Abstract
This article compares the views of Foot and Aristotle on virtues and flourishing. It is argued that the view put forward in Philippa Foot’s recent book, Natural Goodness, suffers from a certain sort of vagueness and it is open to other criticisms which the Aristotelian view can avoid. Foot’s views have been subjected to criticism in the recent literature by David Copp and David Sobel. These criticisms are given consideration in the article and it is argued that the more traditional Aristotelian view advocated by the author will have the means to answer some of these criticisms whereas Foot’s view will not.
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Notes
Foot, P. (2001). Natural Goodness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This text will be referenced in the notes as NG.
Copp, D. & Sobel, D. (2004). Morality and virtue: An assessment of some recent work in virtue ethics. Ethics 114, 514–554. I will refer to this article and the authors in the text and notes as C&S.
NG, Ch. 2, esp. pp.28–32.
Ibid., p.33.
Ibid., p.15–16; 44.
Ibid., 42.
Ibid., p.43, my italics.
Ibid., p.44.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.42.
Ibid., pp.44–45.
Ibid., pp.45–46. See also Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981). On promising and its justice. In Collected philosophical papers, vol. iii (p.18). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Ibid., p.12.
Ibid.
It might be objected here that while Aristotle does distinguish between the strong willed person and the temperate person in the Nicomachean Ethics, Bk.VII Ch.7, this does not mean he believes this distinction holds with respect to the other virtues. That is, it may be that Aristotle believes there is no correlate to the strong willed person when one turns to contexts requiring courage or justice, etc.
This objection would, however, be misguided. If one bears in mind that (1) Aristotle regards virtues as settled states of character and (2) the fact that the distinction between the strong willed and temperate person transfers so well to other contexts, it is very reasonable to think Aristotle would accept the transference of this distinction to other contexts. For instance, one might distinguish between those who end up doing what justice and bravery require but who struggle with themselves to do so, feeling much stronger temptation to flee danger or cheat than do courageous and just persons. Such persons wouldn’t have the settled character required of virtue but through strength of will they may still do what is right.
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk.I Ch.4. This text will be referenced in the notes as NE. At the beginning of Bk.I Ch.4, he writes:
Let us resume our inquiry and state...what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another – and often even the same man identifies it with different things... [Ross trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.5].
NE, Bk.I Ch.7.
In NE, Bk. VI Ch.1–2, Aristotle writes:
...let us now draw a similar distinction within the part which grasps a rational principle. And let it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational principle – one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable, and one by which we contemplate variable things...Let one of these parts be called the scientific and the other calculative; for to deliberate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about the invariable. (Ross trans., p.138)
What is referred to here as the “scientific” part of our rationality is also known as “theoretical reason,” and the “calculative” part is practical reason.
See NE, Bk.X Ch.7–8. In Bk.X Ch.8, Aristotle states:
...the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness. (Ross trans., p.268)
Aristotle (1987), Nicomachean ethics, translated by David Ross, Bk.VII Ch.9, (p.181). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
In the NE, Bk.II Ch.9, Aristotle describes virtuous behavior as follows:
...anyone can get angry – that is easy – or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy... (trans. Ross).
See NE, Bk.X Ch.3. Aristotle states:
...no one would choose to live with the intellect of a child throughout his life, however much he were to be pleased at the things that children are pleased at, nor to get enjoyment by doing some most disgraceful deed, though he were never to feel any pain in consequence. (Ross trans., pp.253–254)
Kant writes:
Suppose then the mind of this friend of mankind to be clouded over with his own sorrow so that all sympathy with the lot of others is extinguished, and suppose him still to have the power to benefit others in distress, even though he is not touched by their troubles because he is sufficiently absorbed with his own; and now suppose that, even though no inclination moves him any longer, he nevertheless tears himself from this deadly insensibility and performs the action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty – then for the first time his action has genuine moral worth. [Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), p.11.]
The principle work of Foot under discussion in this essay, Natural Goodness, op.cit., is a book length defense of this Aristotelian approach to defining the virtues. For other book length defenses of this approach see: MacIntyre, A. (1984). After virtue. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press; Wallace J. (1978). Virtues and vices. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; and Foot, P. (1978). Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
See Blum, L. (1980). Friendship, altruism, and morality. London: Routledge.
See Blum, pp.142–143.
In the NE, Bk.I Ch.10, Aristotle writes:
Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; small pieces of good fortune or its opposite clearly do not weigh down the scales of life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events if they turn out well will make life more blessed..., while if they turn out ill they crush and maim blessedness; for they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities. [Aristotle (1987). Nicomachean ethics, trans. David Ross (p. 21). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.]
NG, p. 94–95.
See Hursthouse, R. (1999). On virtue ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
C&S, pp.534–535.
C&S, p.535.
NE, Bk.I Ch.7.
C&S, p.542.
C&S, pp.538–539.
In NE, Bk.II Ch.9, referring to virtue as the mean, or middle, Aristotle writes:
...it is no easy task to be good. For in every thing it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for everyone but for him who knows; so, too, anyone can get angry – that is easy – or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble. [Aristotle (1987). Nicomachean ethics, trans. David Ross (p. 45). Oxford: Oxford University Press.]
I would also note that Aristotle believes the godlike life of contemplation is virtuous, but it too is uncommon.
The Aristotelian view that I defend here has also been defended in the recent literature by Thomas Hurka. See Hurka, T. (1993) Perfectionism New York: Oxford University Press. For criticisms of the Aristotelian view see Suits, B. (1974) Aristotle and the function of man: Fallacies, heresies, and other entertainments. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4, 23–40; and more recently Kitcher, P. (1999) Essence and perfection. Ethics 110, 59–83. For a reply to Kitcher, see Byron, M. (2000) Virtue and the reductivist challenge. Contemporary Philosophy 22, 34–41. Some of the issues I consider in this section are discussed in these articles.
I offer more extensive support for the compatibility of Aristotelian virtue ethics and Darwinism in my Commonsense Darwinism (forthcoming Open Court Press). For another defense of a Darwinian approach to Aristotelian ethics see Arnhart, L. (1998) Darwinian natural right: The biological ethics of human nature. Albany, NY: The SUNY Press.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this journal for his/her various useful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
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Lemos, J. Foot and Aristotle on Virtues and Flourishing. Philosophia 35, 43–62 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9049-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9049-9