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Theories of Truth Which Have No Standard Models

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Abstract

This papers deals with the class of axiomatic theories of truth for semantically closed languages, where the theories do not allow for standard models; i.e., those theories cannot be interpreted as referring to the natural number codes of sentences only (for an overview of axiomatic theories of truth in general, see Halbach[6]). We are going to give new proofs for two well-known results in this area, and we also prove a new theorem on the nonstandardness of a certain theory of truth. The results indicate that the proof strategies for all the theorems on the nonstandardness of such theories are "essentially" of the same kind of structure.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Salzburg, Austria

    Hannes Leitgeb

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  1. Hannes Leitgeb
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Leitgeb, H. Theories of Truth Which Have No Standard Models. Studia Logica 68, 69–87 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011950105814

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