lack of kryptonite) causes the relevant intrinsic changes in Superman’s body.
References
Choi, S. (2006). The simple vs. reformed conditional analysis of dispositions. Synthese, 148, 796, 806.
Choi, S. (2008). Dispositional properties and counterfactual conditionals. Mind, 117.
Choi, S. (2010). Dispositions and bogus counterexamples: reply to Lee. Philosophia, 38(3).
Gundersen, L. B. (2002). In defense of the conditional account of dispositions. Synthese, 130, 407.
Lee, J. (2010). Disposition, explanation, and causation—a defense of the reformed conditional analysis of disposition. Philosophia, 38(3).
Salmon, W. C. (1989). Four decades of scientific explanation. In P. Kitcher & W. C. Salmon (Eds.), Scientific explanation (pp. 300–301). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank Andrew McAninch and the anonymous reviewer for helpful comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lee, J. Genuine Counterexamples to the Simple Conditional Analysis of Disposition: A Reply to Choi. Philosophia 39, 327–334 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9300-7
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9300-7