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Contracting Responsibility

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Moral Responsibility and Ontology

Part of the book series: Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy ((LOET,volume 7))

Abstract

Most of us most of the time hold most people responsible for most of their actions. We allow that there are certain conditions in which the character of an action may excuse or the character of an agent exempt the agent from being so held responsible. To hold responsible for some action someone who adequately satisfies some exempting or excusing condition would, we believe, be unfair.

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References

  1. R. Jay Wallace: Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments ( Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1994 ), 16–17.

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  2. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, chapter 4.

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  3. P. F. Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’ in his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays ( London: Methuen, 1974 ).

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  4. Mind 90, 1981. Also in John Fischer and Mark Ravizza (eds.): Perspectives on Moral Responsibility ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993 ).

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  5. Ibid., 118 (of Fischer and Ravizza reprint).

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  6. Freedom and Resentment’ 13.

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  7. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 102.

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  8. Freedom and Resentment’, 23.

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  9. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 157–161.

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  10. Ibid., 182.

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  11. I have discussed how far we should worry about such contingency in my ‘Michael Smith and the Daleks: Reason, Morality and Contingency’, Utilitas, forthcoming.

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  12. I am indebted to many people for feedback on this contribution — notably Robert Audi, Paul Brownsey, Anthony Duff, Brad Hooker, Peter van Inwagen, Dudley Knowles, Maggie Little, Angus McKay, Paul Russell, Angie Smith, Michael Smith, Elizabeth Telfer and Jay Wallace. Many thanks to all.

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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Lenman, J. (2000). Contracting Responsibility. In: van den Beld, T. (eds) Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2361-9_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2361-9_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5435-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2361-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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