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Markov's Rule revisited

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References

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I am grateful to Boris Kushner for informing me about [Nov 43], the impetus for this note, and to Anne Troelstra for comments on an early sketch. Research partially supported by ONR grant N00014-84-K-0415 and by DARPA grant F33615-81-K-1539

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Leivant, D. Markov's Rule revisited. Arch Math Logic 30, 125–127 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01634982

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