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A Process Approach to the Utility for Gambling

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Abstract

This paper argues that any specific utility or disutility for gambling must be excluded from expected utility because such a theory is consequential while a pleasure or displeasure for gambling is a matter of process, not of consequences. A (dis)utility for gambling is modeled as a process utility which monotonically combines with expected utility restricted to consequences. This allows for a process (dis)utility for gambling to be revealed. As an illustration, the model shows how empirical observations in the Allais paradox can reveal a process disutility of gambling. A more general model of rational behavior combining processes and consequences is then proposed and discussed.

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Correspondence to Marc Le Menestrel.

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Le Menestrel, M. A Process Approach to the Utility for Gambling. Theory and Decision 50, 249–262 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010325930290

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010325930290

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