Skip to main content
Log in

Integration, individuality and species concepts

  • Published:
Biology and Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Integration (interaction among parts of an entity) is suggested to be necessary for individuality (contra, Metaphysics and the Origin of Species). A synchronic species is an integrated individual that can evolve as a unified whole; a diachronic lineage is a non-integrated historical entity that cannot evolve. Synchronic species and diachronic lineages are consequently suggested to be ontologically distinct entities, rather than alternative perspectives of the same underlying entity (contra Baum (1998), Syst. Biol. 47, 641–653; de Queiroz (1995), Endless Forms: Species and Speciation, pp. 57–75; Genes, Categories and Species). Species concepts usually refer to either one or the other entity; for instance, the Biological Species Concept refers to synchronic species, whereas the Cladistic Species Concept refers to diachronic lineages. The debate over species concepts has often failed to recognise this distinction, resulting in invalid comparisons between definitions that attempt to delineate fundamentally different entities.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Ayers M.R. 1974. 'Individuals Without Sortals'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23: 113–148.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baum D. 1998. 'Individuality and Existence of Species Through Time'. Systematic Biology 47: 641–653.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baum D. and Shaw K. 1995. Genealogical Perspectives on the Species Problem. In: Hoch P.C. and Stephenson A.G. (eds), Experimental and Molecular Approaches to Plant Biosystematics. Missouri Botanical Garden, St. Louis, pp. 289–303.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cain A.J. 1954. Animal Species and Their Evolution. Harper and Row, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cracraft J. 1989. Species as Entities of Biological Theory. In: Ruse M. (ed.), What the Philosophy of Biology Is - Essays for David Hull. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 33–54.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Queiroz K. 1995. The Definitions of Species and Clade Names: A Reply to Ghiselin. Biology and Philosophy 10: 223–228.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • de Queiroz K. 1998. The General Lineage Concept of Species, Species Criteria, and the Process of Speciation: A Conceptual Unification and Terminological Recommendations. In: Howard D.J. and Berlocher S.H. (eds), Endless Forms: Species and Speciation. Oxford University Press, NewYork, pp. 57–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ereshefsky M. 1988. Axiomatics and Individuality: A Reply to Williams's ''Species Are Individuals''. Philosophy of Science 55: 427–434.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ereshefsky M. (ed.) 1991. The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghiselin M.T. 1974. A Radical Solution to the Species Problem.Systematic Zoology 23: 536–544.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghiselin M.T. 1997 Metaphysics and the Origin of Species. State University of NewYork Press, Albany, NY.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grene M. 1989. Interaction and Evolution. In: Ruse M. (ed.),What the Philosophy of Biology Is - Essays for David Hull. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 67–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hey J. 2001. Genes, Categories, and Species - The Evolutionary and Cognitive Causes of the Species Problem. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hull D.L. 1978. A Matter of Individuality. Philosophy of Science 45: 335–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kluge A.G. 1990. Species as Historical Individuals. Biology and Philosophy 5: 417–431.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D. 1991. Parts of Classes. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr E. 1963. Animal Species and Evolution. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr E. 2000a. The Biological Species Concept. In: Wheeler Q.D. and Meier R. (eds), Species Concepts and Phylogenetic Theory; A Debate. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 17–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr E. 2000b. A Critique from the Biological Species Concept Perspective: What Is a Species, and What Is Not? In: Wheeler Q.D. and Meier R. (eds), Species Concepts and Phylogenetic Theory: A Debate. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 93–100.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meier R. and Willmann R. 2000. The Hennigian Species Concept. In: Wheeler Q.D. and Meier R. (eds), Species Concepts and Phylogenetic Theory: A Debate. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 30–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mishler B.D. and Brandon R.N. 1987. Individuality, Pluralism, and the Phylogenetic Species Concept. Biology and Philosophy 2: 397–414.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sober E. 1993. Philosophy of Biology. Westview Press, Boulder.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wheeler Q.D. and Meier R. (eds) 2000. Species Concepts and Phylogenetic Theory: A Debate. Columbia University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiley E.O. 1980. Is the Evolutionary Species Fiction? - A Consideration of Classes, Individuals and Historical Entities. Systematic Zoology 29: 76–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wiley E.O. and Mayden R.L. 2000. The Evolutionary Species Concept. In: Wheeler Q.D. and Meier R. (eds), Species Concepts and Phylogenetic Theory. A Debate. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 70–89.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams G.C. 1992. Natural Selection: Domains, Levels, and Challenges. Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Willmann R. and Meier R. 2000. A Critique from the Hennigian Species Concept Perspective. In: Wheeler Q.D. and Meier R. (eds), Species Concepts and Phylogenetic Theory: A Debate. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 101–118.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson R.A (ed.) 1999. Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Lee.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Lee, M., Wolsan, M. Integration, individuality and species concepts. Biology & Philosophy 17, 651–660 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022596904397

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022596904397

Navigation