Abstract
In this essay, I defend the Moorean position on organic unities. I will present some plausible examples of organic unites and consider some objections to them. In particular, I will consider an objection from evaluative inadequacy and an objection from Holism or Conditionalism. I will also examine one line of criticism that claims the Moorean position is incoherent.
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Notes
This is Chisholm’s definition of "part". See Chisholm (1986, p. 73).
It seems entirely possible that even though A is intrinsically better than B, one ought to prefer B as such to A all things considered. This might happen if one has promised to prefer B as such to A or if an evil demon threatens to kill one’s entirely family if one does not prefer B as such to A. Even though the contemplation of just A and B prima facie requires one prefer A as such to B, other facts might outweigh that prima facie requirement. For further discussion of this point, see Lemos (2011).
Kryster considers several unsatisfactory attempts to explicate intrinsic value in terms of fitting or required attitudes. He does not, however, consider the view described here. I believe the view described here does not face the objections he raises for the other views. For more detailed defense of this approach, see Lemos (1994) and Zimmerman (2001).
One anonymous referee for The Journal of Ethics suggests that this argument is less than successful since it can be rational to choose between two options whose value is unknown. He writes, “If choosing between the unknown (about which I am withholding judgment), and the obviously very bad a rational person can sensibly chose the unknown.” He suggests that Zimmerman might thus hold that we can reasonably choose between (2) and (6). Such a reply, I think, misses the point in two ways. First, according to Zimmerman’s view neither (2) nor (6) have any intrinsic value. Both of them are evaluatively inadequate. We are not, therefore, confronted with a choice between a state of affairs that has unknown intrinsic value and one that is “obviously very bad”. Second, and more importantly, the issue concerns what intrinsic attitudes the contemplation of just these states of affairs requires. Zimmerman holds that the contemplation of just these states of affairs requires that we withhold any intrinsic favor, disfavor, or indifference toward them, that the contemplation of just these states of affairs requires that we not prefer the one for its own sake to the other. Since it seems to me that the contemplation of just (2) and (6) requires that we prefer for its own sake (2) to (6), Zimmerman’s view that (2) is evaluatively inadequate seems false.
For an alternative criticism of Dancy’s view and a defense of the Moorean view, see Campbell Brown (2007).
The terminology in the literature varies and is potentially is confusing. Dancy uses the term “Holism” as a name for the view described here. Hurka uses the term “Conditionalism” for the view described here, but uses “Holism” as a name for what I am calling the Moorean view.
Ben Bradley makes this point in Bradley (2002).
Hurka believes that the Holistic or Conditional view provides a better explanation for the value of the pleasant admiration of beautiful objects. He suggests that “the beauty” increases in intrinsic value when it is admired. He suggests that if the beauty is not intrinsically good, then the attitude of admiration “seems to involve a kind of mistake.” (Hurka 1998, p. 305) But it is not clear to me that it is a mistake to admire something that lacks intrinsic goodness. One might admire a skillful tennis shot or a well-tailored suit without thinking that either is intrinsically good. So, if that is his reason for thinking that “the beauty” changes value, it does not seem like a good one.
One anonymous referee for The Journal of Ethics objects that the Moorean view faces a similar problem insofar as the contributory value of parts can change depending upon the whole of which they are a part, and “the Moorean position accepts that the value of the whole is equal to the sum of the contributory values”. I would note that the Moorean position does not accept that the value of the whole is equal to the sum of the contributory values of its parts. It does not treat the value of the whole as a sum of the contributory value of its parts any more than it treats the value of the whole as a sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. It is not committed, for example, to the view that the parts of a whole that have contributory value or intrinsic value have a determinate value that is amenable to summation. Consider, for example, (1) S is pleased that John is suffering. The Moorean is not committed to the view that “S is pleased” has a determinate value that can be summed with the values of the other parts of (1). More importantly, the Moorean can grant that the contributory value of a part can change in different contexts. It can also admit that there is often no clear non-arbitrary way to assign contributory value to a part. Still, the Moorean does not try to explain the intrinsic value of the whole as a sum of the contributory or intrinsic values of its parts. In contrast, to the extent that the Holist does try to explain the intrinsic value of alleged organic unities by claiming that the intrinsic values of the parts change, the fact there seems to be no non-arbitrary way of explaining which parts change intrinsic value or by how much poses a serious problem for Holism that it does not pose for the Moorean. At the very least, the supposed explanatory advantage of Holism over the Moorean position seems illusory.
One might reply that this objection rests upon a “fitting attitude analysis of intrinsic value” and, as such, it is dialectically problematic since some prominent defenders of holism reject such an analysis. But consider the case of pleasure in the bad. The objection assumes that (i) C’s disfavoring A’s being pleased is intrinsically bad, and that (ii) C’s disfavoring A’s being pleased is ethically inappropriate. The objection holds that the best explanation for (i) and (ii) is that A’s pleasure is intrinsically good. But none of this presupposes that a fitting attitude analysis of intrinsic value is true or that any particular analysis of intrinsic value is true. One can hold that there are significant connections between the intrinsic value of x and the fittingness or appropriateness of attitudes toward X without assuming that intrinsic value can be analyzed in terms of these attitudes. In sum, the objection does not assume that a fitting attitude analysis of intrinsic value is correct.
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Lemos, N. A Defense of Organic Unities. J Ethics 19, 125–141 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-015-9195-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-015-9195-4